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LEARNING FROM COLLEAGUES: A CASE
STUDY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
"ACADEMIC" AND "ECOLOGICAL"
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
RoBERT

J.

CoNDLIN*

INTRODUCfiON

From the beginning of its resurgence in the 1960s, the clinical
movement in American legal education has been driven by a kind of
"academic" perspective. 1 Emphasizing the necessary relationship be* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Work on this article was
supported by grants from the University of Maryland Law School Foundation, for which I
am grateful. In addition, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the Mid-Atlantic clinical
teachers (at a meeting at the University of Baltimore Law School), and the anonymous
readers of the article in manuscript form for this Review, whose comments improved the
discussion considerably.
1 Programs in and arguments about clinical legal education go back at least to the
1930s, see, e.g., JohnS. Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 1
U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1933); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA.
L. REv. 107 (1933); George K. Gardiner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?-Some Reflections, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 785 (1934); Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with SoCalled Legal Education, 35 CoLuM. L. REv. 651 (1935), and have been a regular feature of
law school discourse about the curriculum since then. See, e.g., CLINICAL EDUCATION AND
THE Law ScHOOL OF THE FUTURE (Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1970) (The University of Chicago Law School Conference Series No. 20); RoBERT STEVENS, LAw ScHooL: LEGAL EDucATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 213-16 (1983); Gary Bellow, On
Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE
SETTING 374 (Working Papers for CLEPR National Conference 1973); Arch M. Cantrall,
Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?, 38 A.B.A.J. 907 (1952);
Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 20 (1951}; Jerome Frank,
A Plea for Lawyer Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current
Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDuc. 211 (1948); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Place of
Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 345 (1945); Joseph A. McClain, Jr., Is Legal
Education Doing Its Job? A Reply, 39 A.B.A.J. 120 (1953); Carl McGowan, The University
Law School and Practical Education, 65 A.B.A.J. 374 (1979). See also Robert Macerate,
Keynote Address-The 21st Century Lawyer: Is There a Gap to Be Narrowed?, 69 WASH. L.
REv. 517, 519-21 (1994) (describing the history of the skills debate and its place in the
development of modern American legal education).
The flurry of interest in the topic in the last thirty years represents only the most
recent discussion of the subject. In one sense, of course, all discussions of the curriculum
of the modern law school go back, if not to Langdell, at least to Josef Redlich and Alfred
Reed, see STEVENS, supra, at 112-23 (1983); John J. Costonis, The Macerate Report: Of
Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL Eouc. 157, 15773 (1993}, but it was in the 1930s that law professors started to argue about skills instruction in the law journals in modern day terms. One of the perhaps surprising things about
this debate is how little if at all the arguments for and against clinical instruction have
337
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tween theory and practice, the central role of ideas in the development of behavioral competence, and the importance of the intellectual
dimension of professional socialization, this perspective has shaped
not only the intellectual content of most American clinical legal education, but also its programmatic structure. Academic clinical instruction is characterized by a commitment to supervision by full-time law
faculty, on cases selected principally for their educational value, based
in law offices established in and controlled by law schools (the socalled in-house ,clinic),2 ~o help students acquire a critical and selfconscious understanding of lawyer skill practice, as much- as, if not
more than, a mastery of those practices in their own right.3 While
changed over the years. For example, compare the "modem" arguments of William Pincus
with the "antiquarian" ones of Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn above. See, e.g., William
Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Education, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 283
(1971). Prominent members of the bar and highly respected legal academics have championed the clinical education cause, and numerous ABA, ALI and AALS studies and reports
have been produced to provide supporting evidence. For a complete list of the studies and
reports, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 341-43 (1992) [hereinafter MAcCRATE REPORT]. Supporters include former Presidents of the American Bar Association (Talbot D'Alemberte,
a member of the Macerate Task Force), well known and highly respected judges (Jerome
Frank, and any of the several on the Macerate Task Force), and professors at elite law
schools (Karl Llewellyn, and any of the several on the Macerate Task Force).
2 In contrast, the American Bar Association ·defines "field placement program" and
"extemship" as "any ... program in which actual rendition of legal services or other legal
activity are used and in which full time members of the faculty are not ultimately responsible for the quality of the service or other activity." See Robert F. Seibel & Linda H.
Morton, Field Placement Programs: Practices, Problems and Possibilities, 2 CLIN. L. REv.
413, 413 n.2 (1996) (quoting Memorandum from James P. White, Consultant on Legal Education to the American Bar Association, to Members of Site Evaluation Team at 15 (Sept.
1988)).
3 Understanding skill is a higher priority than mastering it, because skill mastery is not
a realistic possibility in so short a period of time as a semester. Skill is ultimately based on
habit, and the acquisition of habit is too complicated a process to be completed in a semester. Accord James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation
Clinic, 2 CuN. L. REv. 457,463 (1996) ("students ... barely begin to discover their sea legs
... when the semester comes to an end"); see also James E. Molitemo, An Analysis of
Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the
Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 83, 94-96 (1991) (summarizing debate over the
question of whether it is possible for law schools to teach values).
The "critical" understanding of practice that students are to achieve extends to, and in
part is based upon, students' critical evaluation of their own performances. Students are
expected to engage in "critical self-reflection," and clinical courses to contain a "reflection" component. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Improving the Practice of
Law, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 385,393-97 (1996); Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 419-20 ("placement teachers ... teach ... students to use their fieldwork experiences to learn reflective
thinking"); Abbe Smith, Carrying On in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense Is Not So
Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 723, 728 (1995) ("the mantra of clinical
pedagogy [is) reflect, reflect, reflect"); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the
Field? On Mapping the Paths From Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 157, 170 (1994)
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many forces contributed to its ascendancy, the academic perspective
grew principally out of the lessons learned by clinical teachers from
the failure of the apprenticeship (now called externship) method of
clinical instruction, popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, to gain widespread acceptance in law schools.
In apprenticeship instruction, students worked under the tutelage
of practicing lawyers, in law offices located outside of the law school,
on whatever cases came in the door. They followed conventionally
accepted conceptions of lawyer skill passed on by their lawyer supervisors, and analyzed these skill conceptions critically and self-consciously only when · economic, ideological, aesthetic and practical
considerations permitted, which usually was not often. 4 In the eyes of
("Reflection must be central to ... a clinic's work because the fundamental goal of the
clinic itself is to build theory .... "). On the particular importance of critical reflection to
clinical study, see David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 63 (1995) ("Precisely because clinical education
is a more powerful cultivator of affect and judgment than the classroom, it runs a heightened danger of being a corrupter of youth unless clinicians systematically build into their
teaching the capacity for reflection and self-critique .... "). I argued for the importance of
a critical perspective in clinical study myself a few years ago, in an article that might have
been read more receptively if it had been given a different title. See Robert J. Condlin,
"Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL
Eouc. 45, 77-78 (1986).
4 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, traditional apprenticeship instruction and
today's academic clinical instruction differ in the importance they accord "learning to
learn" in their respective conceptions of the law practice subject matter. The academic
perspective makes learning to learn a practice skill in its own right, nearly equal in importance to the more traditional skills of interviewing, negotiating, examining witnesses, arguing to courts, and the like. Drawing on the literature of social and cognitive psychology,
academic clinicians and their students sometimes study themselves learning almost as much
as they study the legal work they produce, to determine what kinds of persons they are
becoming as much as how well they are performing as lawyers. They move regularly in and
out of lawyer role, asking both what should be done and how that decision was made,
focusing equally on both outcome and process.
Apprenticeship was far less self-conscious about the way it operated. For apprenticeship students, critical reflection meant asking about the best way to gain a strategic advantage against an adversary, or the best way to perform a particular tactical maneuver, and
not about the kinds of persons they were becoming. They were less interested in the nature of the work relationships they formed than in the nature of the work they did for
clients.
The difference between these two approaches is not that one method is intellectually
sophisticated and the other not, though this is often how they are differentiated. Apprenticeship instruction, usually stereotyped as the less intellectual~ can be quite complicated
and difficult, challenging the most intelligent of students and teachers-as clinical scholarship focusing on similarly "practical" concerns reflects. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 612 (1984)
(describing a conception of clinical instruction based on ends-means or instrumental thinking); Paul D. Reingold, Why Hard Cases Make Good (Clinical) Law, 2 CLJN. L. REv. 545
(1996) (describing an intellectually challenging clinical program based on the apprenticeship model). Rather, the difference is just that each has a different conception of the law
practice subject matter. Apprenticeship instruction asked what works, and academic
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·most traditional law teachers apprenticeship was a kind of glorified
bookkeeping, in which students performed menial, repetitive and intellectually unchallenging tasks, in an unreflective, unsupervised and
imitative fashion. It was thought more a system for providing cheap,
exploitable labor to law firms than a method for teaching students
about the practice of law. 5 One could debate the accuracy of this
view, but accurate or not, it pervaded the legal academy.
To differentiate themselves from apprenticeship instruction
clinical educators emphasized their commitment to ideas and theory.
Modern clinical education, it was said, would teach students how lawyer skill practices were constituted, how they intersected with and
helped define substantive legal rights and obligations, and how lawyer
skill, as an independent variable, contributed to the just and fair operation of the American legal system. Teaching a politics of law practice
as well as ·a technique, clinical educators promised to produce a socalled "reflective practitioner," 6 someone able to perform the interpersonal tasks of law practice with sensitivity, dexterity and grace, but
at the same time someone also sufficiently understanding of and distant from those tasks to be able to analyze them critically, both to
know when individual performances had failed, and when prevailing
conceptions of good practice needed to be changed.?
clinical education asks, in addition, how that is known.
5 See STEVENs, supra note 1, at 10-11 nn.5 & 6. Stevens quotes an 1881 ABA Report
describing the experience of being an apprentice as follows:
The applicant for admission spends a year or two thumbing Blackstone or Kent, or
both, with now and then a dip into Chitty or Starkie, in the lonesome, dusty, dreary
round of a country attorney's office, where he was left to work his way as best he
could with little to guide him except his common sense (which was often no guidance
at all). He may have asked a few vague questions and received a few vague answers.
Id. at 30 n.28 (quoting J.A. Hutchinson, Appendix to the Report of the Committee on Legal
Education, 4 ABA REP. 278 (1981)).
6 The term is Donald SchOn's, and the idea behind it comes from the work of Sch<Jn
and Chris Argyris. See CHRIS ARGYRIS & DoNALD A. ScHON, THEORY IN PRAcrrcE
(1974); CHRIS ARGYRIS, INCREASING LEADERSHIP EFFECfiVENESS (1976); DONALD A.
ScHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRAcrrnoNER (1984); DoNALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THEREFLECriVE PRACfiTIONER (1987); Donald A. Sch<Jn, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 231 (1995). Argyris and Schtln's work, in turn, can be traced to that
of Leon Festinger. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1956).
7 The principal attraction of the academic perspective was its ability to meet head-on
the traditional law teacher concern about incorporating overly vocational instruction into
the legal curriculum. Insecure about their own place in the academy, traditional law teachers were fearful of adding new members to their ranks who would be thought more suspect
intellectually than themselves. Any program of legal instruction, or group of legal instructors, resurrecting the specter of unreflective, unsupervised and uncritical law practice triggered this fear, and because of this, was almost certain to fail. Whatever else it aspired to
be, clinical education could not be apprenticeship reincarnate. The emphasis on "academics" by the new clinical teacher class held out the promise (or perhaps just the hope) that
this would not happen.
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The academic perspective has held up well. It remains the preferred view of most clinicians, continues to define the structure of
most clinical programs, and is still the central element in modern
clinical pedagogy. 8 There have always been dissenters, of course,
some explicitly disavowing the perspective,9 and others claiming to
have adopted it but whose actual programs may belie the claim.1o But
for most clinicians the superiority of the academic (as opposed to apprenticeship) approach to clinical instruction has not been a matter
for serious debate for a long time.
Recently, this received wisdom was seriously challenged with the
publication of two important articles championing the virtues of externship-based clinical instruction. The first was Stephen Maher's
unapologetic and provocative The Praise of Folly.1 1 In an intelligent if
sometimes overstated manner, Maher made a strong case for the
claim that outside law offices are at least as effective an instructional
environment for teaching legal practice skills as in-house clinics.
Maher's arguments created a minor stir in parts of the clinical community and reactions were mixed, though when the dust had settled, it is
probably fair to say that few clinicians thought any less of the aca8 Robert Stevens has likened an early version of this approach-a view that made
clinical instruction synonymous with student practice and ruled out instruction based on
simulation exercises, in-court observations, and the like-to a "compulsory chapel" perspective. See Robert Stevens, Preface, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 689, 692-94. The phrase captures much of the intensity of many of those early discussions.
9 Gary Palm is one who has always struck me as being more interested in practicing
well with students than studying that practice from some theoretical perspective. See Gary
Palm, Reconceptualizing Clinical Scholarship as Clinical Instruction, 1 CuN. L. REv. 127
(1994).
10 Ironically, Gary Bellow's program at Harvard Law School, in which I was a teaching
fellow in the early 1970s, gave practicing well a higher priority than reflecting on practice
learning. In meetings with students, the program's teaching fellow and practitioner supervisors usually took up critical questions last, if at all, and when they did the questions
typically had more to do with lawyering strategy than student development or studentsupervisor interaction. I recall this as being the cause of mild embarrassment among some
of the teaching fellows at the time, and the inspiration for several in-jokes about "reflection." It was ironic because Professor Bellow was one of the first and most important
champions of the academic perspective, and never more so than when I was in the program. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 1. This should not be taken as a criticism of the program. It was terrific-the best I have ever seen.
11 See Stephen T. Maher, The Praise of Folly: A Defense of Practice Supervision in
Clinical Legal Education, 69 NEB. L. REv. 538 (1990). Maher was not the first to defend
externship instruction, or to describe the qualities of a successful externship program in
detail, see, e.g., Janet Motley, Self-Directed Learning and the Out-of-House Placement, 19
N.M. L. REv. 211 (1989); Henry Rose, Legal Externships: Can They Be Valuable Clinical
Experiences for Law Students?, 12 NovA L. REv. 95 (1987); Marc Stickgold, Exploring the
Invisible Curriculum: Clinical Field Work in American Law Schools, 19 N.M. L. REv. 287
(1989), but he was the first to mount an unapologetic all-out assault on the academic perspective in the process of doing so. He forced the issue more aggressively than did any of
his predecessors.
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demic approach, or felt any less committed to the in-house clinic. 12
As it turned out, however, this was just the opening ex~;hange.
The critique of the academic perspective intensified with the publication by Brook Baker and his colleagues at Northeastern University
Law School, of their daunting and forcefully argued Learning
Through WorkP Articulating a theory of "ecological learning,"
based on a body of research grounded in various forms of educational
and cognitive psychology, Baker and his colleagues revived the case
for externship instruction with gusto, arguing that "the [outside law
office] practice setting may be the optimal place to ·learn lawyering
skills." 14 Rejecting two foundational beliefs of the academic perspective, that students learn practice skills best from full-time law teachers,
and that in learning skills an explicit understanding of theory is prior
to and more important than experience, Baker and his colleagues
claimed that "work experiences are already educationally rich," 15 and
"are at least as important as any aspect of supervision in explaining
what distinguishes a good learning environment" from a bad one. 16
12 Maher describes the nature of in-house clinician resistance to extemship instruction,
and the obstacles placed in his path by the ABA and AALS while he was writing his
article. See Maher, supra note 11, at 640-48. Many clinical readers of the present article in
manuscript form have assured me that the historical antipathy of in-house clinicians for
extemship instruction is a thing of the past, and that the in-house/externship distinction no
longer exists in any tangible form. Perhaps this is right, but I am not convinced. Maher's
difficulties with the clinical establishment are not all that distant, and my own more recent
experiences are similarly mixed. For example, more than a few in-house clinical readers of
the article have told me that they do not like externship programs, and never will. In
addition, at Maryland (and I suspect other schools as well}, externship programs are not
directed by anyone designated or thought of as a clinical teacher, and none of the programs
is thought to be part of the clinical curriculum. No doubt clinicians' views on this issue are
more varied now than in the early 1970s, but my own take on the issue is that most of the
change has been at the margin.
13 See Daniel J. Givelber, Brook K. Baker, John McDevitt & Robyn Miliano, Learning
Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal Internship, 45 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 (1995); see
also Seibel & Morton, supra note 2 (also defending externship instruction). I refer to the
Northeastern group as "Brook Baker and his colleagues" because the Learning Through
Work piece is based .on a series of earlier articles Baker wrote by himself. See Givelber et
al., supra, at 2 n.2. It is not surprising to find a defense of externship instruction coming
from Northeastern. The school is defined by its reliance on extemship instruction. Its
"one semester in school, one semester out" format is what makes the school distinctive.
But this is not an objection to the Northeastern argument. Good arguments are good
arguments whatever the motivation, and necessity is often the mother of invention. Moreover, Northeastern's reliance· on this approach also means that its faculty have more experience with it than most of their counterparts at other schools.
14 See id. at 3.
15 Id. at 2.
16 Id. at 3. Given the timing of their article, Baker and his colleagues ended up challenging not just the popular academic perspective and in-house clinic, but also the MacCrate Report, the American Bar Association and clinical establishment's recent blueprint
for clinical education. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 1. The Macerate Report ratifies the academic perspective, perhaps with a vengeance (though it may be read more
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Because it avoids the anti-practitioner bias and intellectual hubris
that sometimes go hand-in-hand with the academic perspective,l? the
theory of ecological learning, or at least its underlying spirit, has a
certain appeal. It provides a fresh and interesting argument for the
attractiveness of externship instruction, and introduces a new and sophisticated body of non-legal scholarship into clinical writing in the
course of making this argument. These are considerable accomplishments. On the other hand, the world of law office practice, like any
social system, has its vulgarities, mistaken skill notions, and untrustworthy exemplars, and experiencing it in an unexpurgated or uninterbenignly than this, see Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 448), so that to advocate an
ecological (i.e., apprenticeship) approach after this report is, in some ways, to draw swords
with the most powerful forces in clinical education today. Learning Through Work is nervous about Macerate, but acknowledges that the Report's implications still remain "obscure." See Givelber et al., supra note 13, at 2 n.3. Others also have expressed concern
about the "increasing ... specificity" of ABA accreditation standards for externship programs, arguing that the content of these standards is wrong headed. See Seibel & Morton,
supra, at 414-17, 440-41. My own view is that there are fundamental problems with the
Macerate Report. See Robert J. eondlin, MacScholarship: (Yet) Another Perspective on
the Macerate Report, and the Tortured Relationship Between Lawyering Skills and Legal
Education (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Given the steady student
demand for practice instruction, however, and the shrinking pool of law school resources
from which to fund it, the relatively cheap externship format is likely to be around for the
foreseeable future. Whatever its theoretical implications, the Macerate Report is too
practical a document to be meant to dislodge this reality.
17 This Article is not an argument against the academic perspective per se. As I have
already mentioned, I advocated a critical perspective in clinical education years ago, see
eondlin, supra note 3. While it is true that I also criticized some versions of the academic
perspective in the Tastes Great article, I nonetheless emphasized the importance of an academic dimension to clinical instruction, and do so again in this Article. Indeed, the central
point of that article was to argile that practice skills might be best understood and learned
in ordinary law office settings, since an externship teacher who-unlike an in-house clinician-is not directly involved in the work of representation is likely to be more able to
provide a full critique of the student's experiences. See id. at 53-59, 63-73. The problem I
see is not with the academic perspective itself, but with the forms into which it is sometimes
twisted.
Specifically, I am concerned with the caricatured version of this perspective used by
some to weed out what they take to be intellectually non-rigorous approaches to clinical
instruction. Used as litmus paper rather than as an analytical tool, the academic perspective has caused some in clinical education to miss the value (including the academic value)
in non-law school based approaches to practice instruction. Maher's experience with
clinical teachers in writing his article provides a recent example of such behavior, see
Maher, supra note 11, at 640-48, and I have run into the same weeding-out sentiment
repeatedly throughout my more than twenty years of externship teaching. See note 12

supra.
The theory of ecological learning is also appealing for the tacit respect it shows for
legal practitioners. While no one would deny that practitioners are not always "all that
they can be" (indeed, later in the Article I provide several case studies of less than perfect
practitioner behavior), lawyers as a group understand practice behavior. with as much intelligence, sophistication, and insight as clinical (including externship) teachers. Some understand a little more and some a little less, but I have found that to be the case with ourselves
as well.
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preted form sometimes can teach the wrong lessons. That it
sometimes teaches the wrong lessons has been a recurrent objection
to externship instruction, and it is one that the theory of ecological
learning must deal with adequately if it is to revive the fortunes of that
venerable methodology.
Whether Learning Through Work meets this test is not yet clear.
The argument for ecological learning is ambiguous at several key
points, so that it is often difficult to determine what the theory
prescribes, or why it prescribes it,1 8 But more importantly for present
18 For example, I am not clear on what the following prescription for dealing with the
risk of students' learning bad habits of practice from their placements actually envisions:
Despite the learning potential inherent in contextualized experience, mere experience is no guarantee of competence, let alone expertise. One explanation of duffers
is the cognitive acceptability of suboptimal methods that are nonetheless viable internally for the duffer and externally within the larger social domain. To countermand minimal viability requires increasing a sense of engagement and increasing the
potential for connection and integration. These two features, engagement and.cognitive integration, battle suboptimality by creating a positive sense of functional
competence.
Givelber et a!., supra note 13, at 11 n.43 (citations omitted).
The argument for ecological learning is also flawed by its reliance on potentially misleading data derived from student opinion surveys. In discussing whether students are capable of "evaluating their own learning," see id. at 20-22, a critical issue for an analysis
based on student opinion survey data, Learning Through Work does not distinguish between whether students are good empiricists (i.e., whether they collect data about what
they do accurately), and whether they are good theoreticians (i.e., whether they evaluate
what they do against sophisticated conceptions of lawyering skill practice). The instrument
used to survey student opinion does not inquire about these two subjects separately, or
provide an independent source of factual information about student practice from which to
check the accuracy of the students' overall conclusions. It is not possible for a reader to
tell, therefore, whether the students' almost uniformly favorable evaluations of their externship experiences make sense. While the evaluations may be consistent with the students' overall impressions of what happened, these impressions may not have a close
connection with what actually went on, or be the best interpretations to be given those
experiences. The case studies in Part III of this Article illustrate how this can happen. See
also Richard E. Nisbet & nmothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PsYCH. REv. 231 (1977); David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker,
Matchmaker: Student Collaboration in Clinical Programs, 1 CuN. L. REv. 199, 230-32
(1994) (discussing methodology issues in gathering data on student clinical learning).
This failure to be more empirical opens up the Northeastern group to one of the criticisms it levels at academic clinicians. Baker and his colleagues debunk the preference for
in-house clinics as a kind of article of faith, unsupported by hard evidence about which
practice settings work best for clinical instruction. Yet the failure to evaluate their own
survey data from a perspective outside of that data gives their view an article of faith
quality of its own. No doubt students learn something when they are immersed in any
setting, but what they learn, and whether it is worthwhile, are different questions which
must be examined separately. The. Northeastern group acknowledges that students may
not be the best judges of what they have learned (and, one could add, whether it was
desirable to have learned it), but concludes that the students must be taken at their word
nevertheless because there is no realistic alternative. See Givelber et al., supra, at 21. This
conclusion seems premature. The case study data of Part III provide some evidence of
what students learn from externships, and there are others working with different method-
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purposes, the argument is based on what looks to be at best an incomplete, and at worst an inaccurate, understanding of the manner in
which externship learning takes place. Until these, and no doubt
other, difficulties are worked out, an endorsement of ecological learning must necessarily remain qualified. This article is about some of
those qualifications. With considerable hesitation, but more empathy,
I want to tell a cautionary tale about taking ecological learning, in its
present form, too literally. I do so in the spirit of the theory itself,
which calls for further study of law office learning, based on different
perspectives and new types of data. 19
My conclusions are simple and uncontroversially stated. Students
do not invariably learn effective practice skills working in outside law
offices; sometimes they just "practice their mistakes," 20 and those of
their offices. Because these mistakes often have identifiable patterns
likely to be more visible to someone looking at the work from an academic perspective, and because identifying these patterns would help
improve the work, there is a complementarity to the academic and
ecological perspectives which suggests the need for both in a program
for teaching lawyer skills. Since most instructional methodologies are
more complementary than antagonistic, however, this is not likely to
be news. The more important point is that there are simple, easily
implemented methods for combining the two approaches, methods
that do not create logistical nightmares, impose impossible work burdens on supervisors, or introduce unacceptable financial costs. This
Article describes one such method.
I will explain my concerns about ecological learning in the context of a discussion of the subject of learning from colleagues. This is
an unusual subject, so I should say a little about why I have chosen it.
Lawyers and law students, indeed workers of all types, have more and
better ideas for improving their work when they are able to draw on
the experiences and insights of others who understand and do the
same kind of work. The ability to look at familiar problems through
different lenses, and without being committed to and emotionally inologies who have made additional progress on this question as well. It is too soon to throw
up one's hands on this methodological problem. Once an empirical question is identified,
methodologies for investigating it always emerge. (I understand that the Northeastern
group itself is now at work on this project.)
19 See id. at 47. The Article is also prompted, in part, by a quick and compressed reading of all of the back issues of the Clinical Law Review. I was impressed with what a good
journal it has become, and how it is doing for clinical scholarship what the Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics has done for legal ethics scholarship, that is, providing an intellectually sophisticated outlet for writing that has a difficult time finding sympathetic readers
on editorial boards of more general purpose journals.
20 I first learned this expression from a piano teacher, but it captures a distinct phenomenon in the study of all kinds of skill.
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vested in choices already made, often frees others to identify and suggest courses of conduct that persons principally responsible for the
work would never see. Since there is a professional obligation to work
competently for clients,21 being able to draw out and run with others'
insights and experiences is not an optional or inconsequential practice
skill. It is an essential component of professional practice. 22
The importance of the subject notwithstanding, legal academics
do not write much about learning from colleagues. This is a little surprising given the interest in anthropological, ethnographic, feminist
and narrative approaches to legal scholarship generally, but it is true
nonetheless. 23 The subject of lawyer interpersonal interaction has not
21 The professional obligation to work competently for clients is found in Model Rule
1.1. See MoDEL RuLES oF PROFESSIONAL CoNover Rule 1.1 (1983) ("competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation").
22 Accord Jane H. Aiken, David A. Koplow, Lisa G. Lerman, J.P. Ogilvy, & .Philip G.
Schrag, The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 Mo. L. REv. 1047, 1055 (1985)
("Collaboration takes more time than individual work, but it produces better results
.... "). But see Chavkin, supra note 18, at 204-08 (summarizing the "available empirical
research on the impact of collaboration on work product [as] extremely inconsistent"). In
addition to the benefits it provides for client representation, being able to learn ·from the
different ideas and experiences of others helps lawyers grow and develop in all facets of
their lives, including the personal. Others (not all of them, of course) are often in the best
position to help one get beyond expectations, beliefs, assumptions and biases, to determine
whether what one did is what one wanted to do, and whether, on reflection, it makes sense
to want to do that. Professor Chavkin discusses this full range of benefits in detail. ld. at
208-19.
23 Learning from colleagues is a common subject of analysis in fields other than law.
The work of Chris Argyris and Donald SchC>n, supra note 6, for example, is only a small
part of the organizational psychology literature on the subject, and in linguistics the work
of Deborah Tannen and the small industry that has grown up around her writing provide
another famous example. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5 (1994). I
have already indicated that I find the Argyris and Schl:in work helpful, and draw on it to a
considerable extent. Professor Tannen's work is equally insightful, and never more so than
early in her career when she published her Ph.D. thesis, analyzing patterns in the conversations at a Thanksgiving dinner party she attended with five of her friends. DEBORAH TAN·
NEN, CoNVERSATIONAL STYLE: ANALYZING TALK AMONG FRIENDS (1984).
In this first full articulation of her conceptual framework, Professor Tannen used
mostly behavioral language to categorize communicative practices (the number and timing
of interruptions, length of statements, responsiveness of remarks, and the like), rather than
the gender-based categories which have come to be associated with some of her more
recent and more widely known work. See, e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DIS·
COURSE (1994); TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5, supra; DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST
DoN'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990). The index to Conversational Style, for example, contains only two one-page entries, in total, for the topics of
"men," "women," and "gender," but eight entries for "amplitude," fourteen for "intonation," thirteen for "pause," eleven for "rate of speech," eight for "rhythm," eight for "syntax," twelve for "topic," and so on.
I find these earlier behavioral categories more descriptive, less confusing, and easier to
operationalize than their gender equivalents. Cf, e.g., Gay Gellhorn, Lynne Robins & Pat
Roth, Law and Language: An Interdisciplinary Study of Client Interviews, 1 CLIN. L. REv.
245 (1994) (linguistic analysis using equivalent behavioral categories); Linda F. Smith, In-
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been ignored altogether. For example, there is a small but intelligent
body of literature on inter-disciplinary collaboration, showing how difficult it can sometimes be for lawyers to coordinate their efforts with
other types of professionals who understand the world through different diagnostic categories. 24 This is a more esoteric and complicated
colleague communication problem, however, than the relatively simple one presented when persons trained only in law attempt to learn
from one another.
There is also a much larger body of writing on in-house clinical
supervision discussing, among other things, how clinical teachers
should speak with students in reviewing clinical work. 25 This literature overlaps extensively with the subject of learning from colleagues,
but it also differs from it in significant respects. Clinical supervisory
relationships tend to be defined and understood explicitly in teacherstudent terms, and are likely to have instruction as their major if not
exclusive goal. Law office relationships involve a more complicated
mix of roles and relations, both work and social, and conv~rsation
serves a wider variety of ends than teaching and learning. The relationships are similar in many respects, but they are not the same. 26
terviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the "Traditional" Interview and the "ClientCentered" Interview, 1 CuN. L. REv. 541 {1995) (same). For example, Professor Tannen's
own communicative style, described in detail in her write-up of the Thanksgiving dinner
party, would be more masculine than feminine under a more gendered conceptual scheme,
and the styles of some of her male friends would be more feminine than masculine. (See,
e.g., her discussion of the "enthusiasm constraint," and "the machine-gun question," in
Conversational Style, supra, at 58-71.) When female is male and male female in this way,
gender-based categories lose much of their analytical and descriptive power. This is not to
say, however, that men and women behave toward one another in the same way. Often,
they do not. See TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5, supra, at 242-76 {chapter on "What's Sex
Got To Do With It").
24 See, e.g., Saul W. Baerstein, Functional Relations Between Law and Psychiatry-A
Study of Characteristics Inherent in Professional Interaction, 23 J. LEGAL Eouc. 399 {1971 );
J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REv. 741 {1988).
25 See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 1; Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical
Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REv. 321 (1982); Robert J. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes:
Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Mo. L. REv. 223
(1981); Peter T. Hoffman, The Stages of the Clinical Supervisory Relationship, 4 ANTIOCH
L.J. 301 (1986); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyering Competency: The
Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 Mo. L. REv. 284 (1981); Michael Meltsner, James V. Rowan & Daniel J.
Givelber, The Bike Tour Leader's Dilemma: Talking About Supervision, 13 VT. L. REv. 399
{1989).
26 There is also a body of literature on teaching outside lawyers to supervise extemship
students. See, e.g., Liz R. Cole, Training the Mentor: Improving the Ability of Legal Experts
to Teach Students and New Lawyers, 19 N.M. L. REv. 163 (1989). This work fuses the two
supervisory relationships into a hybrid middle category, which might lead to the best of all
possible worlds-if the perspectives of practicing lawyer and academic critic can be
fused-or the worst-if the result is only that supervisors attempt to do too many different
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Even in the feminist and communitarian literature, where there is
a longstanding interest in cooperative, bilateral, and mutually reinforcing modes of interaction, learning from colleagues is discussed infrequently and usually only in passing. Feminist and communitarian
scholarship is interested more in issues of lawyer-client relationships
(such as reducing lawyer domination of client choices, helping lawyers
express client stories in the clients' own voices, and the like), and of
adversary advocacy (for example, ameliorating the wasteful and harmful effects of zero-sum and competitive approaches to dispute resolution), than it is in issues about how lawyers learn from one anotherP
Each of these is an important subject in its own right, of course, and
· all are closely related, but they are discrete subjects nonetheless. The
often compelling, though perhaps also beguiling, narratives of feminist
scholarship rarely speak directly to the problem of learning from colleagues,28 and the lessons this literature may suggest for this particular
things, and not any of them very well, at once.
Sometimes the supervision literature gets very interesting. The most famous example
is the exchange between Robert Rader and Abbe Smith in the pages of this journal, see
Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A Clinic Student's Reflection on Representing Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 1 CuN. L. REv. 299 (1994); Smith, supra note 3, about the frustrations (Rader's) of working with a supervisor (Smith), among other things. The exchange is
marked by a level of insight, strong feeling, articulateness, and candor that is rare in this
kind of writing, making one think more rather than less of the participants for having
spoken up. Rader's complaints are not idiosyncratic, and Smith's sympathetic understanding of them, while still pointing out where they go wrong, would make any supervisor
proud. The two articles are an exemplar of student-supervisor conversation at its most
sophisticated level. All teachers and students should be so sharp (in both senses of the
term).
Mary 1\vitchell also has written an interesting article on a related subject, see Mary
1\vitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 77 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1988), and
clinical students sometimes write insightfully about the experience of working with other
students. See, e.g., Jennifer Howard, Learning to "Think like a Lawyer" Through Experience, 2 CuN. L. REv. 167 (1995).
27 See, e.g., Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992); Margaret Martin Barry, Clinical Supervision:
Walking That Fine Line, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 137 (1995); Nancy Cook, Legal Fictions: Clinical
Experiences, Lace Collars, and Boundless Stories, 1 CuN. L. REv. 41 (1994); Stephen
Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665 (1993); Theresa
Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of
Feminism and Clinical Education, 15 MINN. L. REv. 1559 (1991); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BuFF. L.
REv. 71 (1996); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: Practice-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61
BROOK. L. REv. 889 (1995); Linda Morton, Creating a Classroom Component for Field
Placement Programs: Enhancing Clinical Goals with Feminist Pedagogy, 45 ME. L. REv. 19
(1993); Lucie White, supra note 3; Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
28 This new writing, characteristically in the form of richly annotated ethnographies of
law practice, is about colleague relationships in only the most indirect and attenuated
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problem may be ambiguous.29
sense. Its central concerns have to do with the elements of living well as a lawyer, treating
other people (mostly clients) humanely, pursuing justice before material or reputational
success, and living full emotional, social and intellectual lives. It draws on the insights and
methods of developmental psychology, narrative jurisprudence, communitarian social theory, social anthropology and the like, to shift the scholarly focus from anonymous people
and events in the aggregate, to the stories of individual lives. These stories are often
deeply moving, using real-person vantage points on the operation of the legal system to
show how neutral rules do not always produce fair or just results, how institutional and
systemic failure is rampant, and how professional behavior sometimes aggravates these
problems more than it alleviates them.
It is usually persuasive in the way that good story-telling ought to be, though in this it
is more a literature of argument than analysis (these are never completely separate, of
course). And as with all story telling by just one person, even when described as the story
of many, the story-teller's biases, personal history, understanding, and ability to communicate limit the extent to which the story can be complete, or true. See Gary Bellow &
Martha Min ow Introduction: Rita's Case and Other Law Stories, in LAw STORIES 1, 18-29
(Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996) (illustrating how many different stories are
inevitably imbedded in any single story; or how, in the authors' words, "[a]ll tellings are
unique, incomplete, and inaccurate," id. at 18}. Moreover, built as it is on the metaphor of
intimate relationships such as friendship and marriage, this literature characteristically assumes that professional relationships are roughly equivalent, that functioning effectively in
the latter is just a matter of extrapolating intelligently from the former. It seems not to
entertain the possibility that each type of relationship might have its own core set of appropriate behaviors, feelings, duties, entitlements and the like, and that work might not be just
a vulgar facsimile of love (or vice versa).
29 For an illustration of the strength and the omissions of such narratives, consider
Phyllis Goldfarb's story about working on the death-penalty representation of Chris Burger. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 63, 86-91 (1994}. Goldfarb's story about Burger coming to know and accept himself, his life and death, and the
relationships he formed with people associated with his defense, is movingly and sympathetically told. Burger comes across, articulately, as an admirable figure, someone whom it
would be easy to identify with and to call one's friend, but this reaction might be more
complicated if the story was more detailed.
For example, in the five pages of narrative we never learn what Burger did, or allegedly did, to cause him to be sentenced to death by a Georgia court. According to the trial
court opinion (Goldfarb, interestingly, provides a citation to only the state appellate court
opinion, and that opinion does not describe Burger's alleged crime}, after forcing one
Honeycutt, a fellow soldier at Fort Stewart, Georgia, to sodomize a compatriot, one Stevens, Burger locked Honeycutt into the trunk of Honeycutt's cab and drove the cab into a
pond while Honeycutt was still alive. Honeycutt drowned. See Burger v. State, 247 S.E.2d
834, 836 (1978).
There is always more to such stories, of course, than legal facts report. Maybe Burger
did not do it (there was some dispute over the relative roles of Stevens and Burger), maybe
he was not given a fair chance to defend himself (there were serious Miranda and Brady
problems with the prosecution, resulting in a Supreme Court reversal and remand), maybe
he was incapacitated (the court found that he had been drinking}, and maybe death is too
harsh a penalty even if the facts were as the court concluded (he was only seventeen at the
time, and was, in the Court's words "of low intelligence," though this latter conclusion is
hard to reconcile with Burger's letters to Goldfarb, see Goldfarb, supra, at 88). But surely
his alleged crime is part of Burger's story. It does not have to be described coldly, or
luridly, but it is the reason Burger and Goldfarb have a relationship to begin with, and thus
seemingly a background dimension to everything they do.
Goldfarb leaves this information out, as is her and any story-teller's prerogative, presumably because it is not relevant to the message she wants to convey (in other words, to
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Learning from colleagues also is interesting because it offers a
natural baseline for studying lawyer interpersonal communication
generally. Colleague conversation is a pervasive phenomenon in law
practice, probably the most common experience in a lawyer's life, and
thus, a process which is practiced on a daily basis. It is also a process
on which much depends, including both a lawyer's personal development and professional advancement, in and outside of the law office.
It is fair to expect, therefore, that when lawyers talk with colleagues
they will normally use their most effective strategies for drawing these
others out. Such conversations can be said to represent lawyers at
their learning best. Dysfunctional learning patterns in colleague conversations are likely to appear in other types of lawyer communication, including interactions with clients, adversaries, officials and the
like, and to undermine performance in those relationships as well.
The strategies embodied in lawyer-colleague conversation thus can be
seen as a kind of rosetta stone of lawyer learning, and as such, a rich
source of information about what type of communicative animals lawyers are, and perhaps even how they got to be that way.
Learning from colleagues is also one of the easiest practice skills
on which to collect data, and thus, for purely practical reasons, a natural subject of study. Law office conversations can be tape recorded
and transcribed when all involved agree, and even when they do not,
conversations can be reconstructed after the fact, in case studies, journals, and the like, by one or more of the participants. These reconthe story she wants to tell). But that is the problem with stories. They are always an
advocacy move, used as much to make a point as to discover one, even if the storyteller
does not think so. It is true that all work of reconstruction and synthesis reflects the biases,
beliefs, and blind-spots of the one doing it, that in the end analysis cannot help but be
advocacy to some extent. But most investigative disciplines, history for example, have
methods designed to reduce the extent of this bias, and to provide the reader with as accurate a description of the event under discussion as one person can produce. See, e.g.,
DAVID HACKE1T FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A Lome OF HISTORICAL
THOUGHT (1970). Story telling has no need for such methods because its primary goal is to
persuade rather than reconstruct or synthesize. (For an extensive and sophisticated discussion of these issues, based on a more nuanced and comprehensive view of storytelling and
the narrative method, see Richard Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and
Pretenses, in LAw's STORIES 61 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1995). For an eloquent
defense of the claim that "novelists are as qualified as historians to attempt the ascent of
the glassy slopes of the past," see Hilary Mantel, Murder and Memory. N.Y. REv. BooKs,
Dec. 19, 1996, at 9 (reviewing MARGARET ATWOOD, ALIAS GRACE (1996)).) I should add,
I have nothing against storytelling. This article itself, after all, is just a "cautionary tale."
See page 345 supra.
There is an additional interesting feature of Goldfarb's article. She points out that she
has not had as emotionally close a relationship with a client since Burger, see Goldfarb,
supra, at 87 n.135, perhaps indicating the difficulty of living over the course of a career in
accordance with a conception of role that makes representing clients a facsimile of forming
intimate relationships.
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structions are always interesting, even when they do not reproduce the
real world verbatim, because they offer revealing evidence of what the
persons constructing the cases think makes for effective learning.
Cases articulate tacitly their authors' espoused theories of how to
learn. There are difficult validity problems with reconstructed case
data, of course, but these problems are no more difficult than the ones
encountered in survey research about clinical teacher and student
opinion, the principal alternative sources of data on law office learning. Given the availability of ample data, the importance of the issues
involved, and the subject's easy fit with presently popular approaches
to legal scholarship, therefore, it is a little surprising that learning
from colleagues has not received more attention in legal academic
writing than it has. This lack of interest notwithstanding, I propose to
take it up here.
The discussion has four parts. In the next section, Part I, I describe my views about lawyer communicative competence generally,
including what I believe to be the characteristics of effective conversational learning. This section elaborates on an earlier discussion of the
same topic, 30 and provides the standard against which the data
presented later in the Article will be evaluated. Part II describes the
origins of the present study, the methods used to collect data on law
office learning, and the reasons for undertaking the study in the first
instance. Part III is the heart of the article. It sets out eight case studies in learning from colleagues which make up the evidence for the
article's central analytical claims. It is here that my argument for not
taking the theory of ecological learning too literally will either rise or
fall. Finally, in Part IV, I explore some of the causes of the communication patterns I find, and discuss implications of my analysis for
programmatic questions about the design and administration of
clinical instructional programs. My conclusions are modest, tentative
and somewhat lukewarmly held, and they include the possibility that
perhaps nothing at all can or should be done. It may be that I have
simply met the enemy once more, and rediscovered that it is us. 31

Condlin, supra note 25, at 228-48.
a similar reaction to the related issue of justifying lawyer role behavior, see Edward Dauer & Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573,
582 (1977) (lawyer role behavior justifiable because lawyers as a class simply "no rottener
than the generality of people acting, so to speak, as amateurs"). The Dauer and Leff perspective is not for everyone, but its lack of hyperbole, and aeceptance of imperfection in
human striving, give it a certain appeal when compared with the breezy, self-serving, and
overstated assertions that characterize many justifications of lawyer practice behavior.
30 See
31 For

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 351 1996-1997

352

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 3:337

LAWYER COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE

In a useful oversimplification,32 one can think of lawyer communication as being a mixture of two distinctively different ways of
speaking, talking to persuade and talking to learn, or what I have previously called persuasion and learning mode discourse.33 These
modes of speaking are defined by the rhetorical conventions they employ, the background assumptions they make about the nature and
purposes of lawyer communication, the strategic objectives they pursue, and the moral and political world views they presuppose. They
are analytical constructs or pure types rather than descriptions of any
particular reality. Individual lawyer statements and ways of speaking
invariably will contain qualities from each mode, so that to describe a
particular statement or even an entire conversation as persuasion or
learning mode, is to describe a difference in overall purpose, content,
or strategy, rather than a difference in the manner or style of what was
said. In theory, lawyers should move seamlessly in conversation from
one mode to the other as circumstances and purposes dictate-though
the reality of lawyer communication may be somewhat more undifferentiated than that.
The modes differ principally in the way they respond to the elasticity built into language. Statements lawyers (or people generally)
32 There are more elaborate conceptual frameworks for analyzing student-teacher communication than the bipolar continuum I will use here. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 27, at
163-64 n.48 (reproducing the "Grading Standard for Families and the Law Clinic, Catholic
University of America, Columbus Law School"). There are also other forms of speech that
are important in some contexts, but play little role in student-teacher communication, such
as deliberately offensive speech or perhaps speech primarily meant to establish an emotional bond with another person rather than to engage with, or inquire into, that person's
thinking. I could make my framework more complex by adding additional categories, produced by mixing the properties of the poles in different combinations, but I believe it is
more useful to introduce this complexity in the examination of data. A conceptual framework can be too complicated for its own good, making analysis more, rather than less,
difficult to do. To paraphrase Richard Epstein (defending the utility-maximizing model of
rational choice theory), a "very simple model involving a choice between two alternatives
... hardly hurts the overall analysis when we extend it to choices between many [options],
or across many different domains of social life .... There is nothing about [such a] model
that seems to fly in the face of ordinary experience .... [It] is robust enough to account for
complex cases, yet simple enough to understand why they develop and what might be done
about them." See Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler
of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 683, 685, 697-98. Anatol Rapoport's simple reciprocation program of "tit-for-tat," which cleaned up in Robert Axelrod's prisoner's dilemma
game tournament, even against much more complex programs designed to beat it, is another illustration of the power of a simple model. See RoBERT AxELROD, THE EvoLU·
TION OF COOPERATION 30-54 (1984).
33 See Condlin, supra note 25, at 228-48. Like many analytical frameworks based on
some variant of a cooperation-competition continuum, the persuasion-learning mode construct owes a lot to the writings of Morton Deutsch. See, e.g., MoRTON DEUTSCH, THE
REsoLuTioN oF CoNFLicr (1973).

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 352 1996-1997

Spring 1997]

Learning from Colleagues

353

make to one another have no unambiguous meaning that emerges ineluctably regardless of the words used, or the circumstances in which
they were uttered, or the way in which they were spoken. Communication, even in its simplest and purest form, is not so static, acontextual, or thin a phenomenon. Language is inevitably ambiguous and
this ambiguity is enhanced by context, convention, and circumstances.34 Words do not have the same meaning in all situations, and
norms that regulate discourse often promote values other than clarity.
Knowing a speaker's motives or purposes, for example, gives statements meaning that words alone do not convey. Explaining motive or
purpose in advance, however, can seem presumptuous, or be confusing, and may only add another layer of ambiguity to the message the
speaker tried to send.
The important and yet sometimes unrecognized point in most
conversation, then, is that meaning is constructed as much as it is
found.3 5 Language is interpreted, it is not just decoded. Within the
inevitable boundaries of "communities of interpretation," 36 the ways
lawyers interpret are distinctively personal, shaped by the lawyers'
own beliefs, values, experiences, ideology, imagination, expectations,
and stereotypes about the way the world works and the way people
are, and by structural features of the situation in which the communi34 See Michael L. Geis, The Meaning of Meaning in the Law, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1125,
1125-32 (1995) (discussing the role of convention and context in establishing the meaning
of statements).
35 This is a commonplace, even fashionable, view in some quarters, given the legal
academy's recent interest in post-modernist literary theory, and hermeneutics in particular.
See, e.g., David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist
Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 135 (1985). But I do not mean to endorse this most extreme of the constructivist views. Steven Knapp and Walter Michaels have convinced me
that "the problem of hermeneutics is that there is no fundamental hermeneutic problem."
See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory 2: Sentence Meaning, Hermeneutics 10 (Protocol of the Fifty-Second Colloquy: 8 December 1985, Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture). See also Steven Knapp & Walter
Benn Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEw
PRAGMATISM 11 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985).
36 An interpretive community is "not so much a group of individuals who share a point
of view, but a point of view or way of organizing experience that shares individuals in the
sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance are the content of the consciousness of community members who
are therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they are embedded in the community's
enterprise, community property." See STANLEY FisH, DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY
141-50 (1989); see also STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLAss? (1968). The concept is Professor Fish's most well known contribution to the interpretation debate, and the
heart of his anti-realist theory of meaning. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 12027 (1996). Some find the concept useful, see, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RuTGERS L.
Rev. 676 (1979), and some do not. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
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cation occurs, as much as they are by other persons' words. The
meanings lawyers hear in others' statements often tell more about the
lawyers themselves, their situations and intellectual, moral and emotional commitments, than they do about what the others tried to say.
The persuasion and learning modes represent alternative and distinctively different strategies for dealing with this unavoidable need to interpret built into the nature of interpersonal communication.
Persuasion mode discourse tries to impose a self-interested and
largely pre-determined meaning on communication, principally by ar~
guing with others over the authorship of ideas. Using it, speakers conceal their ends and plans for achieving them, attribute meaning to
others' ambiguous statements before investigating those statements
fully to determine if the attributions are correct, argue for preferences
subliminally and indirectly, suppress strongly felt and hard to articulate but relevant feelings and ideas when raising them would not advance the speakers' ends, protect others from difficult but necessary
topics either by ignoring the topics altogether or by discussing them in
euphemistic (i.e., misleading) terms, argue for beliefs in needlessly
stylized and overstated ways, and feign agreement to produce illusory
consensus when underlying beliefs are the opposite. These attributes,
taken together, make up a kind of instrumental world view in which
speakers define communicative interaction as competitive, and see
winning the competition as imposing their own meaning on others'
words. Strategic calculation and positive legal rules are the only check
on a speaker's behavior, morality is collapsed into legality, and maximizing to the limits of one's constraints is the operative moral code.
At first glance, this may seem to be another way of describing the
widely disparaged stereotype of lawyer adversarial or "positional" advocacy,37 and while there is some truth to this, persuasion mode discourse, as I think of it, is different in important respects from some
forms of adversary behavior. The biggest difference has to do with the
distinction between substance and style. Persuasion mode communication is not characterized principally by stylistic qualities such as belligerence, rudeness, ad hominem attack, or rhetorical forcefulness, but
more by substantive and structural qualities such as keeping agendas
private, disavowing responsibility for failure, intellectualizing all topics including those involving deeply held feelings, arguing coercively
but not abusively, and sealing oneself off from meta-data about one's
own ideological commitments and communication strategies. Persuasion mode communication is rarely if ever unpleasant or personally
For descriptions of "positional" advocacy, see

RoGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY,
3-8 (1981); Carrie Menkei-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 758, 764-94 (1984).
37
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offensive. It is a low-visibility, indirect, and often even cordial method
of manipulating others, by controlling the form and content of conversation, rather than its tone.
For example, persuasion mode speakers try to produce more
ideas than others in a conversation, and with greater eloquence, conviction and complexity, so that they will be thought more knowledgeable and insightful, and thus entitled to greater deference. They
express their ideas in long, well-edited soliloquies, take dense, complicated substantive positions, and speak in a rapid-fire but friendly manner. All of these features make it difficult for others to respond, but
also difficult for them to become offended or resentful. Like persons
who have no movie preference until the group chooses against their
wishes, they keep their agendas secret until it becomes necessary or
opportune to protect them. They consider new and interesting ideas
in private where learning, if it occurs, need not be acknowledged.
They suppress undeveloped or uncomfortable ideas, and take positions only when they can be defended fluently and fully. They rarely
express half-thoughts, tentative beliefs, or whimsical musings even
when relevant or asked for. They avoid conversation about conversation itself, so that they are never distracted by critical insights about
how their manner of speaking and listening might distort what they
think they heard others say.
Three processes are central to persuasion mode discourse. First,
persuasion mode speakers attribute meaning to others' statements
rather than investigate that meaning directly and test it publicly. Attributing meaning permits an immediate response, makes it unnecessary to mull over or assess what has been said, and, within limits,
allows one to shape the issues with which one joins. Confusion, doubt,
and uncertainty attendant to exploring meaning in public are avoided,
views are articulated more convincingly, and conversations are more
easily controlled. Second, persuasion mode speakers react to others'
ideas reflexively in evaluative terms. They know whether such ideas
are good or bad before it is possible to understand completely what
has been said, or to determine whether what was said makes sense.
Initially, this evaluative reaction is private, defining the way persuasion mode speakers respond internally to new ideas or suggestions,
but it is also expressed publicly as an "agree-disagree" reaction, the
third of the persuasion mode processes, so as to force all conversation
into some form of an argument. Persuasion mode speakers investigate ideas, increase understanding, and refine views by challenging
what others say. To the extent that they learn, they learn by arguing.
Persuasion mode speakers also often unintentionally misrepresent what they truly believe, making the information they communi-

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 355 1996-1997

356

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:337

cate frequently incomplete or untrustworthy. Because their primary
concern is protecting themselves from evaluation and embarrassment,
they express fewer and more defensible (i.e., commonplace) ideas
than they would under less threatening conditions, and with greater
commitment than they truly feel. (The discomfort generated by having one's ideas and judgments constantly called into question is all the
more troublesome because the rules of persuasion mode discourse do
not permit it to be discussed.) The commonplace nature of the ideas
expressed may cause others to discount them, and the excess of conviction may influence others not to pursue the ideas further (or the
converse, to challenge them more vigorously than is warranted), when
the wiser course may be more extensive and open-ended investigation. Similarly, intellectualizing discussion, whatever the subject,
causes persuasion mode speakers to suppress feelings, intuitions, and
hunches that may contain important insights helpful in resolving the
problem at hand, and can intensify such feelings, making it harder to
think clearly about the analytical issues involved. In addition, forcing
all conversation into an "agree-disagree" format encourages persuasion mode speakers to concentrate on preparing and defending what
they have to say, rather than listening carefully to the ideas of others,
and to settle quickly on single, simple explanations for compiex
problems, rather than generate and test more numerous and openended possibilities. Each of these effects distorts communication,
making a persuasion mode speaker's comments more difficult to understand, and harder to use.
Persuasion mode discourse produces few problems in situations
of strategic interaction, such as courtroom advocacy, where the point
of conversation is understood by everyone involved to be instrumental
success, but it creates difficulties in relationships of friendship, trust
and dependence, where one side expects to share power and responsibility, and the other side expects to seize them. Persons inadvertently
caught up in persuasion mode conversations have two familiar
choices. They may flee, by breaking off conversations prematurely
before all of their work is done, or by avoiding people altogether with
whom they expect conversation to take a persuasion mode turn. Or
they may fight, by arguing back, or by channeling discussion into topics that do not require exposing gaps in their understanding, or limits
to their rhetorical skill. For many, the psychological costs of learning
under such circumstances are thought greater than the benefits to be
gained from the new ideas persuasion mode speakers may have to
share. Out of its element, in conference rooms, lawyers' offices, and
even around the water cooler, where the object of conversation is discovering what others think, persuasion mode discourse makes learn-
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ing more difficult and, in the process, undermines lawyer competence.
Having said all of this, it is important to add that persuasion
mode discourse is not an anachronistic vestige of a more adversarial
era, or a mutant and ignoble strain of ideal lawyer communication. It
is an important part of our modern day system of adversary advocacy
(though not the only part), and has respectable origins in mainstream
legal discourse. In fact, it may be an exemplar of mainstream legal
discourse. In the formal, stylized, rule-bound, and arms-length world
of legal advocacy, particularly courtroom advocacy and its cognates,
lawyers must be able to convince others (or at least silence them), on
command. Doing justice in individual cases frequently requires the
manipulation of opponents, officials and judges to produce particular
results. This may seem an unfortunate feature of a system of justice,
particularly if one holds perfectionist views about the possibilities of
legal institutions, norms, procedures, and lawyer communicative practices, but it is a real feature of our present system nonetheless, and
one that is not likely to go away simply because it sometimes requires
behavior that would be inappropriate in other settings.
Persuasion mode discourse's only real sin, so to speak, is to be
caught out of its element, used in situations where it does not fit and is
not expected. But to discredit it, even to this limited extent, is not to
replace it. One must show how else lawyers could converse, how else
they could discover the benefits of their colleagues' different perspectives, insights and experiences without jeopardizing the non-learning
and strategic interests inevitably present in all conversation. Put another way, what alternatives do lawyers have to persuasion mode
discourse?
It is not difficult to imagine or describe a learning mode method
of lawyer communication, though finding real-life examples can sometimes be hard. Learning mode behavior, as an ideal type, is characterized by curiosity about whether and how others' views could be
different, candor and honesty in expressing one's own beliefs, warts
and all, an expansive sense of relevance in determining what additional topics might be worthy of investigation, and a refusal to accept
personal conviction as a substitute for evidence and analysis in determining what to believe. Learning mode actors make the nature of
their ends, their affective reactions to situations, and their plans for
adapting available means to those ends, explicit. They explore the
ambiguities in, and candidly articulate their evaluative responses to,
each other's formulations, responses to those responses, and so on,
until consensus is achieved. The purpose of this recursive communication process is not to win or to silence others, but to produce understanding and uncoerced agreement, if agreement is what the evidence
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supports. Learning mode discourse, in short, attempts to achieve a
consensus on the legitimacy of ends and the rational relationship of
ends to means, evaluating ends and means in each other's ·lights,
through a process of communication that is public, bilateral, critical,
and cooperative.
As with persuasion mode discourse, three processes are central.
The first is inquiry. In every manner imaginable, and at every point in
a conversation, ·teaming mode speakers probe for the. details at the
base of others' views. They are incorrigibly curious. They want to
know about the experiences on which others' ideas are based, the inferences and deductions made from those experiences, and the theories which inform and sustain those deductions. They suspend
judgment on new ideas until they have considered them fully, ask
questions rather than agree or disagree as a first reaction, and encourage others to keep talking either by using what some social psychology calls non-verbal facilitators, 38 or simply by being quiet and
not getting in the way as others elaborate on their own. Inquiry embodies a state of mind as well as a set of techniques, grounded in the
sincerely held belief that others almost always have new and useful
things to tell us if only we would let them and, when necessary, draw
them out.
Second, learning mode communication is also evaluative and candid, but in a manner designed to extend conversation rather than end
it. It includes an element of what might be called "owning up," that is,
the expression of considered reactions to others' views even when
those reactions are negative, in a way that treats the others as collaborators rather than opponents. Learning mode speakers "attack errors," as Susanne Langer puts it, rather than "throw out a whole
theoretical speculation because it contains an error." They "aim at
truth," trying to set an argument right, and "steer [their] course by
checking with the proponent: Is this what you mean? Is that really
what you would say?" 39 Learning mode speakers own up to positive
reactions as well as negative ones, and to feelings that qualify or explain their views, such as embarrassment, anger, confusion, ignorance,
admiration, envy, or even the difficulty of owning up itself, if working
through such feelings would help in getting their views correct. They
do not resort to rapid-fire one-liners, where pejorative language,
clever expression and punishing tone carry the brunt of their message,
but rely instead on direct evidence and explicitly articulated analysis
38
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to support their conclusions. They leave room for and encourage
others to disagree, based on contrary experiences, evidence and analysis, and see it as a positive sign when they do. When others do not
raise known objections worth considering, learning mode speakers
raise them on their own. They eschew ad hominem or personal attack
of any kind, and rely on the power of ideas rather than rhetorical skill
to produce understanding rather than victory.
Ownirig up does not dominate learning mode discourse in the
way evaluation dominates the persuasion mode. It is not an automatic
first response to the statements of others. When, how, and to what
one owns up are matters of judgment rather than reflex. Ideas may be
new and not yet intelligibly formed, circumstances or relationships
may not allow for the consideration of difficult, basic, or complicated
points, some topics may be too sensitive or emotionally loaded to be
discussed clearly, and some views, while accurate and interesting, may
be irrelevant to the tasks at hand. Unlike evaluation, which is nearly
all of persuasion mode discourse, owning up is only a small part of
learning mode communication, and works well only when used in
equal measure with inquiry and testing.
Testing is the third constitutive learning mode process. Learning
mode actors understand that their views could be idiosyncratic or
wrong, and want to assess their conclusions in light of others' judgments, relevant data, and agreed-on criteria of validity, to determine
whether this is so. They start with the assumption that even deeply
held convictions must be seen as tentative or provisional (and do not
require others to point this out), and base judgments only on what the
relevant evidence and analysis support. Testing is driven by intrinsic
rather than strategic concerns, grounded in a need to know what is
true, rather than a need to know what it will take to convince. In
· testing, learning mode actors consider all relevant arguments before
coming to closure, treat patterns in evidence as generally more significant than particular pieces of data, reconsider conclusions when told
something new, and treat all conclusions as provisional, sufficient to
go forward with, but no more.
While both persuasion and learning mode methods have their
place in law practice, learning mode behavior is more appropriate in
conversations with colleagues most of the time. Relationships with
colleagues are not adversarial, at least not in the courtroom sense, and
trying automatically to convince colleagues of one's pre-determined
views before hearing what they have to say is usually not an effective
way to proceed. In writing a brief, preparing a prospectus, drafting a
contract, or devising a takeover strategy, the first and most important
step from everyone's perspective is to get the greatest number of ideas
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on the table. Each member of the group needs to be drawn out, her
or his distinctive insights identified and unique twists on familiar strategies recognized. For a problem of any complexity and novelty, the
first step in developing strategy is identifying the realm of the possible. This can be difficult and frustrating, particularly when progress is
intermittent or halting, but it cannot be skipped over without paying a
price.
Communication strategies which demean others' contributions by
criticizing them automatically, ignore difficult to discuss but relevant
points, recast others' ideas to make them appear to be one's own,
reduce complex phenomena to some of their parts, suppress tentativeness, contingency, and uncertainty, fail to understand how perspectives can be one-sided or biased even when sincerely held, hedge bets,
cut losses and pick winnable fights, and are generally secretive about
what they seek to achieve, are a liability in this "brainstorming" stage
of work. They tum up fewer and more pedestrian ideas, produce
shorter and more acrimonious conversations, and introduce more distracting emotional "noise" into conversation than do their learning
mode counterparts. In an ideal world, lawyers would avoid persuasion mode communication in law office conversation most of the time.
Whether they do is the question I now want to take up.
II.

A MODEST EMPIRICAL STUDY ABOUT LEARNING FROM
COLLEAGUES

The idea for a study of learning from colleagues, and the creation
of the data base on which it is grounded, are classic examples of necessity being the mother of invention. A large number of Maryland students work part-time during the school year, and full-time during the
summer, in a wide variety of public and private law offices, courts,
administrative agencies, corporations, and other types of law related
organizations, both for academic credit in extemship programs, and
for money. 40 This will not surprise anyone. It is the case virtually
40 Students in this study received money only in the few situations where their case
studies came from part-time work rather than externships. One such case is reproduced
here. Maryland has not adopted the "credit plus money" model of extemship instruction.
For a recent discussion of the difficult question of whether students should be allowed to
receive credit and money for the same clinical practice work, see Gary Laser, Significant
Curricular Developments: The Macerate Report and Beyond, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 425 (1994)
(in favor of students getting both money and credit), and Lisa G. Lerman, Fee For Service
Clinical Teaching: Slipping Toward Commercialism, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 685 (1994) (against).
See also Interpretation 1 of ABA Accreditation Standard 306(a), which provides, "Student
participants in a law school externship program may not receive compensation for a program for which they receive academic credit." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS
FoR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS Standard 306(a), Interpretation
1 (1996) [hereinafter AccREDITATION STANDARDs]. For a discussion of the development
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everywhere in American legal education.
As is also the case almost everywhere, supervision of this work
has been delegated, for the most part, to the lawyers, judges, and officials who work full-time in the various outside cooperating organizations, and who have agreed to be responsible for the students'
learning. In theory, and sometimes in practice, full-time law faculty
members monitor this work, but even at its best, such monitoring is
far from day-to-day, and at its worst, it is non-existent. None of the
programs was described in this way when presented to the faculty for
approval; instead, they just settled into this format over time as both
professors and students discovered that such a format was in their respective self-interests.
A combination of the ABA's recent decision to take its externship standard more seriously in the accreditation process,41 a looming
site visit by an ABA inspection team, and the Maryland faculty's own
growing sense that the educational potential of student law firm work
was not being fully exploited, produced a familiar curricular reform.
We decided to add (or beef up, depending upon just how badly one
thought things were being done), an "academic component" 42 to each
of our externship programs. This is a "reform," I dare say, that has
been discussed or enacted in some variation in many if not most
American law schools. Most of our externships involved work in one
or more clearly identifiable substantive law or practice skill areas
(such as public law, including government agency work and legal services for the poor, health law, environmental law, intellectual property,
corporate finance, law and entrepreneurship, judicial clerking, and the
like). For these externships, it was relatively simple to have someone
already teaching in the substantive law or practice skill field put together a set of materials and teach a seminar organized more or less
around the theme of "Selected Problems in
"
Each semester, however, there was always a residual group of externs, made up of students whose work either did not fit easily into
of Interpretation 1, see Maher, supra note 11, at 617-21.
41 See Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 439-41.
42 The ABA requires that all externship programs with a credit allocation of over six
units have a classroom component. See AccREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 40, Standard 306(c), Interpretation 2(h)(1)-(3); see also Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 429-30
(discussing extent to which externship programs have classroom components). The phrase
"academic component" has always struck me as one of the strangest euphemisms in American legal education. "Academic" in this context could be used pejoratively to mean something like "impractical," "ethereal," or "gratuitously pedantic," in which case there would
be no reason to include such a component in an externship program at all, or it could be
used literally to mean "scholarly," "learned," or "instructional," in which case it ought not
to be restricted to only a part ("component") of the program. I suppose the phrase is just
another offspring of the alleged theory-practice dichotomy.
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any existing substantive law or practice skill categories, or who were
working in a recognized field but during a semester in which the seminar in that subject was not being offered. These students needed an
"academic component" to their externships as well, but the types of
work they did usually had few if any themes in common.
This is where the invention came in. While sub-groups within the
residual extern class did work that overlapped in different ways, the
only thing all of the groups' had in common was the fact that they
worked for practitioners (in the most expansive sense of that term)
who were not law teachers. It seemed obvious, therefore, that that
was what we should study: learning to learn from someone who does
not see herself or himself principally as a law teacher, in an environment where student learning is not the highest (or sometimes even a
high) priority. Put another way, we decided to study the process of
learning from colleagues in law practice settings. 43
To move the seminar beyond the discussion of abstract theories
of communicative modes, a step which seemed advisable given the unfamiliarity of the subject, and to learn more about what the students
were doing in their externships, I decided to conduct a modest empirical study of the way students learned at work. To do this I resuscitated and revised a data collection device I had used once before to
study in-house clinic supervision. The device comes from the work of
Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, the two scholars most responsible
for developing the idea of the "reflective practitioner," and is dis-cussed in detail in their work. 44 I asked each of the students to produce a case study illustrating a situation in which the student was
trying to learn from a supervisor about how to improve her or his (the
student's) work. 45 I gave the students the following instructions for
43 Learning from colleagues is not studied in the classroom component of most externship programs, see Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 431-34.
44 See ARGYRIS & ScHON, supra note 6, at 38-42; CHRIS ARGYRIS, INTERVENTION THEORY AND METHOD 103-26 (1970).
45 I offered this seminar on a pass/fail basis for four semesters, to a total of sixty-four
students, and have at least one case study from each of the students. (Two cases have been
selected from each of the four semesters I offered the course, to make up the eight cases
reported in Part Ill.) A few students developed an intense interest in the subject and pro-.
duced more cases as part of independent writing projects that grew out of the seminar.
One student, in fact, wrote a 167-page paper about six new cases collected from several
different contexts over the course of two years. The cases were given to me in an anonymous form, as the instructions required, usually with the designations of student and supervisor in place of the participants' names, and with all characteristics which might identify
the externship office removed. I reviewed each case to make sure this had been done
before distributing copies to the class. Each student led the discussion of her or his case in
class, first stating what he or she wanted to learn from the discussion, and then fielding
questions, comments and the like. I participated as another (talkative) student, but at the
end of each case discussion I summarized what I thought had been the general themes
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preparing their case studies.
Instructions for Preparing A Personal Case Study
Describe a learning interaction with one or more individuals,
preferably but not necessarily from your work as an extern, that you
have experienced already or expect to experience in the near future.
Begin the description with a paragraph about the nature of the interaction, the setting, the people involved, and any other details you
think important to place the reader in context. Use fictitious names
for all persons other than yourself, or describe them in terms of title, role, relationship to you, or the like. Be sure that they are not
personally identifiable.46 Next, describe your purposes for the interaction. What did you want to accomplish, how did you plan to do
this, and why did you pick those goals and strategies?
Next, write a few pages of dialogue that actually occurred or
that you expect to occur. Reconstruct it from memory as best you
can, if you do not have a tape or transcript of the exchange. Use the
following format.
raised and points made. About forty percent of the students talked with me individually
about their cases after their respective presentations in class. On a number of occasions,
these post-class conversations lasted for over an hour.
At the beginning of each semester I told the students that I might use one or more of
their cases as part of a writing project I had in mind. They were asked to let me know if
they did not want to be included in the project, and ten did. In retrospect, I would be more
scrupulous about the consent process if I did this again. I think that the significance, and
perhaps even the fact, of my announcement did not register with some students. However,
virtually all of my comments on the cases in Part III were raised with the respective students involved during the class discussions. In fact, the content of the present discussion is
taken directly from the notes made for and used in those class discussions. The students
were also instructed to tell their practitioner supervisors about the seminar, and the case
study assignment, but I did not check to see if they did this because I wanted the supervisors to remain anonymous.
The residual externs were reasonably representative of the school population at large.
15% were people of color (lower than the 25% for the school as a whole), 55% percent
were women (nearly identical to the school percentage), 40% percent were members of
one of the two law journals at the school (higher than the 30% for the school as a whole),
the group's mean grade point average was a little higher than the mean for the whole
school, and the average age of its members was 26, also nearly identical to the school
average. About 90% percent were third year students. The seminar no longer exists, having been swept away by yet another wave of curriculum reform.
46 The fact that the cases were anonymous had some information costs, of course, but it
also made it safer for the students to tell me what they were truly thinking and feeling in
the situations reported. See note 47 infra. In addition, anonymity neutralized any expectations, stereotypes or beliefs I might have had about the offices involved, and forced me to
deal directly with the data of the cases. It also helped prevent inadvertent disclosure of
confidential client information in violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
During the four semesters I taught the course I did not come across a case I could identify
from the information supplied by the students. I did ask the students, however, whether
there was ever a situation in which two students in the class were involved in the same case,
either on the same or opposite sides, and there was not.
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On this side of the page, write
DIALOGUE, that is, what each
person actually said or what you
expect he/she would say. Continue
writing the dialogue until you
believe the gist of the conversation
is illustrated (this should be for at
least a couple of pages).

After having prepared your case in this way, reread it for the
purpose of analyzing the effectiveness of your efforts. Approach
the analysis as if you knew nothing about your intentions, wishes,
desires or expectations, and had only your behavior in the case to
work with. What assumptions about effective learning do you seem
to make? What communication habits do you seem to have? How
related are your goals and strategies?

Since this was an unusual request, I gave the students until the
fourth week of the semester to hand in their case studies. By then we
had discussed the differences between persuasion and learning mode
behavior for three full class sessions (six hours), and had analyzed several anonymous case studies similar to those the students were asked
to prepare. Moving as deliberately as this seemed to help. When it
came time to prepare the cases no student expressed difficulty in understanding the instructions or in constructing an individual case. 4 s
Virtually all of the cases were complicated, interesting, and rich in
learning-from-supervisor issues, and were produced quickly, easily,
and often with a great deal of enthusiasm.49 In fact, many of the stu47 A good deal of clinical writing is now based on data reproducing the dialogue of
practice instruction in verbatim or near verbatim form (such as transcripts, case studies,
journals, and the like), but the data do not usually include underlying student thoughts and
feelings. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 27. This, in part, is probably because the clinical
teachers who collect and write about this material are usually also participants in the conversations reproduced, and would find it difficult to convince students to reveal what they
truly thought and felt after the fact. If the students had wanted to share this information.
presumably they would have done so in the conversations themselves.
I was not a participant in any of the conversations reproduced here, and could not
identify any of the students' supervisors from the content of the case studies. The students
knew this, and as a consequence, did not worry that their thoughts and feelings would get
back to their supervisors if they shared them with me. This was not because of any particular trust in me, but because it would have been difficult if not impossible for me to know
whom to tell, even if I wanted to. I also promised that I would not tell should I happen to
find out the names of supervisors by accident, but I never found out and the issue never
arose. Not knowing the students' supervisors cost me relevant information, of course, but
the cost was more than offset by the additional analysis made possible by the inclusion of
the students' underlying thoughts and feelings.
For a discussion of filling in the left hand column, see Condlin, supra note 25, at 252

n.70.

For one qualification on this, see note 52 infra.
was a little surprising that in some ways the students were more competent at the
unfamiliar task of preparing a case study than they were at the lawyer skill practices they
had been studying for a couple of years in law school.
48

49 It
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dents could not wait to talk about their cases in class.
Except for the occasional accounts of water cooler conversations
about office politics, or of advocacy preparation sessions (such as rehearsing a witness for trial, deposing an opposing party, cataloguing
exhibits, and the like), most of the cases are about one or another
aspect of doing substantive law research and writing legal memos.so
These are stereotypical law firm associate tasks and ones law students
are also thought qualified to do, or as qualified as they are to do
anything. 5 1
Typically the case studies show the students trying to find out
more about the nature of their assignments (for example, what questions should be answered, when is the memo due, what is the proper
format, and most commonly, against what criteria will the memo be
judged), or explaining and defending work they have already submitted. The discussions usually take place in the supervisors' offices, last
anywhere from three minutes to two hours, and involve mainstream
problems of interpreting and arguing substantive law. In short, the
cases involve students solving live law practice research and writing
problems, under real time and money conditions, in the same fashion
as a beginning lawyer.
While there are serious questions about how much one can read
into or extrapolate from student case studies, particularly with respect
to the issue of whether they represent law office conversation generally, 52 they make one major addition to the opinion survey research
50 Students took the research and memo writing seriously and worked hard at it. Their
draft memos were incorporated regularly into documents filed with courts and agencies,
sometimes verbatim, so they knew that what they wrote could have serious consequences
for real clients. Even when their memos were not used in this way, clients often were
billed for their work, so that working efficiently to eliminate needless costs was a high
priority.
51 On the process by which students learn to do effective legal writing, see Joseph M.
Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J.
LEGAL WRITING lNST. 1, 9-16 (1991) (describing how novice lawyers learn to write competently over time by being socialized into a community of knowledge and expertise).
52 The excerpts also may not be perfectly representative of the conversations from
which they are taken, or the relationships between the students and supervisors involved.
They might be the most difficult or frustrating cases the students could remember, for
example, or the ones in which they thought their behavior was the most problematic. The
case study instructions did not ask students to reproduce their most difficult or problematic
conversations, but such conversations are often the ones remembered best. When students
asked how to choose from among several cases all of which were interesting, I often advised them to pick the ones associated with the strongest feelings, on the theory that these
cases would be the easiest to reconstruct. But this may have been interpreted as advice to
pick one's most difficult case, or the case with which one was the least satisfied. If so, the
case studies would resemble a law school casebook of sorts, a catalogue of (self-identified)
abnormal learning strategies under stress, rather than prototypical learning strategies
under conditions of relaxation and confidence. Most of the students did not see the cases
as problematic until after their respective class presentations, however, so if the cases were
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advanced by the advocates of ecologicallearning. 53 The cases report
specifically on what the students said and did in their interactions with
supervisors, not just what they thought they learned from those interactions. 54 By separating the task of data reconstruction from the task
of analysis, the undifferentiated inquiries of "What did you learn?"
and "Was it worthwhile?" were divided into the more specific "What
did you and your supervisor do and say?" "Was it effective?" and
"Why or why not?" . The answer to the question "What did you and
your supervisor do and say?" provides an independent vantage point
from which to think. along with the students in assessing what was
learned, and permits readers to make their own judgments about
whether the students' conclusions are the only or best ones which
could be drawn from the data. The case study device turns an "on
balance, was the experience worthwhile?" inquiry into one of "first,
what happened? and then, was it worthwhile?" 55
The students could still cook the data by describing what happened in terms that were circular with how well they thought things
went, but that did not seem to occur. Invariably students liked their
externships. They saw them as teaching about important practice
skills under realistic time and money constraints, providing information about the nature and organization of law practice which they
could use in making choices about where and for whom to work, and
creating opportunities to escape the subservient roles often assigned
to anyone with student status in law school. Yet, regularly, they also
produced case studies which undercut at least the first of these conclusions. Their cases were full of questionable and sometimes demonstrably ineffective practice . behavior that was either ignored or
reinforced by their supervisors, and debatable conceptions of appropriate skill practice that often went unchallenged and undiscussed.
Moreover, the students did not always see these problems before
presenting their cases in class. On the contrary, many began their discussions confident that they had performed well, but as the class
raised concerns or expressed doubts about actions taken in the cases,
this demeanor often changed. A few students became defensive, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of any interpretation other than
picked for this quality the picking was done at some tacit or pre-conscious level.
53 See note 18 supra.
54 A few students reconstructed only idealized stories of how they thought their conversations should have gone (or should go in the future). Even these stories reveal useful and
detailed information about the students' theories of how learning from colleagues occurs.
55 Thus these case studies provide a vantage point on student experience different from
that in Givelber et a!., supra note 13, at 24-27, and from the approach of Seibel & Morton,
supra note 2, at 417-39 (discussing "contribution of externships to legal education" based
on "descriptive data" about "existing programs" taken from clinical teacher surveys).
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their own ("you had to be there to understand"), but most, though
initially surprised and sometimes visibly disappointed, became interested in the class's different interpretations, discussing them at length,
often even agreeing. 56
If the students constructed the cases with an eye toward justifying
their positive evaluations of the extemships, their presenting cases
which contained ineffective practice strategies is hard to explain. Similarly, if they tried to build "strategic flaws" into the cases to make
their own after-the-fact analysis seem more impressive, one would expect that analysis to have appeared in the case studies themselves,
where it was requested, and where it would have had the biggest impact, but that also rarely happened. The students' reactions of surprise, disappointment, curiosity and ultimately agreement when the
class raised concerns about the cases are also hard to explain on this
view. In short, it is hard to understand why the students consistently
produced cases that called their effectiveness into question, . unless
what they reported is roughly what they remembered happening and
feeling. 57
56 Initially, I had planned to use excerpts from the classroom discussions as further
evidence of the best interpretations to be given the students' behavior in the case studies.
Classroom discussion was another instance of learning from colleagues, and student behavior in these discussions might have been expected to mirror their behavior in the cases.
Using class data proved to be too difficult in all but a few cases, however, and the students
voted down the idea of tape recording the class sessions for consideration at a later date.
My subjective impression is that there were numerous parallels between the conversational
patterns in the cases and the conversational patterns in the classes, but it was more confusing than helpful when I tried to point these parallels out. Even had I been able to collect
such data, finding a manageable way to present it in this Article would have been difficult.
57 See Nisbet & Wilson, supra note 18, at 255 (people have "little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes" but do have direct access to their "focus of attention- ... current sensations ... emotions, evaluations, and plans"), see also
ARGYRIS & SCHON, supra note 6, at 66 ("[e]ach individual's data overwhelmingly challenged his competence [and) [i]t is difficult to see why people would write distorted cases
that make them appear incompetent"). Cases transcribed from tape recorded conversations do not raise this accuracy problem (though tapes have other problems of their own),
but only about ten percent of the cases were transcribed from tapes. There was no discernible difference between the conversational patterns in the taped and reconstructed cases.
This is not to say that the students' reconstructions captured every word of their conversations; rather, it may well be that the case studies in effect reduced these conversations to
their essential parts. The case studies may therefore-and usefully-have made the
problems of the interactions appear more starkly, but they did not change the problems
themselves.
The students' behavior might be explained as a consequence of the widely shared
belief that new lawyers cannot write. See Williams, supra note 51, at 24-25 (describing the
"pre-socialized" legal writer). Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson have shown how stereotypes about the ability of African-American students to perform on standardized tests create a kind of "stereotype threat," which in turn causes the students to perform poorly. It is·
not that students accept the stereotypes, but that in trying not to give credence to them
they redouble their efforts, only to work too quickly or inefficiently. Take away the situa-
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THE CASE STUDIES

It is now time to ask how the students, as lawyers, interacted with
their supervisors to draw on and learn from the latter's different insights and more extensive experience. What strategies did they employ, tacitly or otherwise, to add to their understanding and improve
their work? Were they curious when supervisors reached conclusions
different from their own or saw issues in distinctively different lights?
Did they suspend judgment on new ideas and perspectives, inquire
into their bases, question, probe, and test these views, and take only
direct evidence rather than supervisor conviction as proof? Did they
share their own views directly and completely, discussing ideas in a
non-dogmatic, non-proprietary and non-defensive fashion? Did they
act on suggestions which proved to be helpful, redoing their work to
the extent necessary? Or, instead, did they enter work conversations
convinced of the correctness of their own take on the matter, and try
to convince their supervisors to see things their way, all the while
keeping this agenda secret? Did they judge their supervisors and their
ideas quickly, privately, and harshly, on the basis of insufficient or
non-existent evidence, thus in effect writing their own predispositions,
biases, and stereotypes into fact? In other words, did they converse to
learn or to persuade?ss
Complete answers to these questions must await a reading of the
cases, of course, but some preliminary observations are possible.
More than anything else in their conversations with supervisors, students were concerned profoundly and pervasively with not "looking
stupid," and this concern seemed to drive everything they said and
did. The concern took many forms. Students worried that they were
tiona! cues that trigger the stereotypes and the students' performances improve. See
Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERs. & Soc. PsYCHOL. 797, 798-99 (1995). It may be
that the law students in the cases discussed here were similarly preoccupied with the belief
that not much was expected from them (that no matter what they did they would "look
stupid"), and that in trying to compensate for this stereotype they performed poorly. I did
not know of the Steele-Aronson hypothesis when I collected the case study data for this
article, and thus did not try to determine whether some form of stereotype threat was
involved. The hypothesis is interesting, however, and is well worth testing in the clinical
practice context. It is important to keep in mind, however, that stereotype threat, if present, would explain the students' behavior in the cases, not undercut its representativeness
or trustworthiness. It responds to the question of why the students would behave in this
way, not the question of whether they do.
58 Many would argue that this is a vulgar understanding of the term "persuade," and I
agree with them. Persuasion mode speaking aims to silence others, or have them admit
defeat, as often as it does to help them come to a new understanding. I expressed the same
reservation several years ago when I first wrote about the persuasion mode-learning mode
construct, but in the intervening years I have not found a better term. So I continue to use
"persuade." See Condlin, supra note 25, at 231 n.20, 247 n.62.
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not from the right law school, that they did not know enough law, that
their research was rudimentary and missed cases directly on point,
that their insights were pedestrian and self-evident, that their
problems had clear answers known to everyone (including their supervisors) but themselves, that work assignments were just staged tests of
their abilities to perform and not genuine real-life problems, and that
their supervisors were constantly evaluating them as lawyers and finding them inadequate.
These concerns are present throughout the conversations in the
case studies. It sometimes seems as if a small thundercloud of insecurity hung over everything the students said and did, causing them to
interpret supervisor comments in their most negative light and to see
experiences in their most debilitating form. This self-doubt was not
paralyzing, and may not have been apparent to many of the supervisors. The students did not speak openly of themselves in self-deprecating terms, or disparage their work publicly. They did not wring
their hands, ooze angst, or twist aimlessly and helplessly in the wind.
On the contrary, they appeared to work quickly, competently, now
and then elegantly, at a skill level comparable to that of their peers,
and consistent with what one would expect from someone with their
education and experience. 59 For all outward appearances, they were
functioning without difficulty, contingency, or concern. But in their
underlying thoughts and feelings a richer and more troubling picture
emerges. Here, the students' surface confidence and self-assurance
dissolves. Here, they are plagued by pervasive self-doubt, and this
doubt has real and harmful effects on the quality of their work and
their efforts to improve it. Like evidence at trial which seems convincing until one discovers what other evidence was available, student behavior in the case studies seems unremarkable until one looks at the
students' underlying thoughts and feelings.
In one sense, of course, it is understandable that students would
be anxious. This was the first law firm job for some, and one of the
first for everyone. Even at a rudimentary level the tasks of law practice are unfamiliar to novices, difficult to do well, and have important
and substantial consequences for real people with real interests (including the students). When people are asked to perform difficult
tasks that they are not yet skilled at, with a lot riding on how they do,
it is reasonable for them to be a little nervous. Even research and
memorandum writing, familiar and reasonably well understood
processes for law students, can be scary when the body of law that
must be described and analyzed is new and complicated. First cuts on
59· These conclusions are based on my own reading of the legal memoranda the students
produced. I received copies of everything they wrote, also in laundered form.
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any subject are rarely sophisticated, and students know this,- and so it
is natural for them to be concerned that a truly intelligent perspective
would look totally different. Anxiety on the part of the students
about whether they were ready for law practice was to be expected,
therefore, and thus was not surprising when it appeared in the cases.
But the self-doubt expressed in the cases seems deeper and more
structural than that occasioned by the stress of new challenges. It is so
pervasive and strongly felt that it seems almost built into the students'
conception, albeit a provisional and temporary conception, of themselves as lawyers. The students seem to believe that doing legal work
at all, not just well, entails being nagged by self-doubt about competence and worth.
.
Concern about what others think of one's work is debilitating and
must be managed if one is to function .. This is as true for novice lawyers as it is for big city mayors. 60 The students seemed to realize this
since they adopted one or more of several well known strategies for
keeping their anxieties in check. Ironically, however, these strategies
produced new difficulties, and new anxieties of their own. I will describe the strategies briefly here, but a reading of the cases will be
necessary for a full understanding of their subtlety and sophistication.
The most common strategy for not looking stupid was to bluff,
that is, to pretend to be knowledgeable even when one did not have a
clue, and attempt to discover what oneneeded to know indirectly during the course of the conversation. To some extent, this strategy is
based on a contradiction. Students were committed to learning from
their supervisors what they professed already to understand. But that
did not diminish its popularity. The strategy, which I'll call "indirection," was characterized by secrecy, equivocation, and pretense. Students thought one thing and said another, asked ambiguous and
equivocal questions for purposes other than the ostensible ones, asked
friends and co-workers rather than supervisors themselves to explain
or interpret supervisor comments (and in a carefully controlled manner so that the friends and co-workers did not know all that was going
on), and examined the implications of supervisor comments in private,
rather than risk engaging in an open process of learning.
Indirection was attractive because when successful it allowed the
students to learn without appearing to have not understood, to become knowledgeable without appearing to have been ignorant. It
eliminated the perceived stigma of being a newcomer. The students
could be experts simply by pretending to have expertise. Missing
background experience and understanding could be filled in on the
.

.

60 Ed Koch, the former mayor of New York City, was regularly reported to have asked
citizens in his frequent travels through the boroughs, "How'm I doing?"
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fly, as needed, without supervisors knowing that that was being done.
Those awkward moments of intellectual and professional growth all of
us would like to forget could remain forever"lhe students' own private
secret. The strategy was sometimes transparent, or so it appears in the
case studies that follow, but supervisors also played along, talking in
the coded vocabulary of indirection themselves. To an outside observer it might have seemed that each side was aware that the other
meant more than was being said, but also willing to respect the other's
tacit choice to pretend that neither side knew that.
The second most popular strategy for interacting with supervisors, which I will call "take charge," was made up of a range of more
explicitly competitive and controlling maneuvers than those of indirection, maneuvers commonly associated with the stereotype of lawyer adversarial discourse. Here, students argued differences with
supervisors openly and aggressively, challenged comments critical of
their work, reacted to new ideas and suggestions in an agree/disagree
fashion even when it was too soon to have a considered view, defined
the agendas of supervisory conversations and the standards of successful work performance unilaterally, and generally expressed their feelings and beliefs, sometimes in an exaggerated fashion, with respect to
all aspects of their situations and work, apparently both as a form of
catharsis and as a way of influencing the outcome of the conversation.
The students were not belligerent or rude but just pervasively assertive (though some find pervasive assertiveness belligerent or rude),
very much focused on their own needs and perspectives, and intent on
having the last word on most issues. Unlike indirection, the take
charge strategy was used to convince others openly and unabashedly,
rather than lead them indirectly into doing something they did not
know they were being led to do. With take charge, what the students
said, for the most part, was what they meant.
Take charge is a difficult strategy for novices to use with veterans,
but periodically it would work. Sometimes supervisors would seem to
agree (or stop disagreeing) with aggressive student arguments either
because they thought the arguments were correct, or because the issues involved were not worth fighting about. This happened most frequently when the students seemed to have a strong emotional stake in
the outcome, and were persistent. Even when the strategy did not
produce such satisfying results, however, students often felt good
about using it because they saw arguing aggressively as paradigmatic
lawyer behavior, and thought themselves more lawyer-like for being
able to do it, particularly with lawyers who were more experienced
than themselves.
In many ways take charge was easier than indirection for supervi-
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sors to understand and deal with. Overtly aggressive statements usually came closer to representing what was on the students' minds than
did indirect and manipulative ones, and as such, relieved the supervisors of the need to guess about what the students were trying to say.
Take charge also was more respectful of supervisors as persons because it did not try to mislead them, consciously or otherwise, or to
protect them unilaterally from information the students thought
would be too difficult for them to handle.
These qualities notwithstanding, the constant evaluation and
competition underlying the take charge strategy, and the strong feelings generated by the arguments the strategy produced, made it difficult over time for supervisors not to take student comments
personally and to feel attacked. When the supervisors defended
themselves, the students understandably responded in kind, with the
ultimate effect that each side began to share less and less of what it
thought, and only its most defensible (in other words, commonplace
and uncontroversial) thoughts at that, so as to give the other less "ammunition" to work with. Most of the time, the take charge strategy
ultimately reduced conversations to stylized fights.
A third distinctive strategy, present in a significant percentage of
the cases, might appropriately be called "belly up," or "roll over." 61
Here, the students gave up all hope of influencing supervisor understanding, and tried to discover what supervisors already believed so
that they could ratify it. Belly up was secretive like indirection, but
not as aggressive or competitive as indirection covertly was. Students
going belly up were critical of supervisor instructions and comments,
but they did not express or act on these criticisms publicly. They
either saw themselves as powerless to influence supervisor views, or
were convinced that what the supervisors said must be right. They
were fatalists of sorts, seeing themselves at the mercy of forces outside
their control, and rolling with the punches as their most advantageous
option. They felt no need to examine their supervisors' tacit conceptions of good practice critically because they did not believe that they
could act on critical insights even if they had any. They listened to
supervisors at all only to be sure that they did what they were told.
Going belly up made work easier because it removed most of the fric61 I mean no offense by these terms. This Article is an analysis of communication strategies that are problematic but common, and is meant to help all of us to notice and improve these strategies rather than to criticize the young men and women who revealed
their use of these approaches in their case studies. I take the terms from the adaptive
response of some animals to appease a powerful and threatening adversary. Konrad Lorenz has described the wide range of such appeasement behavior. See KoNRAD LoRENZ,
ON AGGRESSION 131-38 (1963). Belly-up and roll-over have a lighter side, of course, as
any one with a dog or cat for a pet will attest.
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tion from student-supervisor conversations, and for many students the
absence of friction was a working definition of a successful conversation. It also absolved the students from responsibility for the hard
choices that needed to be made in many of their cases, since supervisor judgments always controlled. Again, for many, this freedom from
responsibility made for a more congenial world.
I have described the foregoing strategies in terms of their different approaches to, and attitudes about, influencing conversational
ends. Each reflects the competitive approach to conversation characteristic of the persuasion mode. Thus indirection seeks to influence
outcome by not letting on that influence is being exercised. This strategy is a form of competing to succeed without letting the other person
in the conversation know that he or she has interests at stake and
should argue back if interested in protecting them. It aims to minimize
resistance by anesthetizing it. Take charge turns conversation into argument and tries to win arguments overtly. It seeks to overpower
others, to silence them and treat their silence as agreement. Belly up
tries to eliminate friction from conversation by eliminating disagreement. It is a passive-aggressive form of competition, albeit for the purpose of cutting one's losses in a conversation rather than winning most
of its points. Its only major goal is to end the interaction itself.
But the strategies also could be described in terms of their constitutive maneuvers and techniques, and here too one can see their link
to persuasion mode discourse. Students using each of the above strategies regularly attributed single (often uncomplimentary) meanings to
supervisor comments when additional, more mixed interpretations
were possible, and sometimes more plausible. Rather than .ask the
historian's question of "What could he or she mean by that?" and test
the possibilities against other data from the conversation, the context,
and the relationship as a whole, they would ask the persuasion mode
corollary of "Why would he or she say that about me?". The meanings the students thus attributed often mirrored the students' own
conversational strategies (and the students' use of these strategies may
have contributed to the supervisors' actually behaving in the ways the
students imputed to them). That is, competitive students saw their supervisors as aggressive and difficult to deal with, indirect students saw
supervisors as less than fully forthcoming, and students going belly up
complained that supervisors abdicated responsibility by not telling
them (the students) what to do. Understanding what was being said
became a quite complicated task for all involved, as one would expect,
when the meanings attributed were not the meanings intended.
The students also were frequently judgmental, regularly evaluating the worth of their supervisors' ideas and suggestions, and the legit-
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imacy of the motives behind them. Sometimes they called their
supervisors harsh and unflattering names (privately, of course), and
sometimes complimentary ones, but in most cases these characterizations did not seem to be based on extended deliberation or clear evidence. In fact, many of the students' judgments appeared almost
reflexive, showing little awareness of their (the students') own role in
helping to produce or shape the supervisors' actions. It was .<is if the
students believed they should always be judging, that at every nioment
in the conversation they should have a bottom line view, up or down,
about the accuracy and worth of what their supervisors said and did.
The students also regularly suppressed relevant ide~s and feelings
when they were not sure how their supervisors would react. Indirect
students were reluctant to be candid for fear that their real objectives
would seem offensive or unimpressive. Competitive students, assertive as they were, still hesitated to articulate all of their views in the
somewhat overstated language of advocacy for fear that such language
would be misconstrued. And students going belly up did not want to
do so too obviously, out of anxiety that they would appear obsequious
if they were too overtly accepting of supervisor ideas, and that this, in
turn, would make it difficult for them to look impressive. All of these
were legitimate concerns in the abstract, of course, and some were
justified in context, but the loss to the work relationships resulting
from the students' suppressed ideas and feelings often was
considerable.
It is time to see these patterns in more specific detail. The following eight cases were selected for their representativeness, with each
offered as a good example of the particular strategies and patterns it
embodies. Other cases illustrating the same strategies and patterns
could be presented, each case a little different in its own right, but
there is little strategic maneuvering present in the cases in their entirety that is not captured in the eight reproduced here.
Case One-Simple Indirection62

The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
It was my first day on the job and I wanted to make a good impres62 I have categorized each case according to what I think is the principal strategy it
illustrates, though even a brief reading will make clear that all of the cases contain aspects
of all of the strategies. From my perspective, nothing turns on the labels attached to
individual cases, so that if a reader wants to move a case from, say, the take charge
category into the indirection category (because it involves taking charge by passive means,
for example), that is fine with me.
The case studies are presented here essentially as written by the students, with light
editing of matters such as form and spelling.
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sion, especially since I was the only law clerk hired for the summer.
My first assignment was to "redact" part of a document that was
discoverable material based upon a motion granted by the court.
The only problem was that I did not know what the term "redact"
meant in a legal sense, nor was I clear about which sections of the
document were to be redacted. I felt silly asking my supervisor
["SU"] directly although she had breezed through her instructions
to me as she was getting ready to leave for a meeting. This conversation took place in my cubicle. My supervisor was on her way out
of the office and had stopped by to check my progress. My goal for
this conversation was to find out what my supervisor meant by redact without having· to ·ask my supervisor directly.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I'm glad she asked, now I can
try and figure out what she
meant. I'll try not to take up
too much of her time.

Dialogue
SU: · How is it [the project] going?
·ST: I think I am making some headway. But I have· a few questions. Do you have a minute?
SU:

I'll really feel stupid if I ask
straight out what redact means.
How can I phrase my question
subtly?

ST:

SU:

Great, she is blowing me off,
and I am going to end up looking like a fool if I don't get this
done today. Maybe if I
rephrase the question.

ST:

SU:

I'm running late for a meeting,
are your questions quick?
Yes. Can you suggest the best
strategy for redacting this document?
Well, I suppose you could just
use a black marker or a highlighter and then photocopy the
document until it is taken care
of. Or wait, you know what,
why don't you ask __ how to
do it. I think she has done this
sort of thing before. I am going
to be late. If __ can't help
come talk to me when I get
back.
No problem. Just one more
thing, what does the highlighting on this motion mean?
Oh, it just means that the judge
granted our motions as to those
parts of the document. Just follow his highlights and you'll be
fine. Anything else before I
go?
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I assume the fact that she is jingling her keys means she
doesn't want to hear any more
questions. Actually I think I
have it now. I suppose she has
confidence in me if she thinks
I'll be fine. I still better check
how much time I have to work
on this.

[Vol. 3:337

ST:

Uh, no. I got it, no problem. Is
there a time constraint on this
project?

SU:

Just be done sometime this
afternoon.

The student evaluated her effectiveness in the conversation in the
following way.
Overall, I think I accomplished what I had set out to do. The assignment was simple. I was to edit out sections of a document as
directed by the court. I'm glad I did not directly ask what redact
meant, especially because it became clear in her answer to my strategy question and was clarified even more by her answer to my second question. In hindsight, I don't think my supervisor was blowing
off my questions, rather I think she was just running late. I think I
was hypersensitive to her reaction because it was my first day on the
job and I was eager to impress.

This case, as the student said, presents a simple problem. The
student had not heard of and did not understand the term "redact,"
yet she had been asked to redact a discovery document. The seemingly obvious thing for her to do would be to ask her supervisor what
"redact" means. She could have phrased the question in different
ways: "That's a new term to me, could you tell me what it means?" or
"This is my first time redacting a document, could you (or someone
you could point me to) explain what is involved?" or "I never heard
that expression in law school. Could you explain it to me?" The student's ignorance was only terminological. She knew how to redact, as
the rest of the conversation makes clear, even though she did not
know that she knew. The student's failing, if it was a failing, was only
one of vocabulary. It did not call her competence or intelligence into
question.
Moreover, the supervisor might well have welcomed, or even
hoped for, such a request for explanation from the student. Since it
was the student's first assignment on her first day on the job, the supervisor might have been using the assignment to determine the level
of work she (the student) was capable of doing, and would have
wanted this "test" to be as accurate as possible. The supervisor might
even have used the term to discover the student's response to confusion or doubt. Supervisors need to know whether students will bluff
when they do not understand something in order to determine what
assignments to give and how much to rely on work that is turned in.
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Consequently, they sometimes give intentionally cryptic instructions
in matters of little import early in a supervisory relationship to see
what response the students will make. That may have been all that
was going on here.
Given the context, then, the student should not have "felt silly"
asking her supervisor what she meant by redact, and thinking that she
would look silly was not a reasonable view. What could explain it?
Did the student assume that she had studied redacting in law school
and forgotten what she had learned? This was not likely. She had a
reputation for being a thoughtful and conscientious student, one to
whom others went for class notes and explanations of difficult doctrines and concepts. It was more likely that a discussion of redacting
had never occurred than that she had missed or forgotten it. Did she
believe that competent lawyers always act as if they know something
when they do not? It is not unusual for students to believe this, and
yet to state the view is to discredit it. Whatever the reason, the student was committed to the not perfectly compatible goals of learning
what the supervisor meant, and not asking directly.
Her principal strategy was to ask a somewhat disingenuous question instead. She asked "Can you suggest the best strategy for redacting this document?" but she meant "Can you define redacting?"
Seemingly, she tried to use a question about procedure to obtain an
answer about substance, and not let on that that was what she was
doing. The supervisor either understood what was happening and refused to provide an easy way out, answering the question literally as
asked ("use a black marker or a highlighter"), or took the question at
face value and was fooled.
The student's reaction to this ("she is blowing me off") seems too
harsh. The supervisor answered the question the student asked, very
possibly understanding it as the student wanted it to be understood. It
does not seem fair to fault the supervisor for failing to answer a question the student was unwilling to ask. While the student backed away
from her "blowing me off" characterization in her evaluation of the
conversation, she did not acknowledge the disingenuous nature of her
question, the unfairness of her reaction to the supervisor's answer, or
the extent to which her own behavior helped shape the supervisor's
reply.
The student's next question must have seemed strange to the supervisor if, up until now, she (the supervisor) had taken the student's
statements at face value. Why would someone who understands how
to redact need to ask what the court's "highlighting on this motion
mean[s]?" This question illustrates the difficulty of inquiring indirectly without tipping one's hand. If the supervisor saw the question
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as a signal that the student was bluffing, she had reason to became
concerned. Having now learned that the student will pretend to know
something when she does not, even in a small matter where little is at
stake, she might be reluctant to assign important work to the student
in the future, unsure of whether she could rely on what the student
turned in.
In many ways the matters raised by this case are small and relatively unimportant. The student learned what it means to redact in
about the same time it would have taken to learn by ·asking directly,
though there was a fair amount of fortuity .in this outcome. So we
might ask, "Why be concerned with technical imperfe~ti<_>n~? Isn't this
a case of 'no harm-no foul'?" Yet, in another sense, the quotidian and
trivial nature of the interaction makes the student's actions all the
more troubling. The student was. secretive and disingenuous when
there would have been minimal risk in being more dire~t. It was her
first day on the job, and her first assignment. Her confusion was over
a term she could be expected not to know. She had just been given
the assignment, and had wasted no time spinning her wheels trying to
resolve the confusion on her own. If she could not communicate more
straightforwardly under these conditions, where the interests at stake
were so small, and her blameworthiness, if any, so slight, there is not
much reason to believe that she would be able to do so when more
important issues were involved. Moreover, the fact that the strategy
"worked" this time makes it that much easier to use the next time too,
as the student indicated in her post hoc evaluation of the case, when
she said she was "glad" that she "did not directly ask what redact
meant." In such conclusions, multiplied many times over, lie the seeds
of large scale persuasion mode behavior.
Case Two-Competitive and Didactic Indirection

The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
On Friday I was invited to sit in on a deposition of a witness for
a case I was working on. The witness was general counsel of a large
firm. One of the issues in the case involved registration of employees and whether the employees were properly registered to perform
their duties. There were two attorneys for [my firm], a young attorney (YA), who is very friendly and approachable, and an older attorney (OA), who is supposed to be my supervisor but who
generally seems bothered whenever I approach him, which needless
to say is not often. The head attorney for the defense (HAD) is a
hot shot and is about the same age as OA. OA obviously resents
HAD's success, making disparaging comments about HAD's salary
($600,000-$700,000 a year), and later praising his own nobility ("I
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wouldn't work this hard for so little unless I took my job seriously."). On the other hand, HAD clearly had expected OA to give
him more consideration, and this fact was recognized by OA ("He
should know I am not a gentleman."). I sat in only in the afternoon
and they had been at it all morning, so things were really tense.
The room was very small, hot and crowded. My chair was in
the corner behind the door, the other corner chair on our side being
occupied by YA's documents. This meant that every time the witness wanted to confer with his counsel I had to get up and move so
that the defense team could file out into the hall. Other than getting_ up to 9pen the. door, I had not spoken or moved for three
hours. At this point, OA began asking a question to the effect that
"Did you -ever observe any employees doing anything unlawful?"
This question resulted in the witness asking to confer with counsel.
After the aforementioned laborious process exiting the room, the
defense team would return and HAD would say that the answer was
"privileged." OA would restate the question and the process would
repeat itself. This went on for a period of about two hours. The
firm attorneys were doing a weak job of arguing why this information is not privileged and the defense attorneys were getting very
frustrated with each other. During one of these periods when the
defense team was out in the hall and the firm attorneys were obviously just waiting for their return, I asked a few questions to try and
understand privilege. I also had the secondary goal of trying to help
the attorney articulate his position, since I felt he was not doing this
well.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings

Dialogue

I really don't understand where
the basis for the privilege argument lies.

ST:

Is this an answer to my question? Please listen to what I
have to say. I might say something of use.

OA:

It seems like if the attorney is

ST:

hired to observe and then provide legal advice, the allowed
observations are a "communication."
It is clear that the attorneys
either are not able or don't
want to explain the finer points
of privilege to me.

OA:

Is [defense attorney] trying to
assert that because the witness
is in-house counsel everything
he has knowledge of is essentially a privileged communication?
The term in-house counsel is a
dangerous term. Not everything an attorney does is privileged. Only communications
are privileged.
So therefore, although the
observations of the attorney
are gained by virtue of his position, such restricted observations are not considered
"communications"?
Only oral communications are
protected.
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Why don't you challenge the
other attorney's assertion.

ST:

End of discussion.

OA:

So your position is that the witness's observations and report
are work product and since
they are not prepared in anticipation of litigation then they
are not protected?
Basically.

The student continued:
A couple of minutes passed before the defense team reentered.
Soon afterward, OA asked the same question and they went out in
the hall. This happened at least one additional time during which
the firm attorneys went to confer with another attorney about the
issue of limited waiver. When they returned, the other attorney introduced herself and told me I should have come to their conference. When the deposition resumed, OA asked his same question
and the defense team left to confer again. Everybody was getting
very frustrated. I wondered why they didn't answer subject to objection as I had seen in other depositions and thought I would ask.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
Look out! Frrst of all, I wouldn't
call the last conversation a
"hashing." Second, this is only
the second time I have spoken
and I didn't talk at all during the
last break. Thirdly, most people
prepare for the olympics. He is
clearly taking his frustrations out
on me.

Dialogue
ST: Why ...
OA: Look. I don't want to hash
this out with you every time
they leave!
(Silence).
(Apologetically) It is like the
olympics, I need to be prepared mentally to perform.

The student evaluated his effectiveness in the conversation in the
following way:
It will be a while before I talk to this guy again. At the end of the

day (the issue had not advanced a hair), I thanked him for allowing
me to sit in and apologized for disturbing him. He apologized in a
general way and we parted. Next time I open my mouth I will have
to try to be even more obsequious and non-assertive than I was.

The student in the first case used indirection to learn surreptitiously, so as to protect herself from having to acknowledge that she
did not already understand. In this case, the student used indirection
to conceal a private evaluation of the supervisor's performance, an
attempt to take control of (a small part of) the deposition questioning
process, and an effort to instruct the supervisor in substantive law and
deposition technique in the process. The student does not appear any
more knowledgeable about the issues at hand than the student in the
first case, but his willingness to assert himself was greater.
The case involved a discussion of whether an opposing attorney's
numerous privilege objections to deposition questions were war-
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ranted, and whether the deposing attorney, the student's supervisor,
could do a better job of getting his questions answered. The student's
stated objectives for the discussion were mixed and somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, he believed that his supervisor was doing a
"weak job of arguing why [the] information is not privileged," and
wanted to "help the attorney articulate his position" better. At the
same time, another goal for the conversation was "to try and understand privilege." If the student did not understand privilege, it is not
clear how he determined that his supervisor's efforts were "weak," or
why he believed he could articulate the supervisor's position better.
His underlying thoughts and feelings indicate that his understanding
of privilege could be clearer (as could the supervisor's), but this does
not prevent him from criticizing the supervisor's performance, both by
disparaging particular maneuvers and by attributing unflattering
meanings to the supervisor's statements. This attribution and judgment continued throughout the discussion, and became more negative
as the conversation proceeded. The student's own views, by contrast,
were seen as "clearly" or "obviously" correct.
The student's comments also often appear to be more didactic
than curious. For example, his opening statement, ostensibly a question about the opposing attorney's privilege objection, asked the supervisor to confirm or deny the student's description of the objection,
rather than explain the objection in the first instance. In a context in
which the supervisor was performing under the watchful eye of other
attorneys, such a comment easily could have been seen as an attempt
to give advice, or correct a misunderstanding, rather than an effort to
learn what was going on. So interpreted, it would not be unusual for
an experienced attorney to view the comment, coming as it did from a
new "lawyer" and one only partly familiar with the case, as presumptuous, or at least distracting, and treat it accordingly. The supervisor
answered the question after a fashion ("Only communications are
privileged"), but the student's incomplete understanding of privilege
(he seems to have believed that all attorney "observations" are privileged),63 might have prevented him from recognizing the statement as
a response. His subsequent criticism of the supervisor for not being
responsive, therefore, seems either unjustified, or at least premature.
The next exchange had much the same structure. The student
made a statement about privilege, but under the guise of asking a
question. The supervisor answered the question, though not in a completely accurate fashion ("Only oral communications are protected.").
63 Perhaps he confused the evidentiary privilege with the ethical rule on confidentiality,
which ordinarily protects everything learned "relating to" the representation. See MooEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rule 1.6(a) (1983).

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 381 1996-1997

382

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:337

The student criticized this answer privately for not being responsive
("the attorneys are not able or don't want to explain ... privilege to
me"), and then summarized the supervisor's view in a less than complete fashion. Because the summary was confusing (for example, the
statement that "the witness's observations ... are work product ...
since they are not prepared in anticipation of litigation" appears selfcontradictory), the supervisor may have decided to wait for another
time to discuss the issue, not knowing whether the student's confusion
could be sorted out quickly in the context of the deposition.
The student's last attempt to converse with the supervisor, a
query about why the deposition questions were not answered "subject
to objection," seems to have been a genuine inquiry rather· than a rhetorically concealed instructional point. The student stated it as a question in his underlying thoughts and feelings, and it might have come
out that way in the conversation. Unfortunately, the supervisor
squelched the comment before it was fully (or even partly) articulated,
perhaps because he thought the student still wanted to talk about privilege. The student interpreted the move as unfriendly-the supervisor
taking out his frustrations on the student-but it could also be explained as a practical judgment about how best to use deposition time,
based on a reasonable if inaccurate assumption about what the student was going to say. The supervisor had more pressing concerns at
the moment, and the earlier exchange about privilege might have
raised doubts in his mind about the usefulness of tryingto make "educational" points in the deposition context.
The lesson the student drew from the experience, to minimize
contact with the supervisor in the future, and to be "even more obsequious and non-assertive" when contact is unavoidable, is also suspect. It is not clear, to begin with, that the student was "obsequious
and non-assertive." While he did not state his views directly (his private thoughts were probably too harsh for that), his public comments
were replete with implicit suggestion, tacit evaluation, and veiled assertion. It seems unlikely that anyone in the deposition doubted that
he had views.
If one grants the student's characterization of "obsequious and
non-assertive," however, it may still be wrong to conclude that a
shortage of obsequiousness led to the breakdown of the conversation.
The supervisor may have been less piqued by the student's manner
than by his confusion over privilege, less upset by the fact that he
spoke up than by what he said. Moreover, although it might have
been difficult for the supervisor to learn from the student's comments
in the heat of the deposition, at the end the supervisor apologized for
being brusque, and thus apparently acknowledged that he had been
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wrong. The attorney's overall conduct does not demonstrate that he
wanted only obsequiousness from the student in the future.
Overall, this student seems to have been more evaluative, attributive, and secretive than most of the others in these case studies. He
tried, surreptitiously, to take control of a practice task assigned to his
supervisor, and then failed to understand why his supervisor reacted
defensively, or how his (the student's) own behavior helped produce
the reaction. He may have backed his supervisor into a corner, making it more difficult for his (the student's) points to register. Combined, these actions contributed to truncating the conversation,
making a detailed examination of the privilege issue less likely, and
decreased the likelihood that the student and supervisor would speak
with one another again in the future. In fact, this last point is one of
the "lessons" the student drew from the experience. A conversational
method that inadvertently truncates and discourages conversation is
not yet a fully developed conversational method.
Case Three-Manipulative Indirection

The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
I was talking to my supervisor ["SU") about an assignment she had
given me, to research the elements of a particular cause of action,
and focus on one of the elements. After that, I had to apply my
research to the facts of our case. I had done some preliminary research and began to wonder what my supervisor actually expected
me to find. I decided to speak to her and "feel her out" vis a vis her
expectations. This was the first conversation we had had about the
assignment since I had begun to work on it. My plan was to see
exactly what my supervisor wanted me to find and how she expected the information to be presented. I then wanted to tell her
how I believed the job would be done based on my preliminary research. I did this so that I. could "plant a seed" in her head as to the
reality of the job I was going to perform. Therefore, my supervisor's expectations would be roughly equivalent to what I intended
to deliver to her.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I'm glad she asked me how I'm
doing. Now I can dear up this
issue. I hope she expects what
I can give her.

Dialogue
SU:

How are you today? How is
the assignment going?

ST:

I'm fine. How are you?
Fine.

SU:
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I'd like to catch her in a good
mood and with some free time
so that she will be tolerant of
me if she thinks my questions
are stupid.
I hope this gal does not think I
plan on finding a "gem" of a
case. All I can find are these
little pieces. I'll just have to
force the facts into the law that
I have found. Let me make
sure she knows I'm not dogging
my assignment. I'll tell her
what I've done to date.

ST:

About that assignment, I
wanted to ask you a few questions. Do you have a couple of
moments?

SU:

Yes, what do you need to
know?
I am uncertain about what you
expect me to find on the issues
I am researching. I have done
some research on the issue and
there is no "great" case that
lists the elements of the cause
of action. Some cases discuss
one element while others discuss other elements. But no
case just lays it out nice and
neat. I've checked the
Supreme Court case law, federal and state case law, and
administrative hearing reporters with no success.
What have you come up with
so far? Has anything given you
a broad definition?
Well, there have been some law
review articles that give a nice
definition, but they carry little
precedential value so I left
them alone. I researched the
footnote citations in hopes of
finding something. I just keep
coming up with pieces, not
answers.
That's what lawyering is.
You're rarely going to find a
case that spoon-feeds you the
answer you're looking for.
Most of the time you have to
put the pieces together and
then "lawyer" them to fit the
case you're working on. That is
what it means to be a lawyer.
Yes, I understand that. My
concern was that you were
expecting me to find something
that was the "end-all" answer.
Of course you have to work
your facts into the law, that was
never the question. Every
paper I have ever written has
been done in that fashion. I
just wanted to make sure your
expectations met mine.

ST:

SU:
I just told you no. If I found a
case with a broad definition
don't you think I would have
used it? Geez. Well maybe
this will pacify her,. although
it's pretty much useless. I'll
just let her know I'm trying.

ST:

SU:

No shit. I can't imagine how I
got this far without that wonderful piece of information. I
better try to save myself and
establish that I'm not the idiot
this gal now thinks I am. I'll
give her examples of my competence. Let's get back to the
issue. What does this gal want?

[Vol. 3:337
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I'd like to cement the competence issue again and give her
something to look forward to.
I hope I can meet this selfimposed deadline-! doubt it.

ST:

SU:

This risk element seems trivial.
Most courts don't even bother
with it. Why does she keep
harping on risk?

ST:

Well they are wrong. There are
many elements of the case that
they have.

SU:

Risk just is not that big of a
deal, unless I am missing the
big picture .
. Which is
always a distinct possibility.

ST:

I'M SAYING RISK DOES NOT
MAITER!!!!!!. I think????

Okay. I must escape from this
room. I am feeling very
uncomfortable. The whole
conversation established facts I
already knew yet made me
look or at least feel like an
idiot.
SEE YA. Hopefully she will
need me later. I doubt it.

SU:
ST:

SU:

ST:

Just find whatever elements
you can find and see if our case
has any of them. Focus on the
element of risk and write me a
memo on your findings.
That I can do without any
problem. The research for that
type of memo is substantially
completed. Let me just run
down a few more leads and I'll
be done. I should be able to
give you a hard copy by next
Monday. Is that alright?
Yes. That will give me time to
read some of the cases you
researched already. Is there
anything else you need to ask.
Yes. I'm uncertain as to why
the key focus of this case is
risk. Risk kept showing up in
your Request for Action Memorandum and in your notes, but
it is rarely discussed in the case
law. What's the story on risk.
The clients claim that risk is the
key element of the cause of
action, and that since risk
passed along with the sale . . .,
the sale was legitimate. But,
we feel that there was no real
risk passing in the transaction.
Also, the reason you're doing
your research is to find out just
how important risk is in this
case.
I guess that is why I'm confused. My research indicates
that risk is not as crucial an element as it has been made out
to be.
What are you saying?
Basically, my research indicates
that risk is rarely focused on
and when it is considered it has
been dispensed with rather
quickly by the Court.
Bring that to my attention in
your memo. Can you meet me
around 3:00 this afternoon to
discuss your progress in more
detail?
No problem. I'll see you then.
If you need me I'll be in the

library.
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The student evaluated his effectiveness in the conversation in the
following way:
I believe that my supervisor took my action as a sign of incompetence. I then had to "bail myself out" and try to establish a situation
that was at least equivalent to the situation prior to the conversation. By this I mean, I wanted my supervisor to know that I was not
incompetent, or at least feel the same way about me as she did
before we had the conversation.

This case presents the law office version of a familiar law school
conversation, perhaps best characterized as "What do I have to do to
get an A?", and represents the most popular use of the indirection
strategy. The student seems to have little substantive work to do in
the conversation, and mostly to want reassurance that he should write
up his research in the way he understood it. In effect, he appears to
be asking, "Should I trust my own judgment in summarizing my research?" The answer to this question must always be "yes," of course,
for what other basis could one possibly use for writing a memorandum? Surprisingly, students often asked supervisors to answer some
facsimile of this question, only to feel bad afterwards for having done
so (as the student did in this case).
The discussion has two parts. In the first, the student asked the
supervisor "what [she] expects [him] to find on the issues [he] is researching." The concern, he said, is that there is no "great" case that
"just lays it out nice and neat," there are just "pieces, not answers."
The supervisor's response, in effect, was not to worry, that "that's
what lawyering is. You're rarely going to find a case that spoon-feeds
you .... Most of the time you have to put the pieces together and
then 'lawyer' them to fit." The student got upset at this admittedly
platitudinous advice ("No shit. I can't imagine how I got this far without that wonderful piece of information."), but what more satisfactory
answer could the supervisor have given? If the supervisor knew what
the student would find in his research presumably she would not have
asked him to do it in the first instance. Not clear about what was
being asked, therefore, the supervisor may have given a rhetorical answer to a rhetorical question, perhaps hoping that the inadequacy of
her response would cause the student to rephrase the question. She
may not have been clairvoyant, but she might not have been unresponsive either.
What does the student seek to accomplish with this general inquiry? His comments reflect that one of his purposes was to "make
sure [the supervisor] knows I'm not dogging my assignment," but he
would have better· served this purpose simply by writing up his research and turning it in. The clearest evidence of diligence is compe-
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tent work, submitted on time. Even his more manipulative purpose,
to "plant a seed in [the supervisor's] head .... [so as to make her]
expectations ... roughly equivalent to what I intended to deliver to
her," required that he first determine what the memorandum would
say when finished. The fact that neither of these articulated objectives
was served by the approach adopted suggests that the student's goal in
this part of the conversation must have been different from the ones
he stated. Perhaps, like many of the students in these cases, he wanted
no more than for the supervisor to attest to his (the student's) competence, and express confidence in his ability to do the work. The difficulty with this, however, is that there is not a close relationship
between being thought competent and asking to be stroked.
We might ask how risky it would have been for the student to
have been more direct with the supervisor. Suppose he had said
something like, "I'm nervous about doing this memo correctly, and
have a couple of questions, which might be non-questions to you.
Would you mind if I asked them anyway?" Would the supervisor have
thought less of him for starting in this way? Students frequently say
yes. But most supervisors I have spoken with believe that nervousness in these circumstances is understandable. They are not bothered
by it, believe that it takes more confidence to acknowledge nervousness than to suppress it, and think more highly of students who are
direct, provided that they also continue to function. Since nervousness is also often transparent, they say, there seems to be little point in
trying to deny or ignore it.
The second half of the conversation is about the student and supervisor's different perspectives on the importance of risk in the problem under investigation. Here, the student had a genuine question,
which he asked fairly straightforwardly ("I'm uncertain as to why the
key focus of this case is risk."). When the supervisor answered equally
directly ("The clients claim that risk is the key element"), the exchange might have ended since the client was not a party to the conversation.64 Instead, it continued in much the same fashion as before.
The student disagreed with the client's view, inviting a response, but
for the supervisor to respond she would have had to hear the student's
entire argument, and read the cases herself. Although the student
does succeed in getting the supervisor's attention on the risk issue,
64 The supervisor's response, reprinted on page 385 supra as reported by the student, is
puzzling. How do the clients know what the key elements of the cause of action are, as the
supervisor is quoted saying? And why is the supervisor apparently using the client's theory
on risk to reach a conclusion opposite to the client's (and perhaps contrary to the client's
interests), namely that the sale was not legitimate? It may be that here the student's memory, or at least his transcription of it, erred.
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here too he would have been better off putting his thoughts in the
memorandum, where he could explain his position in detail. As with
his first point, the student seems more interested in obtaining approval in advance than in discussing the issue of risk in detail.
At the end of this session, the supervisor might have thought that
the student understood the point about deciding for himself how to
write the memorandum. But this would have been wrong. At the end
of the exchange, the student's underlying thoughts and feelings were
critical of the supervisor's response, preoccupied with looking good,
and lacking any indication that the student had decided to make his
own judgments about how to frame the analysis. The next time a similar problem comes up there is not much reason to believe that the
student will behave differently. This is a conversation that probably
could have been avoided, but once begun, would have worked better
if it had been carried on more directly.
Case Four-Taking Charge Over Work
The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
I walked confidently to my supervisor's ["SU"] office and stood
at the door of the office until I was invited in and asked to have a
seat. She was on the telephone for what seemed a very long time,
but I sat patiently pretending to be undisturbed by the way in which
she was wasting my time. I wondered why she did not ask me to
come back at a later time. She finally ended her telephone conversation and looked at me with an apologetic expression.
My purpose in the interaction was to express my criticisms of a
song writer's contract which I was asked to review. The contract
was written for our client who was a musical artist. However, the
agreement seemed to be more beneficial to the producer. I wanted
to revise the contract in such a way that would be more beneficial to
our client. I planned to accomplish this goal by explaining my views
to my supervisor in an aggressive manner. I decided to speak in an
aggressive manner because I thought that to do otherwise would
result in my opinion not being taken seriously.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I . am just giving constructive
criticism.

Dialogue
SU:
ST:

What can I help you with.
Well, I reviewed the contract
and I wrote down some things
that I thought needed to be
changed.
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She is not acknowledging my
opinions.

SU:

I need to get more confrontational.

ST:

So what. While this may be
true it has nothing to do with
the point I am trying to make.

SU:

ST:

She is holding her experience
over my head. I still think that
I am right.

SP:

389

There are no provisions in the
contract that need to be
changed and there is nothing
that needs to be added. I
wanted you to review the contract only for grammar. I have
used similar contracts with all
of the artists that I have represented.
This contract seems to benefit
the promoter more than it benefits the writer. The writer is
left with almost nothing.
In order to exploit a writer's
material this type of contract is
essential. It is very difficult for
writers to find good producers.
You want to be careful not to
scare producers away.
With all due respect I disagree.
I think that we should at least
attempt to devise a different
type of agreement. If the producer does not agree he will
express his dismay but how will
we ever know unless we try.
I have been doing this for many
years and I know what should
and should not be included in a
contract. I think that the contract should remain unaltered.

The student evaluated her effectiveness in the conversation ih the
following way: "I seem to be making the assumption that effective
learning is not effective (sic). I seem to have a habit of becoming defensive when others do not agree with me."
In the take charge strategy there is a much greater
correspondence between what a student thinks and what she says.
Here, for example, in order "to revise [a song writer's] contract ... [to
make it] more beneficial to [the] client," the student began by telling
the supervisor that "some things [in the contract] ... needed to be
changed."· The supervisor immediately responded that such changes
were unnecessary and furthermore were not within the student's assignment or authority. The student pressed on, expressing her views
"aggressively," as she put it, but also accurately. She thought, and
said, that the contract was unduly beneficial to the producer, and that
there was no risk in trying to change it. The supervisor explained why
the contract was drafted as it was ("It is very difficult for writers to
find good producers. You want to be careful not to scare producers
away."), but the student seemed either not to hear this explanation, or
not to believe it ("this [explanation] has nothing to do with the point I
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am trying to make"; "she is holding her experience over my head"; "I
still think that I am right").
With the issue thus joined, around the question of what was possible, the student was destined to lose the argument. She had no experience in drafting song-writing contracts, and the supervisor did, so that
however long the conversation went on the supervisor would have the
final authoritative word. The student could be expected to be angry
about this, since generalized assertions of experience are hard to confront and test, and thus make it look as if the deck was stacked against
the student from the beginning, as in some ways it was.
But it was not inevitable that the conversation would· take this
course. A "point-counterpoint" or "salvo-salvo-truce" format is not
the only way the student could have chosen to proceed. For example,
the contract "seemed" one-sided to her, and from this she concluded
that it "needed" to be changed. She might instead have been curious
about whether the contract was truly one-sided (her unfamiliarity with
the law or the structure of the song-writing industry might have made
it seem more one-sided than it was), or about why it was written in a
one-sided fashion if in fact it was (producers might be able to demand
one-sided terms because they have more bargaining leverage). This
curiosity might have caused her to initiate the discussion by asking a
question rather than making a statement. She might have asked, for
example, "Is this document unfair to our client, or is it just me?",
"How do producers get away with putting terms like this in a contract?", "Would Madonna have to sign this type of contract?", or
some other such question.
Instead, the student began confrontationally, and so confrontational a start is difficult for a supervisor not to take personally. By
rejecting a document the supervisor had used over time, the student in
effect attacked the supervisor's work in general, and not just the present contract. What is surprising is not that the supervisor was defensive, but that in the course of defending her work she explained to the
student why the contract was drafted as it was (it is "essential" to
agree to such terms because "it is very difficult for writers to find good
producers"). But the student adhered to her "aggressive" posture,
and did not probe this explanation, to discover whether all producers
had such leverage, whether it had always been that way, whether
other writers had tried to bargain for different terms and what had
happened to them when they did, or how all of this is known about an
industry which is private by its nature. The student needed answers to
these questions whether she wanted to test her conclusions, or argue
for them persuasively.
When we ask "Why did the student proceed in this way if it was
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not in her interest?" we are thrown back on a familiar explanation.
The student wanted to be· "taken seriously" by her supervisor, and
believed that presenting her views "aggressively" was the best way to
insure that this· happened. Aggressively, in this context, meant directly, forcefully, and without doubt or equivocation, as if her views
were indisputably true. Perhaps trapped in a trial advocacy view of
legal conversation, she felt that to be successful on her own terms she
needed to be all-knowing, and to take unilateral charge of the task at
hand. "Take charge" was not as popular as "indirection." For most
students it proved emotionally too difficult to sustain. But it appealed
to this student, and a number of others like her.
Case Five-Taking Charge of the Agenda
The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
1\vo years ago I began working for a small law firm. At the time I
started there was another law clerk who had been there for over a
year. He and I worked well together, occasionally assisting on each
other's assignments. In June he decided that he needed to stop
working in order to adequately prepare for the Bar Exam. The two
of us review~d the major cases that he was handling, so that I could
step right in to assist the attorney in charge ["SU"]. The [present]
conversation took place between the attorney and myself during the
last week that the other clerk was working.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
·
I wanted to control the meeting
because the attorney never has
real time for questions and
only gives minor assignments.
That's okay. I have already
been briefed by the other clerk.

ST:

SU:

I can do the work and understand the cases. I wanted him
. to know that I was aware of the
various time constraints and
motions.

ST:

I felt that he was putting me

SU:

off.

Dialogue
I asked for this meeting so I
could begin working on the X
case, the Y case, and the Z
case.
Well, I am not sure what you
can do for me. The cases are
complex and I have had [the
other clerk] working on those
cases.
Actually, I am familiar with the
different cases because [the
other clerk] and I have
reviewed them. What I am
interested in is completing the
work that was in progress and
beginning research on the next
steps.
I appreciate your willingness to
discuss the cases, but I really
haven't done much work with
them and ~ould need to read
the files before giving an
assignment.
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I really wanted him to be aware
of my wanting and ability to
help.

ST:

Damn, another minor simple
project.

SU:

I felt like I could do the job and
wanted to try a different tactic.

ST:

I was frustrated and felt he did
not think me capable of doing
the work.

SU:

I wanted him to know I've
done all the major projects and
needed work.

ST:

Damn! I just wanted to scream
because a court runner/or high
school student could do these
jobs.

SU:

[Vol. 3:337

If it would help, I could give

you a written summary of the
recent activity and a factual
summary. I read the files last
week and discussed them with
[the other clerk).
That's okay, I need to sit down
and read the files before that
and I would need to review
them anyway. What you can
do is arrange a conference with
the other attorney in the Z case
so I can have .a deadline to read
that file by.
The pretrial is already set for
October 4th and to get discovery of the other side by then, I
really should draft interrogatories for you to review at the
same time.
I think you should hold off
until I've read the file, so we
can discuss it at that time.
What else are you working on
for the other attorneys?
I finished the motion to dismiss
an indictment in A's criminal
case, the jurisdictional based
motion to dismiss in your case
and the summary judgment
motion in B's federal case. So
this is the perfect time to work
on your cases.
Let's see, with X I'm waiting to
hear from two doctors regarding expert opinions. You could
contact each of them and see if
they will help. And in Y, I'd
like you to stop by bankruptcy
court and pick up some forms
for subpoenaing witnesses in an
active hearing. And next week,
I'll give you other projects to
complete.

The student evaluated his effectiveness in the conversation in the
following way:
At that point [SU] thanked me for asking to help and said to let him
know when I needed other work. I felt that I had done an okay job
of trying to pick up the cases. But, the conversation felt hurried,
like he was impatient to leave and didn't want my help. Maybe, I
should have been prepared for the little assignments and told him
that I could be of more use doing the research areas. The ending
just left me frustrated and I, in some way, felt that I could do more
and was misunderstood. As an aside, [SU] asked an ex-partner to
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step back in on the Z case and the discovery still is not complete.
Basically, I still get the same projects from him. However, the other
attorneys have given me major projects.

This case is similar to the previous one in some respects, and as a
consequence, many of the same comments apply. In both cases, the
students made decisions about what needed to be done in the work
and then set out to convince their supervisors to allow them to do it.
But Case Five also illustrates another dimension of the take charge
strategy not prominent in the earlier case. The student wanted to
work on bigger cases than this supervisor had given him, and decided
to use the occasion of another law clerk's leaving to orchestrate such
an assignment. In the conversation the student proposed directly that
he take over certain of the departing clerk's cases, and even suggested
specific actions to be taken in the cases right away. Without disagreeing, the supervisor put the student off, delaying decisions on both reassignment of the cases, and the specific work to be done. At the end
of the discussion, to the student's growing frustration, the supervisor
assigned the student new "minor, simple" projects of the type he was
trying to escape. The student's attempt to take over the other clerk's
cases had not worked. So far, nothing surprising: attempts to control
conversations usually meet with resistance, and students are not often
in a good position to overcome such resistance from their supervisors.
What is noteworthy about the case, however, is the student's reluctance to attempt to understand the interaction from the perspective
of the supervisor. Rather than examine why the supervisor resisted
his entreaties, the student grew increasingly frustrated by the failure
of his efforts and attributed his lack of success to the supervisor's not
"think[ing] me capable of doing the work"-a recurrent student anxiety. But consider the various ways in which the supervisor might have
interpreted the student's comments. He might have taken them at
face value, as an attempt to orchestrate work assignments, and
thought that such a move was presumptuous. He might have liked to
give law clerks small, simple tasks at first, to evaluate their skills and
build up confidence in their work, and might have seen the student as
trying to short-circuit that process. He might also have looked upon
clerks as "gophers" or "runners," just as the student feared, and have
reacted to the student's efforts as an attack on that view. Or his reaction might have had nothing to do with his attitudes toward law clerks.
Instead, he might not have wanted responsibility for the former clerk's
cases himself, and hoped to use the occasion of the clerk's leaving as a
reason for passing them on to someone else. Asking an ex-partner to
step back in on one of the cases suggests that this was at least part
(and maybe all) of what was going on. There were a number of
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possibilities.
The issue is not whether any of these· interpretations of the supervisor's behavior is necessarily correct, for the conversation is too cryp_.
tic to be able to tell. Instead, the issue· is why the student did not
generate multiple interpretations of the supervisor's actions, and test
to determine which interpretation was most likely to be true. 65 He
could have framed the question to be answered as "What could explain the supervisor's behavior?" rather than "Why is he doing this to
me?" To answer this question he could have asked the departing clerk
how long it took before the supervisor gave him .major projects, or
whether the supervisor put off important decisions in conversations
with him as well. He could have observed the supervisor's interactions with other people in the office, to determine if strong personalities and confrontational approaches made the supervisor nervous. He
could have asked secretaries and paralegals if the supervisor dealt differently with non-lawyers, or if he routinely let cases sit untended for
long periods of time, on a kind of "out of sight, out of mind" philosophy. In other words, he could have tried to figure out what interpretation of the supervisor's behavior took account of the largest range of
available data, to discover whether the troublesome patterns ·were
present in all of the supervisor's interactions, or just in the supervisor's interactions with him. Without such an analysis, even the decision of how best to take charge of the case assignment task. would
have been difficult to make. Had the student focused on these possibilities, he might not have spoken any differently during this particular conversation, but he might well have suspended judgment about
the reasons for the resistance he encountered, and proceeded afterwards to search out information from which to shape a more effective
strategy for later meetings with the supervisor. 66
The inclination to attribute meaning rather than investigate it has
more than an accidental relationship to the persuasion mode. Attempts to control conversations usually meet with resistance, as I have
mentioned, and anyone using such a strategy must be prepared to
overcome it. Reconfiguring another's views, to put them in their
65 Perhaps the the student did do this, at some other time that he does not refer to in
the case study. My analysis is addressed just to what the case study reports. Even if there
was more to this particular story, however, this kind of premature attribution was a recurrent pattern in the cases.
66 It is worth noting that if the student had pursued this issue with others in the office,
he would not thereby have fallen into persuasion mode again. I have mentioned that one
element of the "indirection~' strategy is to engage in veiled questioning of co-workers
rather than speak plainly with supervisors themselves, see page 370 supra. Here, however,
the student's objective would not have been to avoid conversation with the supervisor, but
to prepare for it.
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weakest form, is one way to do this. There is a limit to the extent one
can hear what one wants to hear, since words and ideas are not infinitely malleable, but as we have seen in this and other cases, people
rarely speak in a manner that can be understood in only one way.
Invariably there is play in the communicative joints, and thus the opportunity to choose, within limits, the version of the other's comments
to which one will respond. Taking on an argument in its weakest form
does not guarantee that one will overcome it, but it increases the odds
that this will happen. For the take charge strategist, therefore, attributing meaning is preferable to investigating it, because it allows one to
respond to the argument one is best prepared to rebut.6 7

Case Six-Belly Up over Agenda
The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
I approached my supervisor ["SU"] hoping to get more guidance on
a project I was doing. She had asked me to update case files, which
meant I first had to inventory and summarize the files she already
had. There was a problem with doing complete summaries, as some
of the information contained in the files was still confidential. I
needed to find out the length and detail required of the summaries,
as well as establish the exact documents which were still confidential. I set out to ask my supervisor these questions directly, as I
thought they were fairly simple and straightforward. I was a little
worried though, about appearing stupid because my questions were
very easily answered.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I just want to establish some
rapport with her before asking
all my questions. Sometimes I
am not always positive she
remembers exactly who I am.

Dialogue
ST:

Hi Ms._ _ _, how are you
today?

SU:

I'm fine
, what do you
have for me today?

67 Some students may pursue a different kind of purpose in their attributions of meaning to their supervisors. They may choose, not the most refutable rationale, but the most
psychologically comfortable one. Some people may find it more satisfying, at least in an
unconscious sense, to see themselves as the victims of unavoidable injustice, rather than as
people with continuing potential, and hence responsibility, for changing things.
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Good, it looks like she has a little time for me, and will be
receptive to what I have to ask.
I just keep worrying about how
the questions are going to
come out sounding. I feel a little tentative here. I am very
much aware of how much more
experience she has than I do.
So far, so good. Looks like I
may actually get what I came
for here.
Time out. Why is she hitting
me with all this information? I
only have a couple of questions
to ask her about what I am
doing. I do not remember asking her about everything on her
desk. If she didn't have time
for me she could have said so.
I feel kind of ambushed by her
complaints. I had nothing to
do with a congressional
request.
Sure, of course I will do something for you. After all, that
really is what I am here for.
Work on a congressional report
could be pretty interesting
stuff. I wonder if she will ever
get back to my questions
though.

[Vol. 3:337

ST:

I have just a couple of questions about the stuff you gave
me to do last week. I just want
to be sure that we're on the
same wavelength.

SU:

Great, hit me with what you've
got.
Okay, here goes ....

ST:
SU:

You understand that I'm a little
preoccupied today. This (gesturing to her desk) is all in
response to a congressional
inquiry. It has me a little crazy,
this all has to be ready to go by
the end of the day. They want
to know how effective some of
our programs have been.

ST:
SU:

That sounds pretty interesting.
Actually, as long as you're
here, why don't you do something for me (shuffles through
the papers on her desk looking
for something). Here, I need
cites for these cases (hands me
a piece of paper with case
names on it). You do know
how to use Lexis don't you?
Yes, I have my student password with me ....
Great, here you go.
I'm sorry, which of these cases
did you need cites for? I can't
make out all the names. I have
trouble too when I write in
pencil, sometimes the lead
smears (we're both lefthanded).

ST:
SU:
ST:
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No problem. I am glad she
clarified things, otherwise I
would be downstairs forever
looking for cases that do not
exist, and worse, are not even
necessary for the report.

SU:

ST:
SU:

Not a problem. Clear instructions are definitely a plus.

ST:

I know what you mean. Here,
some of the cases are ones we
cooperated on with [another
office], so they might have the
cite. This one has a litigation
release number, so just verify
it. Okay, and this one had no
litigation release made, so you
may not find anything on file.
Just check and see if the [other]
·
office was wrong.
No problem. I'll be back as
soon as I find all of them.
Oh, as long as you're looking
for the cites, you might as well
copy the cases, just so I can
make sure everything is okay.
Okay, I'll be back as soon as I
get done.

The student's report continues:
Time passes. I get almost all of the cites, but cannot find three of
them. I head back to [the supervisor's] office to let her know how I
did on the assignment, and also to see if now I can get her to answer
the questions I came in with the first time I saw her today.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I hope this is what she wanted
from me. I feel bad that I
could not get cites for all of the
cases we wanted to use.
Well, here goes nothing. Hopefully her expectations were not
too high.

ST:

SU:
ST:

SU:

I hope she will be a little
impressed that I looked anyway, just to see if there was
anything else that could have
been useful for her to use.

ST:

Dialogue
(after knocking on the door)
Hi, I'm back from the library.
How did you do?
I found almost everything you

asked me to look for. Here are
the copies of those cases and
litigation releases. I couldn't
find this other one in either of
the libraries. The search came
up with nothing.
That's fine. You know what
probably happened? The company being investigated was
called [name], but the case was
filed under a different name.
I'll just get back on the phone
with the [other] office and find
out how the case was filed.
When I find out, I'll get you, so
you can get the cite for this one
also.
I also looked for the one with
no litigation release, just to see
if there was anything else out
there involving the case that
you could use.
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Whew! I am glad she understands that there was no cite
for the case.

SU:

Oops. Guess I should have
taken her at her word and not
done any more than what was
requested of me.

ST:

SU:

I feel a little dismissed by her.
She is done with me, so now I
have to go. Well, I may as well
try to get my first questions
answered now.
I feel like I have just been shut
out. I may have more of an
idea as to the length of the
summaries, but I still have not
gotten the answer to my questions. I feel a little frustrated,
but I do not want to push my
luck by asking too many questions. I am not sure of where I
stand with her, so I will let
things drop. At any rate, I do
not have too much more time
to put in today, I can always try
again tomorrow.

ST:

SU:

[Vol. 3:337

There would not be anything
else on the case since there was
no litigation release filed on it.
What else have you got for me?
The only other case I couldn't
find was this one.
Okay. It probably had the
same problem as the other
case. I'll call the [other] office
and find out what really happened to the case. Thanks for
your help. It's been great.
I still have a couple of questions to ask about the stuff
from earlier.
Right. Just summarize the
files. You should get about two
good paragraphs out of them.
Use my existing outline as a
model.

The student evaluated her effectiveness in the conversation in the
following way:
I did not accomplish anything I had expressly set out to do. Rather
than get any clarification of the original assignment, I was given an
entirely new one to work on. This was not a frustrating experience,
however, because my supervisor was very open to most of my requests to clarify the assignment. I think that my approach would
have been an effective one, if it were not for the fact that my supervisor's priorities had changed. At the end of our conversation, I felt
too tentative to go on, so rather than take a chance on rejection, I
left instead of asking questions which would have accomplished my
stated goals. I need to be more assertive in my dealings with bosses,
and not be so afraid of looking stupid or insecure. Looking at my
thoughts and feelings throughout the conversation, I was struck by
the insecurity and tentativeness I expressed. I need to work on my
perceptions of myself in order to be more successful at achieving my
goals.

At the outset, the student's approach reflected the familiar pat-
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tern of maneuvering for advantage characteristic of persuasion-mode
communication. She initiated the conversation to "find out the length
and detail required of the summaries" she had been asked to prepare.
This description (and understanding) of her objectives was comfortably unspecific, giving her lots of wiggle room to succeed. For example,
what exactly did she want to know? How many pages, on average,
each summary should contain? Whether confidential information
should be included? How to determine what information was confidential? Whether to summarize the procedural posture of each case,
the evidence, or both? Or what? Understanding her objectives at this
level of generality made it much easier for her to feel that she had
achieved them, whatever her performance. If the supervisor later criticized the summaries, the student could blame the supervisor for not
giving clearer and more specific instructions. Framing objectives to
guarantee success is one form of competing for advantage, and as
such, a subtle but fairly common example of persuasion mode communication behavior.
In addition, the student's basic query in the conversation, about
the length and detail required of the summaries, might actually have
been a difficult one to answer. Without reading each file carefully, the
supervisor could not say how much detail would be needed to make a
summary complete. Yet reading each file carefully was what the supervisor hoped to avoid in asking the student to prepare summaries.
"Use your own judgment" would have been a responsive answer, but
the supervisor could reasonably have inferred that the student had
rejected this solution in deciding to ask the question in the first instance. If she sensed that the question could not be answered easily,
the supervisor had two choices: give a rhetorical answer, as in the
third case study ("That's what lawyering is .... "),or duck the question
altogether, as she did. The student criticized the supervisor for not
answering, albeit privately, and the conversation moved on, leaving
the issue unresolved and the student frustrated, but without a more
specific question, it is hard to see how things could have been otherwise. In the process, moreover, the student placed responsibility for
the supervisor's failure to answer on the supervisor, without acknowledging her own possible contribution to the problem. Perhaps, in addition, the question's unanswerability was part of what made it
strategically useful, since any_ deficiencies in the supervisor's answer
could operate as excuses if the student's work product was later
criticized.
The student's comments throughout the conversation have many
of the same attributive, evaluative, and secretive properties found in
the case studies in general. For example, she felt "ambushed" when
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the supervisor changed the topic to the new congressional inquiry.
But the supervisor might have done this because she did not know
how to answer a rhetorical question. Or she might have been concerned about what she might be getting into given the student's possible "wind up" before asking her question ("okay, here goes .... "),
especially if the student's underlying anxieties were manifest in some
non-verbal way. The student also suppressed feelings of insecurity,
inadequacy, and tentativeness, though she was not an insecure person
or she could not have reported and analyzed the case as she did. On
the contrary, she was a reflective and insightful student who saw much
of what was problematic in the conversation she reported. Still, she
did not seem willing to trust the supervisor with her nervousness, perhaps fearful that she might "appear stupid" if she did. Like many of
the students in these cases, she might simply have wanted to be assured that she was competent.
The new feature of the case, and the one from which it takes its
name, is the student's decision, made privately and unilaterally, to
give up on her agenda for the conversation. She began the discussion
with a specific question in mind, one which she thought could be "very
easily answered." At the end of the discussion many hours later, the
question remained unanswered, leaving the student "frustrated" and
disappointed. In her post hoc evaluation, she attributed this failure to
her supervisor's change in priorities. But the student must share part
of the blame. The supervisor did not refuse to answer the student's
question. The question was not asked. The student's reason was familiar. She did not want "to push [her] luck by asking too many questions," because she was "not sure where [she stood] with [the
supervisor]." While this concern is understandable, it is quite possible
that either the original decision to ask so vague a question, or the later
decision to give up on asking it, jeopardized her standing with the supervisor too.
This case involved a small assignment, which was perhaps
makework to begin with, and the student got a partial answer to her
question in spite of her hesitation ("You should get about two good
paragraphs out of them."). So the effects of her reluctance to be more
assertive were minimal. But as in the first case study, if the student
could not ask a relevant, work-related question under these conditions, when the stakes were relatively small, how likely is it that she
would be able to ask one when more important interests were involved? If she could not ask for herself, shouldn't she have done so
for the firm and its clients? For example, if she went away from the
conversation unclear about how to prepare the summaries and
overdid them just to be safe, spending more hours than necessary
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writing them up, wouldn't the office, and perhaps the clients, have
been measurably worse off because of this mistaken use of her time?
Giving up on a question because a supervisor tries to avoid answering
it is appropriate only if the question is unimportant. But if the question is unimportant, it is not clear why the student would want to ask it
in the first place. Learning mode discourse requires some measure of
assertiveness (though not, to be sure, the over-assertiveness of the
take charge strategy).
Case Seven-Belly Up over Work
The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
This conversation took place about three days after I got the assignment. And this day was the first time I was able to see my direct
supervisor ["SU"] for the work. I had already been working on it
by reviewing the files and having my supervisor for assignments
[i.e., the one assigning clerks to attorneys] fill in the gaps by answering my questions. But neither of us knew exactly what the work
supervisor wanted. So I started the assignment as best as I could.
Asking her [i.e., the work supervisor] about it was kind of intimidating because I hadn't really spoken to her before and she was the
boss in the office.
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I don't know if I should bother
her now since we're at a break
from court.
Conversion? But the note on
my desk stated that I should
dismiss it. Maybe she doesn't
know of that additional information yet.

ST:

SU:

ST:

Dialogue
I wanted to ask you about
these cases. Do you want
Motions to Convert or Dismiss
on these cases?
On this case, do a conversion
motion.

Did you see the note from
[another attorney in the office]
stating that the Debtor does
not have any contact with the
attorney's office?

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 401 1996-1997

402

CLINiCAL LAW REVIEW

That sounds kind of harsh, but
she doesn't sound like she
means it in a malicious way. I
hope she doesn't think that I'm
second-guessing her.
Now I understand the reasoning why we would ask for conversion in some cases and
dismissal in others-or at least
this attorney's philosophy on it.
This is different from what
[another attorney] said about
the Motion. He said that he
asks for both in an either/or situation because he wants to
cover all of his options. I wonder if I should tell her what this
other attorney said.
I hope that she doesn't think
that I'm stupid because she
thinks that she's telling me
something which she probably
considers very elementary.
· I understand the reasoning but
I'm still a little unclear about
the other cases. They seem so
new to me and I don't want to
make a mistake now. It's better to know her reasoning for a
variety of situations. so next
time I can make the determination on my own.
Does she mean just to ask for
· only the dismissal or the conversion or ask for bo~h like the
other attorney suggested to
cover all bases? I don't want to
ask her because it does sound
like she wants me to ask for
just one or the other. I can
always ask the other attorney
and then she can make corrections on it later.

[Vol. 3:337

SU:

I don't care what [the other
attorney] says. Don't listen to
what [that attorney] says
because I'm in charge of the
case. He wants to file a Motion
of Default but Judge _ _
doesn't like them. And I don't
like them, either. I think that
there should be penance.. The
debtor filed a voluntary petition and then if the case is dismissed, he gets everything he
wanted because he was able to
get the creditors off his back
for a little while. He's back to
the same position and the creditors might not get anything.
So I want to put as many mechanisms in place to prevent just
a dismissal. The debtor
shouldn't benefit from his lack
of diligence and good faith.

ST:

I understand. So with this case,
should I file a motion to dis-

miss it or tp convert it?

SU:

For this first case, you can do a
conversion, and this second
one, it's ok to do a dismissal.

ST:.

Ok.
(She then introduces me to the
attorney whose fees are being
contested by the debtor. She
was the Assistant Trustee so
she had to be there also,)
(She then turns to me.)
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Great. I will do that when we
finish in court. At least she's
saying that she will talk to me
about it later. I hope she's not
thinking that I don't· know
what I'm doing and therefore
she needs to talk to me first
before I do anything further.
I want her to know that I've
done work on it already. I
don't want her to think that I
haven't done anything just
because I asked her to clarify
what she wanted me to do for
the assignment. This was the
first time I spoke to her about
it because she wasn't in the
office when I received the
assignment last week.

SU:

So check the docket sheet and
then after you have everything,
come see me and we can talk
about it.

ST:

I've already finished most of it.

SU:

Great
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The student did not evaluate his effectiveness in the conversation.
This case presents a substantive law variation on the theme of
deferring to supervisor authority and expertise. The student wanted
to know whether the supervisor agreed with the decision to assent to a
motion to dismiss a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Another attorney in the office had said that a dismissal was all right, but the student
thought it wise to check this out with the supervisor directly responsible for the case. The student was nervous about raising the issue because the supervisor was "kind of intimidating," and the most
powerful attorney in the office. On the other hand, she (the supervisor) had praised the student's work on a prior project, and also was
"nice" and "patient." 68 The student had the familiar complement of
insecurities and anxieties, not wanting to seem stupid, thinking that
his questions were elementary, and worrying that the supervisor
would think he did not know what he was doing, and he suppressed
the same sorts of important questions and confusions. In these respects his case is much like the others.
The interesting feature of the case stems from the supervisor's
low-level modification of the bankruptcy code to add a "penance" element to the statutory requirements for dismissal of a voluntary petition. "Penance" was not a legislative or doctrinal term, or a rule of
the bankruptcy court, but a personal requirement of the supervisor.
She did not want a debtor to "benefit from his lack of diligence and
good faith." Penance also was not a consensus requirement of the
office. We know from the student's underlying thoughts and feelings
68 These positive aspects of the supervisor's behavior came out during the discussion of
the case in class.
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that at least one other attorney did not demand penance before agreeing to dismiss, and the student evidently had not come across the idea
in his work before then. Perhaps without realizing it, the student had
uncovered an interesting and familiar issue of legal process, an illustration of the way in which law is modified in its application by the
interpretation of enforcing agents. In effect, the supervisor amended
the bankruptcy code under certain conditions (though under what
conditions was not clear), to make dismissal more or less difficult in
particular cases, and this practice raised interesting questions about
the fairness, legitimacy, and scope of the bankruptcy law, at least as
enforced by this office. For a law teacher, this example of the intersection of practice norms and substantive law is an ideal subject for
study.
For the student, however, it may have been just more evidence of
the cacophony of expert opinion, something to be coped with or endured rather than inquired into. Yet there were many questions the
student might have been curious about, even without reaching issues
of jurisprudential abstraction. The student could have wondered how
one differentiates between bankruptcy petitioners who get dismissal
with penance and those who do not (and in fact he was somewhat
curious on this score). What kinds of experiences should count as penance? If only some attorneys in the office had a penance requirement,
how did the office insure that all petitioners were treated evenhandedly? Was consideration given to this issue in assigning cases to
lawyers in the first instance, or was the issue ignored as a de minimis
one, not worthy of serious consideration? Did the office have formal
guidelines on the issue, or was the matter left to the discretion of individual attorneys? Had the attorneys in the office discussed the issue
among themselves, and did each know what standards the others used
in determining when to agree to a dismissal?
We do not know which, if any, of these or related questions occurred to the student. At one point, he stated (to himself) that he
"understands the reasoning why we would ask for conversion in some
cases and dismissals in others," but it is not clear how he formed such
an understanding. The supervisor had expressed her "pen~nce" rationale, but had not said what counts as doing penance, whether it was
a requirement in every case, why it was required in this case, or why it
had not been satisfied. The student acknowledged as much when he
reflected that he was "still a little unclear about the other cases." .
He also was confused by the conflicting strategic advice he had
received from the other attorney ("cover all of [your] options"), but
decided not to mention this so as not to look "stupid." His concern
almost certainly was unjustified. If two experienced attorneys disa-
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gree on an issue of professional practice with which each is conversant, the question of what should be done is not likely to be
"elementary." And it is not "stupid" for a person who must work with
both attorneys to want to resolve the contradiction, at least in his own
mind, before deciding how to act, or what to believe. Moreover, the
supervisor's long and perhaps defensive explanation of her position
suggests that she might have understood that her view was controversial, and despite its abruptness may indicate that she was willing to
talk about it if asked.
Faced with these difficult and confusing questions of policy and
strategy which he had to resolve in order to fully understand the work
he was doing, the student suppressed his concerns and followed the
directions of his most immediate superior. This decision may or may
not have weakened the firm's handling of the bankruptcy case, but its
effects on the student's understanding of the bankruptcy process and
the role of lawyers in operationalizing law might have been considerable. The student chose not to pursue a clearly presented opportunity
to discuss the way in which lawyers make, and learn to make, expert
judgments, of both strategy and policy. This is almost tantamount to
passing on the best experience of being an intern. The student did not
think of his decision in these terms, of course, but in hindsight it seems
clear that his deferential approach risked undercutting both his own
learning and the quality of his work at the firm.
Case Eight-Partial but Troubling Success

The student ("ST") reporting the case described it in the following way:
As a summer associate ... of a large law firm, I was working at
a branch office of the firm. The firm policy was to have each branch
summer associate spend two weeks at the firm's main office in the
city to get exposure to the attorneys and practice groups downtown.
The advice given to me regarding this two weeks was to get as many
small, meaningful, and substantive projects done (and with as many
different attorneys) as possible.
The first assignment given to me involved drafting a Complaint
for a client/subcontractor who had not received final payment for a
construction project. The owner of this construction project had
filed for bankruptcy, and failed to make the final payment to the
contractor, who in turn withheld payment to the subcontractor (our
client, herein "C").
The assigning attorney ["SU"] ... reviewed the contract and
found that there was no language which stipulated that payment to
the contractor was a condition precedent to the contractor fulfilling
its obligation to pay the subcontractor (Md. law requires such a con-
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dition to be express). However, after reviewing the law and studying the contract it seemed that something was · missing. In · the
client's file I discovered that there were Supplements to the Contract, one of which specifically provided that "final payment to the
subcontractor was conditioned precedent [inter alia] upon the Contractor's receipt of final payment from the Owner."
·
I was faced with the awkward position of having found what I
thought was either: (1) an oversight on behalf of the attorney, or .(2)
a situation which I could not reconcile with the most recent Maryland case law (i.e., it appeared we didn't have a cause of"action until
the contractor was paid and then refused to pay our client). ,I
needed to speak with the attorney to determine if: (1) I could be put
"back on track" because, perhaps, I had failed to understand how
our cause of action arose under Maryland law; or, (2) I should move
on to another project because drafting a Complaint, in light of this
contractual language, would be putting the cart before the horse (or
some such metaphor).
·
Underlying Thoughts
and Feelings
I need to indicate that I have
done most of the work and have
stopped short of writing due to
this discovery.

Good

mo~d

today, lucky me.

Lay the foundation for the "bad
news" and try and sound "legally
coherent." Every time I do this I
feel like I'm speaking real slowly
trying to make the case law logic
fall into place, while anticipating
the possible questions:
Lucky again, it's probably so easy
that if I had screwed it up I would
really look silly. He seems to be
pushing this to a conclusion . ·..
maybe I gave the impression that
I needed confirmation of my
analysis of the case law just cited.
Oh, but an irilportant safety tip
on the Causes of Action~ glad I
asked.

Dialogue ·
ST: Hi, Mr. [SU], I was hoping you
might have some· time to help
me focus more on the Complaint you need for Mr. c and to
make sure, after having done
the necessary research, that I'm
still on the right track.
SU: Sure, have a seat ... tell me
what you've found.
ST: [Explain the evolution of case
law to the . recent Md. cases
which call· for the "condition
precedent" language to be effective] .
SU:

Okay that sounds good .. :from
what I can tell we should be
able to put together a Complaint with Breach of Contract,
Substantial Performance, Quantum Meruit, etc. . . . Find out
which Causes of Action fit, and
draft up an appropriate Complaint ... there's great book
which specifically addresses
Maryland Causes of Action.
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I'm not going to flounder around
here, I'll just slip in this little
problem I found innocently . . . I
don't want him to think I'm second guessing him, or come across
as, "ah ha, found something you
missed!"
Thank goodness he cut me off, I
was having trouble saying that ...
Why did he throw in the explanation about Mr. C, I hope he
didn't think I accused him of
missing something, how can I follow up with a completely objective statement of my problem
without implying that this was
something which should have
been known before a draft Complaint was requested?
Maybe if I show him the language
he'll recognize it and explain to
me what he conceived as the
appropriate approach to take
with this Complaint. I can at
least appear like I have given it a
shot (which I have). Actually,
I've given it the ol' college try,
and I've found something he
missed. Maybe he'll cancel this
assignment altogether and give
me something that is really going
to be useful to someone. I don't
want to get stuck doing a project
that's a "sure loser" or one that
will never be seen or used by anyone. I've only got two weeks
downtown here to get some good
work done. .
Uh-oh, either I missed something, or I'm .to be asked to do
something I find very distasteful.
Oh ·great, a project to be kept on
file ... why? because it's a loser.
When he says "straightforward"
does he mean it's going to be a
lot harder for me to draft this or
that it's going to be a lot harder
to win the case for our client. I
hate advocating a position that I
can't support myself.

ST:

Uotting notes] . . . Great, I
haven't come upon that book
yet. I was also troubled by the
language which I found in the
Supplements to the Contract
because it appears it may give us
some problems in light of the
recent holding in Maryland
cases ...
SU: The Supplements! Do you have
them· with you . . . I may not
have looked closely enough ·at
them. Unfortunately, Mr. C
entered these contracts without
counsel and then came to us last
week when he realized payment
was not forthcoming.

ST: [showing [SU] the paragraph
and phrase in particular] ... it
seems like the drafter of this
contract has reacted to the very
language in the Maryland cases
because the phrase here is verbatim as to the requirement to
create a condition precedent ...
so I'm having trouble finding
the appropriate language to use
to give our Complaint the necessary assertiveness.

SU: [pondering] Okay, we can still
do this ... it just may not be as
straightforward as I had hoped
... in fact, it may be something
I just keep on file until the time
comes. It has been some time
and I'm afraid if I don't get
something in we'll run into limitations problems.
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Oh well, if I'm going to do it, I
want to get it right the first time
so I don't have to re-do it. I'll go
out on a limb and explain what I
think this breach claim will look
like so he knows what's coming
or where I was coming from.

He said "yes," but he meant to
say "not really," I think. This
means I'll have to get as close to
attacking the contract without
(somehow) drawing attention to
the fact that they gave us an
explicit condition precedent
which sinks our ship.
I'm fishing for any kind of help
with the language in hopes that
maybe he's done something similar before, or could give me an
example.

Oops, he doesn't seem to think
we're as bad off as I do, I'll bet
that means that there is something I can find to give fairly
strong support for the other
claims.

I hate when they say "try everything," it sounds so endless.
Surely he appreciates that I'm
only down here for two weeks.
Tune to sound confident again, I
feel like I'm floundering in here.
Maybe if I respond with a legal
argument, carefully refuting his
concern regarding the possible
limitations problem, I can get
another shot at canceling this
project altogether. At least I can
show that I'm thinking.

[Vol. 3:337

ST: Do you still want the breach of
contract claim in the Complaint
because that's what I'll probably
have the most trouble with ...
just finding the words to make it
sound forceful enough, I mean I
can do it, I may just have to
make it as simple as ... "we had
a contract, we complied with it,
and we haven't been paid."
SU: Yes, the breach of contract
claim will be the main thing
here, you'll need to allege the
elements and make reference to
the contract.

ST: Okay, I guess I'm just troubled
by making reference to the
contract, at least with any specificity, because surely the opposition will be relying heavily on
the provisions in the
Supplements ... how do you do
that without seemingly ignoring
the obvious flaw, and yet ...
SU: Well, we're not sunk on this
thing ... I agree that the provision hurts us, but we have substantial performance and all
[thinking] ... I think you can
supply me with a Complaint
using general language under
the breach claim and then follow-up with appropriate specificity in the other alternative
claims of recovery. Try everything ... like I said, I'll have to
review all this ... I would just
like to have a Complaint ready.
ST: Okay, I can do that, I just
wanted to make sure that I
wasn't misreading the provisions
here, and to confirm that you
wanted me to go ahead with
this. I don't think there'll be
limitations problems with this
because we could argue that the
cause of action hasn't arisen yet
until the Contractor receives
payment, that is when the obligation arises to pay Mr. C his
final payment ...
[pregnant pause]
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Dam, he didn't jump at the hint
that limitations wouldn't be a
problem, I hope he doesn't think
I'm whining, well I'm just going
to have to make this the best
Complaint he's seen ... I think
I'll hand it in early too, to make
up for any "cool points" I may
have lost here.
What's that, I'm right! I missed
that, say that again ... but I still
have this project.
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Anyway, I'll move ahead with
this, at least now you'll know
why some of the claims in the
Complaint will seem kind of
"shallow" or less forceful than
the others.
SU: Not a problem, do the best you
can with it, it'll really save me
time, then I can see I may be
doing some editing in the future
on it. Thanks for coming in, I
think you're right on about the
Supplement provisions, I just
wish Mr. C had come to me
before he signed all these.

The student did not evaluate his effectiveness in the conversation.
This case presents a more interesting and complicated set of issues than we have seen till now. The student was faced with the difficult and not infrequent problem of correcting an oversight by his
supervisor. The supervisor had asked the student to draft a complaint
for a subcontractor client who wanted to sue a general contractor for
nonpayment for work done on a construction project. During the
course of his research the student discovered a set of Supplements to
the construction contract which conditioned payment to the client on
payment by the project owner to the general contractor. The general
contractor had not been paid, and was not likely to be since the owner
had filed for bankruptcy. The supervisor did not seem to be aware of
the Supplements or this condition precedent in asking the student to
draft the complaint. The student was in the "awkward position" of
having to point out the supervisor's oversight without making the supervisor "think [the student was] second guessing him, or com[ing]
across as [saying] 'ah ha, found something you missed.'"
Assessing this case is complicated because of the seemingly successful, yet problematic, character of the student's response. The student was able to point out the existence of the Supplements, and their
importance to the case, without antagonizing the supervisor, or provoking him into a feared defensive or vindictive response.69 By most
standards this would make the interaction a success. The student was
69 The student's concern about retaliation might have been justified. Supervisors in the
cases sometimes did punish students who pointed out supervisor mistakes, though these
punishments were not always imposed consciously or mean-spiritedly. This may have happened here also, as I will discuss shortly. The threat of retaliation is sometimes genuine.
Nevertheless, my impression from discussions with students both about the cases in this
study and about externship work generally, is that this threat is usually more perceived
than real.
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happy with his efforts, and most students in his position would have
been as well. Lawyers looking at the interaction describe the student's maneuvering as skillful and clever. But the student accomplished what he did in an indirect, somewhat manipulati\'e, and
potentially misleading manner, and these qualities may have had long
range consequences for the supervisor, the firm, the client, and the
student himself. In the end, the scenario is troubling, both for what it
might have taught the student about working with colleagues, and for
what it says about the way lawyers in practice avoid important but
difficult normative dimensions of the strategy decisions they face.
The first noteworthy feature of the case is that it involves an unusually sophisticated and confident student. Unlike many of the earlier cases, where supervisors pretty much decided what the
conversations would be about, here the student controlled the content
and form of most of the discussion. Although ostensibly questioning
the supervisor about what should be done, for the most part the student identified the subjects to be discussed, decided when the topic
should be changed, and· chose the course for the conversation to take
(though he did not obtain the result he had hoped for).
The overall structure of the student's presentation was "Socratic"
in the "primrose path" sense of that term. That is, he began by laying
a foundation of substantive background law against which the questions to come would be analyzed. This was his summary of the Maryland case law on conditions precedent. Then he set a "Socratic" trap
("I was also troubled by the language which I found in the Supplements to the contract because it appears it may give us some
problems .... "). The relevance· of the Supplements appears to have
been a surprise to the supervisor, as the student predicted it would be,
but he (the supervisor),recovered immediately by acknowledging that
he might have missed something ("The Supplements! I ni.ay not have
looked closely enough at them"), and, in the same sentence, by blaming the client for signing the contracts· without consulting .counsel first.
Whether the supervisor knew about the Supplements at all seems an
open question. The student then sprung the trap, by "showing [the
supervisor] the paragraphs" in the Supplements which contained the
condition precedent language, and pointing out how they made it dif~
ficult to find "appropriate language ... to give [the] Complaint the
necessary assertiveness."
This had the potential to be a tense moment in the conversation.
The supervisor might have been put off by the student's indirect approach, which might have made him feel he had been set up rather
than informed. Rather than begin the conversation with a direct
statement of what he wanted to say, such as "I found some language
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in the Supplements to our contract that makes it look like we might
not have a breach of contract claim after all, at least not yet," and then
explain what he meant in response to the supervisor's almost certain
request for details, the student made the same point obliquely and
calculatingly. He (the student) did not say that he thought the Supplement language was fatal, but instead only hinted that it might be, explaining that he was "having trouble finding appropriate language" for
the complaint, and asking rhetorically how he could allege breach of
contract "without ... ignoring the obvious flaw" in the claim.
The feared tension never emerged, however. The condition precedent point was not lost on the supervisor, but he did not seem to
fault the student for raising it indirectly. In fact, the student's inexplicit, almost apologetic way of presenting the point may have been
what allowed it to register. The supervisor may have interpreted the
student as "walking on eggs" and being filled with self-doubt and tentativeness, and this may have prevented him from thinking that the
student was saying "Ah ha, [I] found something you missed." Once
assured that he was not being put down by the student, the supervisor
was free to incorporate the student's contribution into his understanding of the problem.
The difficulty with the student's.choice of an indirect, "no friction" (one is tempted to say "win-win") approach to the conversation
is that it still seemed to be meant to avoid any more discussion of
controversial and difficult issues than necessary, and to measure that
necessity in a worryingly narrow way. For example, rather than "push
his luck"-as he might have perceived it-once the hard issue of
pointing out the Supplement language had been navigated "successfully," the student allowed the discussion to end. The result was that
other important but hard issues were left unresolved. The student still
had to prepare a draft complaint in which the breach of contract claim
would be "the main thing." He was to do this "using general language
under the breach cl~im and then ... appropriate specificity in the ...
alternative claims. " 70 "Try everything," he was told, as if this would
have any more meaning to the student than it did to the supervisor.
How the student was to allege the elements of breach of contract,
when the facts necessary to establish such allegations did not exist,
was in some ways a more difficult question than the question of
whether a breach existed in the first instance.
The student apparently decided not to ask this and related questions because he was concerned that the supervisor might think he was
"whining." He resolved instead "to make this the best Complaint [the
70 The supervisor obviously did not hold himself to the latter half of this standard-the
requirement of "appropriate specificity"-in giving the student.instructions.
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supervisor's] seen." A few moments earlier, he had already told the
supervisor that he could "have a Complaint ready," even though he
did not know how he would finesse the condition precedent issue,
thought the project was "distasteful" and a "sure loser," and believed
that the complaint would "never be seen or used by anyone."
If it was up to him he would have cancelled the project altogether, but he did not say this. He thought that telling the supervisor
about the Supplement language would cause him (the supervisor) to
cancel the project on his own, but this seems wishful thinking. If the
supervisor did not want to hear about the Supplement language, and
was surprised and dismayed by it, as the student thought he would be,
then denying its significance was as likely a response as cancelling the
project. There was no reason to expect the supervisor to take responsibility for making an argument the student understood better, but
was unwilling to make.
Moreover, there was ample reason to be concerned about the assignment to draft this flawed complaint. Perhaps the supervisor truly
wanted to prepare a complaint for the file, as he said, so that it would
be available for use should the appropriate occasion arise. 71 Having
pleadings already prepared can sometimes corroborate leveraging
moves in negotiation, and is thus often a useful thing to do in advance.
But if this was the supervisor's motive he would not have wanted the
student to prepare a pleading which equivocated on,· or ignored, the
condition precedent issue. A complaint which failed to allege compliance with a condition precedent could not survive a motion to dismiss,
and a complaint which alleged compliance could not have been
drafted in good faith. Drafting a complaint which would have been
either useless or legally insufficient, therefore, had more of the earmarks of a gesture to save face than of actual, meaningful work on the
case. It seemed designed to allow the supervisor to acknowledge the
importance of the student's discovery without requiring that he (the
supervisor) admit his oversight in giving instructions to the student in
the first place.
It is also conceivable that with this assignment the supervisor after all may have punished the student for ·pointing out the problem
created by the Supplement language. Made aware that a complaint
based on breach of contract was now premature and, given the
owner's bankruptcy, probably not going to be needed at all, the supervisor told the student to continue to work on it anyway. If this was
71 It is also possible that the supervisor planned to file the complaint, fudging on the
issue of compliance with the condition precedent. This seems to have been the student's
view, and in its support, the supervisor did say that he was "~fraid if [they didn't] get
something in [they would] run into limitations problems."
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largely dead-end and time-consuming work, which would deny the
student "exposure to attorneys and practice groups downtown," as the
student feared, then the supervisor's instructions prevented the student from making a good impression in his important two-week assignment in the main office. The supervisor may have put the
student's career in the firm on hold, in other words, whether intentionally or not. If the student saw it that way, it would not be surprising if he resolved not to raise such problems in the future. In
retrospect, it is not clear whether being direct about the condition precedent problem would have been any more harmful to the student's
interests than bringing it up obliquely. What at first glance appeared
to be a skillful resolution of a difficult dilemma may turn out, on reflection, to have been too clever for its own good.
It is also noteworthy that there was a Rule 11 concern lurking in
the background, of whether the student could draft a complaint he
knew could not be filed in good faith. This concern does not appear
anywhere in the student's statements or thoughts, though in many
ways it was the most serious of the problems raised by the student's
discovery. This problem existed, moreover, even if the complaint was
not destined for immediate use in court but only for the attorney's
own files. In a perfectly plausible scenario, the student might have
drafted the complaint so as to avoid reference to the condition precedent issue, placed it in the client's file and forgotten about it. Another
clerk or lawyer, at some future date, unaware of this history or the
condition precedent issue itself, might have activated the draft, filed
the complaint thinking it was ready to go, and subjected the firm and
possibly the client to Rule 11 sanctions. Since the "empty head, pure
heart" defense to Rule 11 is no longer available,72 serious harm could
have resulted, all because the student's willingness to risk the friction
resulting from direct confrontation, and the supervisor's tolerance for
embarrassment resulting from admitting a mistake, were limited.
Multiply this commonplace interaction many times over, and one gets
a sense of how the difficult normative questions involved in commencing litigation for a client can drop out of day-to-day law office conversation. When this happens, lawyers do not flout the law so much as
simply not see it. Other lawyers in the office do not usually point this
out because there is little if any incentive for them to do so, and no
immediate penalty if they do not. Lawyers are no more immune from
short term thinking than the polity generally.
It would have been nice if the student had responded to his predicament in a more direct manner, but that rarely happened in the
72 See Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 851
(1986).
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. cases I collected. The approach described in this case is about as skillful as students got in hard cases, that is, those in which something
ambitious and difficult was being tried. This student articulated a
somewhat accurate version of what he believed and felt, without an~
tagonizing the supervisor in the process, and his point seemed to influence work on the case. The supervisor was able to avoid
embarrassment by blaming the client, and the student was able to
avoid antagonizing the supervisor by being awkward and apologetic.
The student changed the direction of the case from that set by the
supervisor for the good, without rupturing his working relationship
with the supervisor, and that is quite a lot.
But looked at from another perspective, the case is also a good
illustration of what is wrong with persuasion mode conversational
strategies, even when they "work." One should not have to go to such
lengths to help a supervisor save face, or have to choose which difficult issue to raise on the theory that raising more than one is "pushing
one's luck." Work which is improved so incrementally and hesitatingly is likely never to be sophisticated, and decisions made under the
cloud of so much irrelevant baggage are likely never to be truly intelligent. Persuasion mode interactional strategies are, to paraphrase
Owen Fiss, a concession-to the conditions of modern law practice, to
the nature of legal training, perhaps even to the type of person attracted to law-to be tolerated perhaps, but neither praised nor admired,73 and, one might add, to be improved upon whenever possible.

*

*

*

In reading through the foregoing cases several distinct impressions emerge. It is clear, for example, that students thought about a
whole lot more than they expressed to their supervisors, and that
much of what they did not say was highly personal and critical. In
fact, for me, the extent and intensity of this underlying criticism was
the biggest surprise in the cases. It is probably safe to say that these
patterns are also present in students' law school .conversations with
their professors. A few of the cases collected in the study, but not
reproduced here, involved conversations with law professors, and in .
those cases most of the same patterns were present. The cartoon bubble over the students' heads, in other words, is often a whole lot more
interesting and negative than the words that come out of their mouths ..
One is also struck by the absence of any expression of curiosity,
ignorance, doubt, or sense of shared responsibility for client interests
73 See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (settlement is no
cause for celebration, but at best "a capitulation to the conditions of mass society," a capitulation that "should be neither encouraged nor praised").

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 414 1996-1997

Spring 1997]

Learning from Colleagues

415

in the cases, both in what the students said and in what they thought.
They did not seem to see themselves as their supervisors' colleagues
(even if "junior" colleagues), notwithstanding that that was the relationship they professed to want. They were novices at most of the
work they were asked to do, recognized that, and agreed in principle
that novices need to ask for help from experts. Yet they rarely did this
in a candid way. They behaved as if they were certain when they were
confused, knowledgeable when they did not understand, suspicious
when they could have been trusting, and accepting when they should
have been questioning. Many of their private thoughts were highly
insightful, and would have been quite useful to supervisors who were
not thin-skinned and could have run with them. But they were afraid
to be transparent because they thought they would "look stupid."
Perhaps to avoid facing rejection, they rejected themselves and their
supervisors preemptively-but of course that meant they endured a
form of rejection anyway.
It is hard to know whether these patterns reflect a problem of law
practice generally, or a problem of a particular group of novice lawyers. Did the students talk this way because of something structural
and timeless about law practice discourse, or because of who they
were, and how they had been educated? Would they have conversed
in the same manner if they had been novice monks, musicians, or morticians? It would be interesting to see if similar patterns appear in the
conversations of experienced lawyers, but collecting such data would
be much more difficult to do. Lawyers are not as guileless as students
(I mean this as a compliment to ·students). Their professional personas, like those of politicians, are "on" more of the time, and getting
them to fill in the left-hand column of underlying thoughts and feelings in a non-strategic and candid fashion would be exponentially
more difficult.
The students in these cases were relatively willing to reconstruct
arid report personal data spontaneously without first asking how it
would look. And having reconstructed it, they also were willing to
analyze the data honestly and critically. Lawyers are less likely to provide such data and to analyze it as critically because they have less
need for the insights such a study would provide. They have discourse
strategies which "work" in some sense, and are more likely to believe
that what works need not be fixed (or examined). Student strategies
are still developing, and studying the various forms they could take is
often thought by students to have real payoffs (and does).
It is my impression that persuasion mode ·strategies are quite
widespread throughout law practice discourse generally, but this
would be difficult to establish.. Certainly, many .of the supervisors in
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the cases studied here seemed to use persuasion mode strategies as
extensively as the students (though without knowing the supervisors'
underlying thoughts and feelings we cannot be altogether sure about
this). Lawyers seem to develop in one of two directions as they become experienced and successful. Some become more candid, curious
and cooperative in their interactions with colleagues. As they have
less to prove, they seem to discover that they have more to learn, and
as the (always unrealistic) anxiety of looking stupid subsides, the interest in learning from others increases. Others-it is hard to say
which group is larger-seem to become more closed, defensive, combative, and controlling as they achieve greater and greater success because, they believe, of these very qualities. They seem to view looking
critically at their conversational strategies as a threat to all they have
achieved, and self-knowledge as an impediment to continued effective
performance. The case studies we have just examined do not tell us
which pattern of development is more common, nor whether persuasion mode discourse is a problem of the profession as a whole. 74
Nonetheless it is helpful to see what such discourse looks like at the
creation, to see how innocent and innocuous it often is when just getting started.
IV.

WHAT THESE CASES TELL

Us

ABOUT ExTERNSHIP

INSTRUCTION AND WHAT IF ANYTHING SHOULD BE
DONE ABOUT

IT

The foregoing cases suggest that the process of ecological learning can be a deeply problematic one, in which students are absorbed
into a practice world where communication patterns discourage student reflection more than they enhance it. These patterns stand out in
the case studies, though they may escape detection in surveys of student and teacher opinion about what has been learned. The conversations we have just examined frequently were less collaborative
explorations of strategic puzzles than they were struggles over the imposition of pre-determined and sometimes quite debatable solutions
for what were seen as relatively straightforward problems. In these
74 Lawyers may be no more effective in talking with one another than they are in talking with clients, see, e.g., DoUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN
CHARGE (1974); Hurder, supra note 27; Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers.
and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663
(1989); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469
(1984); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuMAN
RIGHTS 1 (1975), or talking with adversaries, either in private negotiations, see, e.g.,
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 964-94, or in courtroom advocacy, see Condlin, supra
note 16, at 17 n.28, and authorities cited therein.
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struggles, students-and supervisors 75-frequently were more secretive than open, more controlling than curious, more indirect than candid, more locked into pre-set views than interested in discovering new
perspectives, and more intent on taking unilateral control than on
sharing authority. The case studies paint a picture of an educationally
less attractive world (at least with respect to the subject of learning
from colleagues), or even a less benign one, than is often claimed to
be the case, and law schools are right to be concerned about sending
students into it in an unmonitored way. This is not to say that externship settings are educationally more problematic than those of the inhouse clinic, for all is not perfect in the clinic either,76 but it is to say
that legal education's long-standing nervousness about apprenticeship
or externship instruction has a basis in fact.
A.

The Causes of Students' Persuasion Mode Behavior

To identify the problem is not to identify its solution. Before we
can say how this problem might be addressed, and in particular how
externship instruction can be shaped so as to respond to this problem
while still retaining the value of ecological learning, we need to understand its causes. Thus we should ask why the students behaved in
these ways. They were nervous about performing well, and unsure
that they would be able to measure up to what they took to be their
supervisors' expectations (which, in retrospect, probably were their
own unrealistic expectations for themselves). Under the stress of
these pressures they seemed to revert to basic, if not always consciously understood, beliefs about what it means to perform well as a
lawyer. These beliefs, it turned out, gave a higher priority to managing relationships and conversations than they did to learning from
them. At one level, this says something about who the students were,
and more generally, something about the kinds of persons who become lawyers. There is a good deal of intelligent writing on this "psychological" explanation for lawyer persuasion mode (or "adversarial")
behavior, however, and I will not pursue it here.77
75 Throughout this discussion I have focused consistently on student failings, and yet it
is arguable that the supervisors performed at least as badly. Some might see this focus as a
form of blaming the victim, or at least the less powerful, but that is not my intent. The case
study project was designed to be a study of only student learning. The data collected are
complete (or as complete as the method used permits) only for students, and I have discussed the issues raised by the cases only with the students involved. No doubt a richer
analysis would be possible if supervisor perspectives could be factored in, but trying to get
this information would have had costs as well. See note 46 supra.
76 See Condlin, supra note 25, at 260-74 (discussing communication patterns in in-house
clinic supervision).
77 See, e.g., RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL
DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989); Robert
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More interesting are the nurture corollaries to this nature argument. Here I will consider three such "environmental" explanations:
students' immersion in office culture; their subjection to supervisor
power; and their training in law school. First, the students' behavior
might represent the results of conscious choices based on calculations
about what traits and skills would be valued by the offices in which
they worked. The "possessive individualism"78 at the heart of the culture at large is often reproduced in a related "take charge, never explain, and never apologize" ethos in law firm practice, partly captured
in the popular notion of the lawyer as adversary champion. Trying to
take charge of conversations, one of the strategies the case studies
display, fits smoothly with this ethos. More broadly, while persuasion
mode behavior is not the same as at least the most well-known forms
of adversary champion behavior-except for some versions of the
take charge strategy it is not theatrical or stylized enough for the
courtroom-it contributes to or constitutes adversary champion behavior in some essential respects. Most importantly, it helps win conversational exchanges without appearing to have done so. In other
words, it increases the likelihood that the outcomes sought by persuasion mode speakers will be accepted and implemented by other members of the relationships or groups in which they are acting, while at
the same time minimizing resistance to and animosity for their (persuasion mode speakers') getting their way. This latter quality allows
lawyers to succeed in adversarial maneuvering over the course of a
career in law practice without building up a reservoir of anger or resentment in others that will sometimes spill over in particular cases to
the lawyers' disadvantage.
Recognizing this fit, the students might have predicted that their
supervisors would see a predisposition to "win" conversations as a desirable trait and would want to· reinforce and develop it. They might
have inferred that their supervisors would view any in-house cost in
lost learning (to the extent they thought about it) as more than offset
by client gains realized when the students were turned loose on adversaries. Almost all of the students received good to rave reviews from
their supervisors, and many were asked to continue on in their firms
after their externship semesters ended, so this calculation might have
been correct.
Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 972 (1961); Alan Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 392 (1971); Andrew Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 93 (1968).
78 The phrase, and the theory underlying it, are from C.B. MacPherson. See CRAW·
FORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF PoSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1979).
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On the other hand, the students would have worked in their offices for only a short time before making these calculations. It seems
a little remarkable that they sized up their situations so quickly, and a
little surprising that the situations turned out to be so much alike. The
unlikelihood of so many independent calculations being made so rapidly suggests that a pre-existing and shared conception of appropriate
lawyer behavior was driving the students' actions, more than particularized calculations about the kinds of behaviors that would play well
in their respective situations. Individual law firm cultures may have
reinforced the students' conception of appropriate behavior, but my
lack of knowledge about the firms involved prevents me from pursuing that possibility here.
Second, it is possible that the students acted as they did out of
fear. The students were only junior "colleagues"-in other words,
subordinates-of their supervisors, and the supervisors had power
over the students, to enhance or impair their job prospects. There also
were sometimes significant differences, on such factors as race, gender
or other such characteristics, between students and their supervisors.
The externship students were filled with anxiety,79 and the sources of
student fear deserve more examination. My own data and discussions
with the students simply do not support generalizations either way
about the role of issues of difference. It is also difficult to be certain
whether students actually faced real risks of unfair, vindictive behavior by supervisors, though my sense is that usually such risks, if they
were felt, were more perceived than real.8°
Overall, my sense from discussions with the students is that they
were not fearful of particular supervisors as persons. Rather their anxiety seemed to be directed to the supervisors as supervisors, that is, to
the supervisors acting in role. On this score, aside from the obvious
concern the students had about earning positive rather than negative
evaluations, it seemed that they feared supervisors because the supervisors were, or at least were perceived to be, expert practitioners. As
such, the supervisors were the antithesis of what the students saw
themselves to be, and also the ultimate embodiment of what the students wanted to become. To the extent that supervisors frightened students, it seemed to be primarily because the supervisors reminded the
students of the size of the gap between the students' ideal world and
their real world, and the very real possibility that they might not close
this gap. I take it, however, that this is the fear of law practice itself,
for which the supervisors were a proxy, and not of the supervisors
themselves as people. To the extent that students adopted persuasion
See pages 368-70 supra.
so See note 69 supra.

79
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mode tactics out of fear, then, the fear they were addressing may
largely have been a generalized anxiety about law practice, rather
than any specific danger of harm at the hands of their supervisors.
A third type of "cultural" explanation is particularly important
for law teachers to consider. The patterns in the students' conversations look remarkably like the patterns in law school communication
generally, in and outside of the classroom, and in the journals as well.
This assertion will be controversial. Many legal academics explicitly
reject the adversarial model of lawyer role, and the controlling and
competitive communication practices associated with it. They see
legal relationships as cooperative undertakings based on mutual trust
and support, shared power and responsibility, and an underlying consensus on applicable principles and norms. 81 They believe that such
relationships are created and sustained by learning mode types of behavior (though they do not use this term), and that they teach their
students this more communitarian way of interacting. But these
teachers probably remain a minority within the academy. Moreover,
while the differences between adversarial and communitarian views
are numerous and profound, the various ways in which the two views
are discussed and defended in law school conversation frequently are
not. Proponents of each view often make the case for their respective
positions, so to speak, in persuasion mode terms. 82 Since law school
81 Alternate dispute resolution, feminist, and communitarian legal theory are the areas
of scholarship where these views are most prominent. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note
37; MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); Glennon, supra note 27; Goldfarb, supra note 27; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37; White, supra note 27.
82 I do not mean to suggest that all advocates of non-adversarial thinking fall into combative modes of advocacy, for they do not. For a discussion of all of the current hot-button
issues in legal education by a clearly identified communitarian thinker, in a cordial, balanced, and bipartisan manner, see GLENDON, supra note 81, at 199-229. While Glendon's
chapter titles are not always that friendly (for example, "The New Academy - Look Ma!
No Hands!"), I assume that an editor wrote these titles.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow's recent dispute with David Luban over the relative merits of
settlement versus adjudication, however, is a good example of the kind of argument I have
in mind. Luban adds an important philosophical dimension to an early Owen Piss argument against settlement, see Piss, supra note 73, at 1075, in part by grounding Piss's argument in a "public-life conception" of political legitimacy. See David Luban, Settlements
and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2626-40 (1995). (Luban's discussion is much more complicated than this, ultimately rewriting Piss' argument as much as
grounding it, but for present purposes the foregoing summary will do.) Menkel-Meadow
responds, not by exploring what Luban could mean by a "public-life conception" of political legitimacy, or how his argument differs from Piss', but principally by claiming that
Luban has got it wrong. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEo. L. J. 2663
(1995). The title of her response, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, sets this adversarial tone
from the outset, and she maintains the tone throughout.
This is surprising, since Menkel-Meadow is well known for her long-standing rejection
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conversation is the dominant image most students have of the way
lawyers talk, it is not surprising that they would try to imitate it in
their first legal jobs.
This is not to say that legal educators set out consciously to teach
students to attribute rather than investigate meaning, keep agendas
private, agree or disagree as a matter of reflex, fail to inquire, own up
or test, and the like, at least not exclusively, but just that they regularly act that way themselves, and students understandably follow
their lead. Again, the problem is not with these practices in their own
right. Persuasion mode behavior has a place in legal advocacy, and
always will be part of a competent lawyer's complete repertoire of
communication skills. That, in part, is why law teachers learned these
skills in the first instance, and why many consciously continue to teach
them to their students. The difficulty, instead, is that legal educators
often fail to articulate or demonstrate an alternative or corollary
of adversarial, competitive, and antagonistic communicative methods generally, as she reminds us in a mildly astonishing opening paragraph:
I have often thought myself ill-suited to my chosen profession. I love to argue,
but I am often too quick to say both, "yes, I see your point" and concede
something to the "other side," and to say of my own arguments, "yes, but, it's
not that simple." In short, I have trouble with polarized argument, debate, and
the adversarialism that characterizes much of our work. Where others see
black and white, I often see not just the "grey" but the purple and red-in
short, the complexity of human issues that appear before the law for
resolution.
/d. at 2663.
The paragraph is "mildly astonishing" because Menkel-Meadow seems to suggest that
Luban (or perhaps everyone other than herself-her term is "others") does not understand
the "complexity" of the issues involved in the "informalism" debate. There is plenty of
evidence to the contrary with respect to Luban. In addition to the Erosion of the Public
Realm piece, supra, see, e.g., David Luban, Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on
Negotiation and Informal Justice, 14 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 397 (1985); David Luban, The
Quality of Justice, 66 DENY. U. L. REv. 381 (1989).
More importantly, there is little about the manner in which Menkel-Meadow argues
with Luban that is different in any fundamental respect from the adversarial manner she
rejects. Her objection to adversarialism, in other words, is itself an instance of adversarialism. She argues well. My point is not that she is wrong and Luban right (that question
does not concern us), but just that she is more evaluative, judgmental and dismissive of
what Luban has to say, than curious about whether he has added anything new to the
discussion. She does not try to see the links between her view and his, or identify the
interpretive and argumentative moments, in the data they start with and the theories they
espouse, at which their respective analyses took different turns. Instead, she tries simply to
show that Luban is mistaken, a move made even stranger by the fact that she and Luban
do not disagree about very much at all. Luban seems to recognize this in the introduction
to his article, where he states that "the question cannot be 'for or against settlement?' but
'how much settlement'?", see Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm,
supra, at 2620, echoing and agreeing with the title to and argument of an earlier MenkelMeadow response to Fiss. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: The
Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985).
Yet Menkel-Meadow seems not to see it this way.
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method of communication, .appropriate for situations and relationships in which the principal objective is learning and not advocacy.
When only one approach is presented, the tacit lesson to be drawn is
that there is but one way to talk in law, irrespective of the situation,
relationship, or task, and the lesson usually registers. Persuasion
mode communication skill may be the one subject law schools teach
successfully by the pervasive method.
B.

WhatShould Law Schools Do?

If law schools are one of the causes of persuasion mode behavior,

or even if they are simply one possible vantage point from which to
challenge the forces within the professiop that encourage such action,
we might then urge the schools to chart a new course. The most obvious response is to suggest that law schools should teach students how
to learn from colleagues. The curriculum could differentiate between
advocacy and learning, show how each process contributes in distinctive but equally important ways to the practice of law, and help students to develop both kinds of skills. While acknowledging that
advocacy-based communication strategies produce leanl.ing, legal educators could show how these strategies inhibit it as well, and how they
need to be supplemented if they are to represent a complete package
of lawyer communication skills. While initially attractive, however,
this reform may be easier to describe than to implement. The reason is
one I have already alluded to, namely the existence of widely shared
conceptions of the lawyering role, conceptions that favor adversary
behavior.
Lawyers are essentially communicative animals. They are constituted by their talk. Any attempt to change that talk, because it is a
change of identity and not just skill, must be consistent with the nature
and limits of lawyer role if it is to succeed. This requirement creates
problems for the project to make lawyers more self-conscious learners. With all of the filigree and garnish removed, the core of what
most lawY-ers do is to act as relational agents83 "within the bounds of
83 I have borrowed this term from William Eskridge's discussion of the judge's role in
statutory interpretation. As Eskridge explains, "A relational contract is one that establishes an ongoing relationship between the parties over time; in many respects the contract
is incomplete because of uncertainty about what problems will occur, but the parties understand that all will make their best efforts to accomplish the common objectives. In a
principal-agent contract of this type, the agent is supposed to follow the general directives
embodied in the contract and the specific orders given her by the principal, but her primary
obligation is to use her best efforts to carry out the general goals and specific orders over
time." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 125 (1994).
In the context of lawyering roles, Eskridge's definition helpfully focuses on the considerable discretion lawyers do enjoy, and on the ultimate confinement of that discretion within
the bounds of fidelity to the lawyer's principal, namely the client. See generally MoDEL
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law." 84 Lawyers are not free-lance policy planners, wild-card social
critics, or public-good problem solvers. They are agents. They represent clients, whether "in trouble" or not, with interests potentially or
actually adverse to other persons, 85 and their overriding responsibility
in this representational process is to protect client interests.
The obligations of relational agency are complicated, occasionally
work at cross purposes, and differ from one setting to the next. Overall, they would seem to require lawyers to be various combinations of
learner and advocate as different situations demand, though not always in equal measure, or necessarily at the same time. In relations
with clients and colleagues lawyers should be principally learners. 86
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rules 1.2 & 1.4 (1983).
84 The phrase comes from the famous "zealousness" obligation of Canon 7 of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See MoDEL CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) ("A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds
of law"). The content of the obligation, if not its literal language, has been largely carried
over into the Model Rules, notably in the Comment to Rule 1.3. See MODEL RuLEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983) ("A lawyer should act with commitment
and dedicatio~ to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized
for a client.").
The "within the bounds of law" qualification is needed to capture the idea of the
lawyer as an "officer of the court," with responsibilities to judges, adverse lawyers, other
parties, witnesses, and the like. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court Discourse on the
Good Behavior of Lawyers: Leeway Within Limits, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 183, 185 (1995) ("in
Supreme Court decisions reflecting the justices' perceptions of how lawyers work or should
work ... one ... theme repeats: lawyers ... are officers of the court"). Although the
direct obligations of relational agency are to the client, therefore, the faithful agent is also
constrained by the law.
The relative strength of these opposing pulls of lawyer role, the individualist interests
of the client on the one hand and the communitarian interests of the social system at large
on the other, is a matter of longstanding debate. In general, however, and despite many
famous exceptions, it seems fair to say that the obligations of relational agency are today
first and foremost obligations to a client. The law permits a great deal of mean-spirited,
self-centered and destructive behavior, which lawyers are bound to undertake unless they
are allowed to withdraw from the. case, if it is in the client's interest and the client insists
that it be done.
85 "Adversity" is a necessary condition in this relationship. Without the potential for
opposition there is no reason for client concern, and nothing about which to consult a
lawyer. Sometimes the adversity is only feared, or imagined, and often it is far off in the
future, if it materializes at all. But without the potential for someone upsetting the client's
plans there would be no need to ask a lawyer to memorialize those plans in a document,
strategy, or the like. Nature taking its course would be all the protection the client needed.
86 The key term here is "principally." Lawyers learn when they advocate and advocate
when they learn. A clear line between the two processes does not exist except in the
constructs used here to separate them out for purposes of analysis. There is no such thing
as disembodied learning done from no particular point of view,.and no such thing as pure
advocacy devoid of all inquiry, testing and the like. Learning always starts from a perspective, however tentatively held, so that all or almost all communication to learn has within it
at least a tacit, provisional argument that things ought to be viewed in a certain way. Similarly, successful advocacy must understand and respond to the effects it has on an audience.
Speakers who do not adjust arguments to take listener concerns or corrections into ac-
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They should try to understand client interests accurately, so that when
they defend these interests they do so faithfully, and they should try to
understand colleague suggestions fully, so that when they act for clients they do so on the basis of a reasonably complete range of relevant strategic factors and considerations. But in relationships with
adverse lawyers this emphasis changes. Here, lawyers are principally
advocates who try to convince adversaries to do what their own clients
want. 87
count, or who do not stop when points have been successfully communicated, for example,
are not persuasive even when their arguments are correct. The level at which persuasion
and learning converge, however, is considerably more abstract than the level at which ordinary law office conversation occurs. The two processes are experienced as quite different
behavioral phenomena in the law office, and it is this behavior rather than its epistemological foundation that is my focus here.
A complete discussion of the persuasion-learning dichotomy would take us very far
afield, ultimately even into areas as esoteric as the Kuhn-Popper debate about the nature
of scientific understanding and investigation, and the underlying realist-relativist debate
about the nature and existence of the physical, abstract, and theoretical universe. See, e.g.,
ALBERT GENE MosLEY, PERSPEcrivEs ON THE KuHN-POPPER DEBATE: NEw DIREcrioNs
IN EPISTEMOLOGY 75-84, 129-45 (1978) (discussing whether scientific argument consists of
an attempt to communicate insights into an alternative framework for the purpose of producing a paradigm shift, or whether it is the presentation of empirical, inductive falsifica- tions taken from simple sense perceptions of objective reality); STEVEN WEINBERG,
DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY: THE SEARCH FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF NATURE
184-90 (1994) (defending objective nature of scientific knowledge and inquiry against philosophical and sociological relativism); Chhanda Gupta, Putnam's Resolution of the PopperKuhn Controversy, 43 PHIL. Q. 319 (1993) (attempted reconciliation of the realist-relativist
conflict). See also CHALLENGEs To EMPIRICISM (Harold Morick ed., 1972), for a collection
of essays by many of the most well known participants in this important chapter in the
philosophy of science.
87 Sometimes the obligations of advocacy require that lawyers cooperate for mutual
gain, but this is not because cooperating is intrinsically good, the best way to show respect
for others as persons, or a solid foundation on which to build a social system. It is because
cooperating is the course of action most likely to protect client interests under the circumstances. The obligations of advocacy also sometimes require lawyers to compete over
scarce resources to obtain disproportionate shares of whatever is at stake for their clients'
benefit and at the adversaries' expense. Both types of behavior, cooperation and competition, are self-interested action, when they are undertaken to advance client interests.
There is sometimes a tendency to think of lawyers as self-authorizing Platonic guardians, charged with the generalized task of building a better world, and no doubt they should
contribute to this task whenever they get the chance. As lawyers, however, they are mostly
just agents, obligated to be loyal, competent and diligent on behalf of a client, rather than
on behalf of an idea, a group, or themselves. (For a thoughtful discussion of these differing
role definitions, see Richard D. Marsico, Working for Social Change and Preserving Client
Autonomy: Is There a Role for "Facilitative" Lawyering?, 1 CuN. L. REv. 639 (1995).)
Even the laudable structural changes in the profession during the past twenty years that
have softened some of the harsher aspects of adversary advocacy, such as the development
of alternative methods of dispute resolution, the reform of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the elimination of "Socratic" grilling as the educational method of choice, have
often been justified by arguments based on client (and sometimes lawyer) self-interest.
Individual lawyers may reject the relational agent role, across the board or in particular instances, and pay whatever price is entailed, but they cannot make that role into one of
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As learners, lawyers must be more open, trusting and direct than
they are as advocates, and as advocates, they must be more controlling, skeptical and circumspect than they are as learners. Internalizing
the dispositions, skills and values needed to shift between these different although not opposite perspectives is more difficult than choosing
one or the other perspective and using it across the board, and, not
surprisingly, the latter move is more popular. The reductionist response to the difficulties of dealing with a multi-faceted conception of
lawyer role, namely to see the relational agent duty in terms of only
one of its two distinctive dimensions, has always been popular with
lawyers, so much so that it is difficult to write it off as reflecting just a
failure of understanding, or a lack of character. It is a brute fact of
legal professional life and, as it will turn out, a major concern for the
project to teach lawyers to be better learners.
With lawyers, advocacy has always been the first among equals in
the obligations that make up the relational agent role. The metaphor
of "adversary champion" has never explained all that lawyers do, but
unlike "boardroom facilitator,"ss broker,s9 "lawyer for the situation,"90 "transaction cost engineer,"91 "limited purpose friend"92 (at
least as modified by Alan Donegan),93 and the like, it has achieved a
central place in the ideology of the profession.94 It is the key element
a principal.
88 This is one way of describing the Model Rules' new image of lawyer role. I must
have learned the expression from someone, but I no longer remember from whom.
89 HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS & ORDINARY LITIGATION
12-19 (1990).
90 Louis Brandeis used this phrase during the confirmation hearings on his nomination
to be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to describe his role in the
Lennox case. See John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv.
683, 694-98 (1965). It has since become a stock item in the catalogue of lawyer role descriptions, so well known that it is often quoted without attribution.
91 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239,253-56 (1984).
92 See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1084 (1976).
93 See Alan Donegan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GooD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' RoLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 123, 130-33 (David Luban ed., 1983).
Donegan requires that a client's claims be "reasonably defensible" and the facts on which
they are based be "possibly true." /d. at 133. While there is every reason to believe that
Fried would accept these qualifications, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 179
(1978), he did not include them in his original discussion, and it is possible to read the
"Lawyer as Friend" article in more adversary champion terms. Even with these qualifications, the model of the lawyer as friend is a very adversary one. For highly critical responses to Fried's essay, see, for example, Dauer & Leff, supra note 31; William H. Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wise. L. REv.
29, 106-13.
94 David Luban has made a spirited, cogent and, for me, convincing "moral activist"
case for the irrationality of the adversary champion conception of lawyer role. See David
Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEo. WASH. L.
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in the mythic moral and political tale lawyers tell about themselves to
the outside world (probably because mythic tales are told about warriors, not merchants or bureaucrats), and such stories have a way of
becoming self-fulfilling. Of all of the metaphors used to describe lawyer role, it is the most prominent and the most enduring. It dominates
the way lawyers think about themselves and about how they should
act. 9 5 Legal educators may be able to refine or expand the conception
of adversary champion at the margins, but they are not likely to alter
it fundamentally, or remove it from its primacy of place, at least not as
long as litigation and its facsimiles remain the default alternatives for
resolving legal disputes.
Even a modest reform, such as making the ability to learn from
colleagues part of the repertoire of practice skills thought to define
professional competence, and teaching about this skill in the ·law
school curriculum, presents several difficulties. ·To begin with, it
would require law schools to expand the content .of a curriculum already overloaded with course subdivisions, or to insert new material
into existing courses already crammed to the brim with particular topics. Change of this sort is difficult at any time, wholly apart from the
subject matter added, but even more so when that subject matter
would require law teachers to develop new teaching materials from,
and become expert in, bodies of scholarship outside of law.
One might respond that law schools already teach about learning
from colleagues, so that any curricular changes, materials development, or faculty retooling would be minimal. I agree that law schools
already teach in this area, in the sense that they pervasively inculcate
REv. 955, 963-73 (1995). For a brief history of Luban's moral activism, see Robert J.
Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining, 51 Mo. L. REv. 1, 69 n.187 (1992). Irrationality notwithstanding, however, even
Luban does not expect this conception to be displaced any time soon. Such a conception
seems to serve fundamental aesthetic, ideological and psychological ends as much as systemic and instrumental ones. It is appealing to many, it seems, more because it is intrinsically satisfying than because it produces good social effects. Luban shows how it could not
pass a "good social effects" test. This means that arguments about its irrationality, and
even its dangers, are slightly off the mark, at least insofar as altering its "brute fact" status
is concerned.
95 It is easier to see this dominance in the way lawyers represent "persons in trouble,"
such as criminal defendants, than in their representation of persons who face only potential
and future trouble, such as settlors of estates, or makers of contracts. Nevertheless the
latter types of representation are also best understood as requiring a fidelity to client interests akin to that of the adversary champion.
The conception of adversary champion does not apply to mixed lawyer representational roles, such as "intermediary," now permitted under MoDEL RuLES OF PRoFEs.
SIONAL CoNover Rule 2.2 (1983), or to lawyers acting in non-representational capacities
such as mediator, arbitrator, or private judge. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 3, at 477-97 (discussing "complications" of mediator role). While the number of such roles is increasing,
most lawyers still function principally as relational agents.
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persuasion mode communication habits, but much of that present
teaching is problematic and sub rosa. It would need to be made explicit and examined critically, and a richer theoretical model of lawyer
learning would need to be adopted. Again, all of this is hard enough
under ideal conditions, where there is a consensus that the project is
worthwhile, and a commitment exists to carry it out. When it also
requires overcoming the institutional and personal interests that
caused the instruction to be kept sub rosa in the first instance, it becomes that much harder.
More importantly, students and faculty would need to be persuaded that being able to learn from colleagues is a valuable practice
skill, a skill that firms take into account when hiring and promoting,
for example, or that can be a factor in developing a professional reputation, or whose absence could be the basis of malpractice liability or
professional discipline. Otherwise, why should they study it? Given
the legal system's commitment to the adversary champion model,
claims such as these would be difficult to make convincing.
Certainly, the bar could make the skill valuable by including it in
a more nuanced formal definition of professional role, one based on
obligations of both advocacy and colleagueship, and making a failure
of either obligation a problem of professional competence. 96 But it has
not done this, and is not likely to. Such a definition would describe
law practice more accurately, but conceptions of role based on clashing metaphors have always been problematic. Such conceptions are
difficult to internalize as default rules because they are too complex,
requiring complicated "both hands" 97 type judgments which lawyers
(and perhaps people in general) do not like to make. We tend to have
recourse to role definition in a pinch, when it is supposed to help resolve dilemmas, not add new layers of difficulty to them. A dissonant
definition lacks the singlemindedness and clarity of purpose that make
such resolutions easy.98 I do not suggest that the effort to expand the
96 I have in mind a conception of lawyer role in which the duties of advocacy and colleagueship would be seen as co-equal, neither one being more important than the other,
and each being necessary. Present definitions of role permit lawyers to learn from one
another, but they do not make it mandatory, or as important as being an adversary champion. In my different view, it would be as grave a mistake to dominate a conversation
inappropriately and as a result not grasp a client's true wishes, for example, as it would be
to miss a filing deadline, or commingle funds. While this might modify the idea of adversary champion in a substantial way, it would not be as radical an alteration as is found in
the idea of lawyer as "intermediary," introduced by Model Rule 2.2. See MoDEL RuLES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNOver Rule 2.2 (1983). See also Stark, supra note 3, at 501 ("Mediation training is training against the dominant paradigm, and in certain respects, is subversive of values deemed fundamental in American legal culture.").
97 By this I mean judgments based on analysis which takes the form of "On the one
hand we should do this, but on the other we should do that."
98 These qualities of clarity and singlemindedness of purpose are also essential to moral
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profession's conception of role is hopeless, just that it is a roll against
the odds, so to speak.
As a practical matter, therefore, any response that law schools
make is likely not to be a broad institutional refocusing but rather an
effort by individual faculty members. Some will find the subject of
learning from colleagues intrinsically interesting and will want to accommodate their schedules to study and teach about it. This group
probably never will be large, however, because the incentive structure
of law school teaching does not contain many inducements for choosing this course. Student demand for such instruction is not likely to be
widespread, colleagues may see the subject as "soft," and practitioners
accustomed to the adversary champion model may dismiss instruction
in learning skills as a waste of time. 99 Each of these is a powerful
pressure, and collectively they can be overwhelming. Law schools
have an institutional interest in making such instruction available for
those who want it, but this interest probably will be served by the few
faculty members who choose to teach the subject for its own· sake.
Non-volunteers are not likely to be pressed into service.
Those who do choose this course must be careful not to indulge in
an excess of enthusiasm. Students should not be led to believe that
they must do a communicative about-face and become singleminded
learners where once they were singleminded advocates, or that they
must achieve some ideal learning state in which they never conceal,
never prejudge, and never compete. Learning skills do not replace
advocacy skills but work in tandem with them, and there is no evidence that anyone has ever become completely transparent, non-judgmental and non-competitive, even in the most trusting and nurturing
of relationships.
In addition, if the instruction is to be more than preaching to the
converted, law teachers will need to show students how learning from
colleagues is a useful skill, not just a morally or aesthetically attractive
one. Arguments from taste will work with true believers and disciples,
and political myth-making, whether the myth is based on a competitive or cooperative
conception of lawyer role. The alternative dispute resolution, feminist, and communitarian
literature is filled with attempts to define lawyer role in cooperative terms, but these definitions tend to be presented as alternatives, and not complements, to the adversary champion model. Advocates of cooperative lawyering often have little if anything good to say
about adversarial behavior, and respond to adversary "possessive individualism" with a
similarly sweeping assumption of the harmony of group and individual interests. In general, neither side in this debate seems to see itself as a corollary of the other. Neither
articulates an overarching conception of lawyer role large enough to include all aspects of
the work lawyers do, and all facets of a lawyer's complicated set of overlapping and contradictory duties.
99 See Stark, supra note 3, at 476 ("relevance of 'communication facilitation' to many
legal practitioners is [not] clear").
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but neither group is likely to be large. 100 Students will not be more
direct, candid, and cooperative in colleague relationships until they
are convinced that it will not cause them to appear weak, fragile, or
naive, or hinder their advancement in practice. Legal academics sometimes dismiss such careerist concerns as ignoble, but they are real concerns of students nonetheless, and instructional programs which
ignore them have a way a being dismissed themselves.
Part of the way in which these concerns can be addressed is to
show students how little cost there usually is in expressing what is
truly on their minds. In almost all of the cases set out in Part III students would have been more impressive (their stated goal) if they
could have expressed their underlying thoughts and feelings instead of
much of what appears in their dialogue. This would be uniformly true
if one added the additional condition that they edit their underlying
thoughts and feelings one more time before expressing them (which
they would do if the thoughts and feelings had to be expressed).
Students frequently held to the not perfectly compatible beliefs
that their own successes were attributable to their ability to bluff, dissemble, argue, and the like, but that when others did these things they
had little positive effect, and were always obvious. Students seemed
not to extrapolate from the fact that they detected such behavior in
others to the fact that others detected it in them, or from the fact that
such behavior did not impress them to the fact that it did not impress
others either. Consistently, they made themselves the exceptional
case and did not realize that they were doing this. It was a major
breakthrough for many when they considered, often for the first time,
that many of their achievements had come in spite, rather than because, of some of the things they did.
It also will help to show students that learning from others is not
an innate and unteachable ability, but rather has a skill dimension that
can be studied, acquired and internalized as disposition. 101 This
means that teachers must be able to describe learning skills in behavioral terms, show how they can be practiced, predict the stages
through which their development will proceed, and give students realistic standards of what can be accomplished, and how quickly. Learning to learn is like any other subject. One must be able to specify
what is to be learned, and measure when learning has taken place. 102
100 No argument will be necessary for those who already believe that "the life which is
unexamined is not worth living." See 3 THE DIALOGUES oF PLATO 129 (Benjamin Jowett
trans., National Library).
101 But see Stark, supra note 3, at 494-96 ("the jury is still out on the question of whether
and to what degree [interpersonal] skills can be taught, at least to adults").
102 This is not a suggestion that work is all technique, or that career success is defined
solely by technical accomplishment. I believe that the politics and morality of work
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Some students may need to be cautioned against trying to do too
much rather than too little. For example, it is best to practice new
learning skills one at a time, at the margins, rather than all at once, as
part of a complete personality makeover. The latter is destined to fail,
and thus is an unfair test of whether the new skills can be learned. It
also is necessary to think carefully about where and when to practice
such skills, choosing situations in which supervisors understand, or are
at least sympathetic to, what one is trying to do, and client interests
are adequately protected. Students are not likely to act in ways that
will call undue attention to themselves, or jeopardize their reputations
for being good adversary champions, and there is nothing wrong with
this. We all define ourselves in terms of the "coordinates on the map"
of our social and work situations. Students are no different from anyone else in this regard. Learning new skills is a time-consuming, incremental, halting, and somewhat serendipitous process, a process of
slow change over time that students should be encouraged to get into
for the long haul. That is the only way lasting progress will be made.
C.

Can the Problems of Persuasion Mode Communication Be
Addressed in Externships?

The foregoing cases raise serious questions about the kinds of lessons students may learn ecologically if they enter their extemship settings with no accompanying academic examination of what they are
experiencing. Yet externships also provide distinctive practice experiences too important to waste. Among other things, these include opportunities to work on out-of-the-ordinary substantive law problems
(those presented by the song-writer contract in Case Four, for example), to confront low visibility lawyer-client conflicts of interest not
policed effectively by formal ethics rules (such as the tension between
doing what is necessary to get a job offer and what is necessary to
protect the client's interests in Case Eight), and to study the effect of
money, status and power on the conduct of adversary advocacy (for
instance, in the deposition sparring between· rival lawyers in Case
Two ). 103 Each of these opportunities has its counterpart or approxichoices ultimately have a closer relationship to career satisfaction than technical accomplishment does, though sometimes this is not realized until later in life. But it does not
follow, as many seem to think, that in subjects seen as inherently fuzzy and soft (such as
learning to learn), technique is unimportant, or cannot be described. Accepting this view is
often a way of dismissing the subjects as unimportant or not capable of being learned.
Learning from colleagues has a skill dimension, notwithstanding that it is ultimately about
much more than being skillful, and developing this skill is an important step in moving
toward a more complicated understanding of the process.
103 For a more extensive discussion of the benefits of externship instruction, see Condlin,
supra note 3, at 63-73; Maher, supra note 11, at 544-47, 562-73.
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mation in the in-house clinic, of course, but extemships provide the
chance to work on the problems in their post-law school form, under
real time and money constraints, where fewer extrapolations and
leaps of faith are required for the lessons to be transferred. Externships do not substitute for the in-house clinic, but they do complement
it.
There are two principal quality controJ problems with extemship
instruction. First, it is difficult for extemship students to know quickly
when they are just practicing mistakes. Supervision is not as continuous as it is in the in-house clinic (the outside supervisor is also a fulltime practitioner with other responsibilities), and a great deal of time
can pass before mistakes come to light. Second, extemship students
have a greater tendency to accept supervisor (practitioner) advice uncritically, as received wisdom, than do clinic students. There is no
ethos of listening critically, as there is in the clinic, and it is awkward
for supervisors to try to prevent this from happening by intentionally
criticizing their own actions.lo4
Many remedies have been suggested for these problems. 1 os The
most popular, and the one adopted by the ABA in its accreditation
standards, tries to solve the problems by requiring a stronger law
faculty presence in the extemship office. It specifies, among other
things, how often faculty members must meet with outside supervisors, review student work, and even make site visits to the outside
office during the semester. 106 This remedy seems to operate on the
premise that extemships will be effective to the extent that they can
be made to resemble in-house clinics.
Many have questioned the wisdom of so procrustean an approach, arguing that there are effective and manageable methods for
incorporating a critical perspective into extemship practice which also
preserve that format's distinctive identity as "outside" instruction.1°7
These criticisms make sense. It is true that extemship students need a
critical perspective, and true as well that law teachers are well positioned to help them achieve this, but law schools do not need to bring
104 See page 434 infra. For a more extensive discussion of the weaknesses of the externship format, see Maher, supra note 11, at 576-97.
105 See, e.g., Givelber et a!., supra note 13, at 43-48; Maher, supra note 11, at 598-605;
Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 446-51.
106 See AcCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 40, Standard 306(c), Interpretation 2.
For discussions of the Standard (including Interpretation 2) in its various drafts, see
Givelber et a!., supra note 13, at 45-48; Maher, supra note 11, at 622-30; Seibel & Morton,
supra note 2, at 440-51. For a history of ABA regulation of externships, see MACCRATE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 105-13. For a discussion of the less stringent Association of
American Law Schools standard, see Seibel & Morton, supra, at 439 n.56. ·
· !07 See Givelber eta!., supra note 13, at 46-47; Maher, supra note 11, at 623-25; Seibel &
Morton, supra note 2, at 443-46.
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all clinical work in-house, or send their clinicians into externship practice settings, to pursue this goal.
Instead, law teachers need two types of information to review student practice experience critically: student conclusions about what
they learned from the experiences, and trustworthy and detailed descriptions of what the students did. Student conclusions about what
they learned are actually working hypotheses about lawyer skill practice, which teachers and students analyze, refine, and eventually adopt
in the course of their conversations. Detailed factual descriptions of
what the students did are the independent data bases from which
teachers and students evaluate the wisdom of their conclusions. Testing analysis against empirical evidence in this fashion is the heart of
what critical review is all about. It does not matter so much where,
when, or how often teachers and students meet, as it does that their
analysis and evidence be on the table in an accurate and testable form
when they do. Distance from the actions under study may even improve analysis. Defensiveness and emotional commitments often subside with time, and interest in understanding what happened, and why,
often increases.
Student conclusions about what they learned from their
experiences are available to direct supervisors and law teachers alike,
but the actual supervisors usually know a lot more about what the
students did. Either they were present when the work was done and
observed it directly, or they are able to read more into after-the-fact
reports because of what they know about the situations and parties
involved. Moving law teachers into outside offices is one way to reduce this difference, and moving the law office into the law school
(that is, creating an in-house clinic) is another. But these are not the
only solutions, or even necessarily the best.
The case study device described in this Article, for example, provides a way to overcome this information gap in large measure, and
thus to enable the student to have the benefit not only of the input of
her or his direct supervisor but also of a well-informed academic interpreter.108 It is logistically less cumbersome and less intrusive than
moving teachers or offices between the law school and the world of
practice. Moreover, it provides rich data about student practice behavior, data that are hard for students to ignore, avoid, or dismiss when
post hoc analysis turns up problems they did not foresee. Case studies
are produced before students know what they want them to show, in a
108 While the case studies used here focused on the particular issue of learning from
colleagues, there are other comparable sources of information from which academic externship teachers can study additional aspects of students' work. These include court and
deposition transcripts, office records, and the like.
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kind of clinical "original position," so that once self-interest becomes
clear, it is hardly credible to deny that they are accurate.
Aside from the issue of self-interest, it also is important to recognize the distinct benefits of analysis based on some memorialization of
the students' practice experiences. Memorializations separate the process of figuring out what happened from the process of figuring out
what it means, to both processes' advantage. Such written records provide a common data base on which to ground analysis so that
everyone works on the same problem. They are more detailed than
conversational recollections, allowing for more finely grained analyses, and they do not change, so that interpretations may be refined
many times over before becoming final.
In externships, case studies are to the study of practice experience
what case opinions are to the study of legal doctrine. Without them,
clinical supervision would be roughly akin to studying doctrine on the
basis of student and teacher recollections of what a court said. It is
possible to make progress in this way, but difficult. In-house clinical
teaching often relies on such joint, unwritten recollections. One result
may be that in supervision sessions in the in-house clinics, more attention will be devoted to what happened, as opposed to what was meant
to happen and why, than in externship teaching. This is especially
likely because such factual disputes are intellectually and emotionally
safer than disputes over what would have worked best. They are safer
because they they are less conclusive (and therefore less productive),
since often there is no dispositive way to break evidentiary ties over
whose memory is better, or whose observations were more accurate.
Arguments over theory have winners and losers.
Moreover, even a poorly prepared case reveals a student's tacit
theories about effective performance and provides a basis for critical
supervisor review. For example, students may regularly choose easy
or unambitious problems, report underlying thoughts and feelings in
platitudinous terms, or consistently present cases in which their work
is not substantially involved. These patterns can become data in their
own right, about the students' (lack of) readiness to analyze their
practice experiences, data which teachers may use to raise issues of
their own. 1o9
This kind of intervention, however, should probably happen only
in rare cases-and in the externship setting, the choice not to probe is
one the teacher can safely make. As a rule, questions of what topics to
109 Case studies which seem too simple, or too good to be true, can be checked for
accuracy with the others involved, but the decision of when this is to be done should be left
to law teachers to make on an individual basis, and not be required across the board in
accreditation standards.

HeinOnline -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 433 1996-1997

434

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:337

take up are better left to students. They know what they are interested in; and what they are· prepared to confront. The freedom to set
the agenda in this fashion is not as available in the in-house clinic,
wbere students have more unilateral responsibility for client interests,
and the agenda of supervisory discussions is dictated more by events
in the cases than by student and teacher interests. One of the advantages of externship instruction is that it permits students and teachers
to work on selected practic~ issues in depth, rather than on all issues
raised by the students' casework. This is possible precisely because
outside supervisors relieve students of the unilateral responsibility for
insuring that client interests are adequately protected.
Finally, it is important to recognize that externships provide a
congenial setting for studying the particular skill with which this Article is concerned, namely the process of learning from colleagues. In
externship instruction, at least when case studies of the sort presented
here are made part of the course, law faculty supervisors are freer
than practitioner-supervisors to discuss student-supervisor interaction
because it is not their behavior under review .. Faculty are less likely to
be defensive about, or protective of, actions taken or statements made
in conversations between the students and their direct supervisors,
and less likely to rule out discussion of sensitive topics on principle, or
otherwise. This is not a special quality of law faculty supervisors. If
the situations were reversed, and faculty discussion with students was
under review, practitioner-supervisors would have this advantage. It
is easier to analyze without qualification and remorse when the subject of the analysis is not personally threatening. 11 o
CoNCLUSION

Historically, legal education has been about the study of law, its
content, nature and effects, the interests it serves, and the extent to
which it embodies and effectuates the principles and policies of our
societal commitments. 111 The principal goal in this study has always
been intellectual understanding, and the only skills directly implicated
have been those of reasoning and research. Other lawyer practice
skills, relevant to the study of whether the legal system (through lawyers) delivers on what law promises, have not been directly in-.
110 See Condlin, supra note 3, at 53-54 (describing difficulties of being both qata and
critic). Accord Seibel & Morton, supra note 2, at 417-18. For another illustration of the
use of a tripartite method of clinical supervision, this time in the context of an in-house
clinical program, see Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 64-87.
.
.
111 In a Langdellian legal universe, where law was discovered not made, legal education
was concerned more with the content than the nature or effects of law (though, not surprisingly, discovered law usually reflected prevailing beliefs about desirable effects). But the
history of legal education, taken as a whole, reflects all of these concerns.
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volved. 112 Because of this, changes in the content of legal education
typically have resulted from new injections of theory, that is, from
closer looks at legal rules, policies, institutions, and systems in light of
critical perspectives grounded in reasonably well worked out descriptive and normative theories borrowed from other mature bodies of
thought. 113
Clinical legal instruction, on the other hand, has generally approached the task of law curriculum reform from the opposite direction. Although there have been and continue to be notable
exceptions, overall clinical education has been concerned more with
refining practice and pedagogical technique than legal rules and policies, more with improving individual lawyer behavior than legal institutions and systems, and more with achieving technical and
instrumental success than justice.l 14 It has been more of a bottom-up
than top-down reform, and this has always made it somewhat of an
ugly duckling in the law school world.
For this and other reasons, modern clinical educators have joined
112 See Costonis, supra note 1, at 164 n.28, 194. Other reasons for this inattention to
most lawyering skills have to do with the short time frame of legal education, the difficulty
of acquiring legal analytical skills themselves, the high teacher-student ratios in law schools
{which dictate large classes and make graduate school, or mentor-like, instruction impossible), the fact that the best practitioners cannot be convinced to join law faculties because
they would lose too much income, and the like. Accord Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical
Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 Cl.IN. L. REv. 93, 108 {1994). The salary problem is not a
new one. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 at 172 {1986) {Thurman Arnold explaining to Jerome Frank in 1933 that they could not get practitioners to
join the Yale faculty because they were "making too much money"). All of these factors
have appeared to dictate, in Dean Costonis' words, that "[I]egal education's comparative
instructional advantage over law practice lies in doctrinal and general-education instruction, not in skills training." Costonis, supra, at 194.
113 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Condlin, supra note 16, at 2-9.
114 I do not suggest that justice and individual instrumental success are unrelated, but
just that the connection between the two is not self-evident, or one-for-one, and needs to
be made explicit in clinical scholarship and instruction. This is not always done. Instrumental thinking can be sophisticated, interesting, and great fun to read, see Amsterdam,
supra note 4 (explicating ends-means thinking). Moreover, it sometimes has heuristic effects, provoking ideas about new and better ways of doing things, and so it can also play a
central role in improving our understanding and design of skill practices generally.
But it is also essential that clinical education focus directly on developing "new and
better ways" of doing things, and on exploring the background propositions of theory that
are essential to conceiving or refining such reforms. Accord Phoebe A. Haddon, Education
for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REv. 573, 577-82 (1994) (arguing that
skills study must be structured to include "serious reflection on how legal education can
better contribute to the profession's conception of its public responsibility"). Without a
reformist dimension, the study of instrumental technique, no matter how highly developed,
is just motor-skill training. While such training can sustain an individual scholarly and
instructional life, a discipline· needs basic theory on which to ground such puzzle-solving
discussions. For clinical legal education that ultimately means a theory of justice, for it is
justice that we seek, or should seek, with the techniques we develop and teach.
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in the turn to theory, and have come to explain and defend their programs more in terms of their intellectual rigor than their practical benefits. Clinical law teachers have sought to establish that they adhere
to the same standards and use the same methods of analytical inquiry
as traditional law teachers, and that they are motivated by the same
kinds of intellectual values and goals. The proof for these claims is to
be found in the designs of clinical programs, designs which are topheavy with opportunities for "critical reflection." The "mantra" of
clinical pedagogy, as Abbe Smith put it, became "reflect, reflect,
reflect. " 115
Reflection is important, and designing programs to provide opportunities for it is important too. But it is also important not to approach the challenge of program design in a narrow way.
Unfortunately, certain program formats (notably, in-house clinics)
have come to be thought of by many as intrinsically superior to others
(in particular, externships), while other formats (here I am thinking of
simulation-based programs) have come to be thought of by many as
not sufficiently clinical. The emphasis on design has shifted clinical
education's substantive focus somewhat from the content of instruction to its format, and this shift creates the danger that form will be
privileged over substance. Not everyone preoccupied with program
design privileges form over substance, of course, but the ABA may be
among those that do, and if so, this is unfortunate. 116
There is no magic programmatic bullet for guaranteeing the effectiveness of clinical (or any other kind of) instruction. Student practice
must be monitored to be sure, but this does not mean that law faculty
supervisors necessarily must be responsible for reviewing all student
lawyering decisions, or that externship offices must be made to look
like in-house clinics. 117 It means only that students cannot be permitSee Smith, supra note 3, at 728.
The ABA is such a difficult concept to operationalize. I have in mind here mostly
things like Accreditation Standard 306(c), see note 106 supra, and the Macerate Report,
see note 1 supra. The problem with such documents is that they are drafted by or for
committees, and as a result, tend to include something for everyone. They are hard to pin
down to single positions because there is always something that goes the other way,
whatever the other way is. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 16, at 2 n.16 (discussing the MacCrate Report's having it both ways on the issue of whether it is intended as an accreditation standard). I do not have any direct experience with ABA programmatic rigidity in
reviewing externship offerings, though like everyone else I have heard stories, but I have
experienced the in terrorem effect that a concern about such rigidity can have on a law
faculty, and the crazy things it can cause a faculty to consider, and sometimes do.
117 Indeed, I am inclined not to favor training extemship practice supervisors to supervise in more academic fashion. But cf Cole, supra note 26. In my view, externship offices
should not change in any way to accommodate law students, since they already represent
post-law school practice settings accurately. Extemship students should enter such offices
without a ripple, so to speak, just as other law clerks do. In this way, externships will not
115
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ted to practice in an uncritical, unself-conscious fashion, internalizing
questionable habits, beliefs, and values, without knowing that they are
doing so. The key to preventing unself-conscious socialization, however, does not have to do with how often, or where, or about what
topics students and teachers meet, but what they say to one another,
and on the basis of what data, when they do. The content of conversation is everything in clinical (or any other kind of) instruction. There
is no design or structural protection against bad conversation, and no
design or structural morass that good conversation cannot transcend
and transform. Clinical teaching is successful to the extent it helps
students think about their practice experiences "from the standpoint
of somebody else"; 118 to the extent it helps them step outside their
beliefs, expectations, hopes, and assumptions, and see their own behavior as data like all other data, and themselves as subjects like all
other subjects. Any instructional format which produces this result,
under whatever conditions, in whatever settings, produces reflective,
distort law practice experience in the process of providing it.
118 The phrase is Hannah Arendt's. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM
49 (1963). For an extended and sympathetic discussion of the idea, and the Kantian framework from which it is derived, see Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 60-62. Seeing
things from another's perspective is a difficult task under the best of circumstances, and
sometimes not possible even then, as the psychological and anthropological literature on
participant observation makes clear. See, e.g., CHRIS ARGYRIS, BEHIND THE FRONT PAGE
110-52 (1974) (describing difficulties encountered by newspaper editors trying to learn,
with the help of a psychologist, how to interpret one another's communications accurately
while discussing editorial policy decisions); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FUR·
THER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 55-70 {1983) (diSCUSSing the "nature Of
anthropological understanding"); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR 14-16, 145-46 (1988) {discussing process of "authorial self-inspection"); GEORGE W. STOCKING, JR., OBSERVERS OBSERVED: ESSAYS ON ETHNOGRAPHIC
FIELDWORK 128-30, 137-39 {1983) (discussing ethnographic interrogation). Sometimes, to
paraphrase Henry Friendly who had a very different situation in mind, seeing practice experience from the standpoint of somebody else may even require a student to "determine
what [the supervisor] would think the [student] would think on an issue about which
neither has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 {2d Cir. 1960).
The need to see matters from another's perspective is a recurrent issue in lawyers'
work. Trying to deduce legislative or framers' intent in doing statutory or constitutional
interpretation presents a group facsimile of this problem. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 83.
The problem also arises in legal negotiation, where bargainers must understand one another's perspectives before making and accepting offers. The negotiation literature has not
yet come to grips with the difficulty of this process, and has characteristically opted instead
for a set of interpretive rules of thumb, which do little more than exhort bargainers to
avoid over-interpretation and be careful about projection. See Condlin, supra note 94, at
23. For a recent example, see ROGER FISHER, ELIZABETH KOPELMAN, & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT 19-66
(1994).
Ultimately, this task embodies a variation of analytic philosophy's "other minds"
problem, see, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, WHAT DoEs IT ALL MEAN 19-27 (1987) (discussing
"other minds" problem), and the related problem of understanding the "subjective character of experience." See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QuESTIONS 166-75 (1979).
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critical practice, and reflective, critical practice is the necessary and
sufficient condition of .ecological learning. 119 The ABA, and clinical
educators generally, should acknowledge this fact and let a thousand
flowers bloom. They should also see to it that the flowers are well
tended.

119 There are lots of other purposes for clinical instruction, of course, the most prominent of which is simple technique development. (I have in mind here the internalization of
question-asking repertoires, argument moves and maneuvers, investigation strategies, and
the like.) But the essential elements of technique are taught best in simulation exercises,
where students can repeat tasks over and over until they have them under control. Live
practice is distinctive for the opportunities it presents to study the political, moral, and
social dimensions of practice skill. It is somewhat of a waste to use it to teach just technique. This is true notwithstanding that using practice skills in real life situations and relationships is the final stage in the development of technique.
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